Adversarial REA
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| analyze_binaryC | Extract binary metadata, symbols, strings, and security info from a target |
| get_symbolsC | Extract symbols (functions, imports, exports) from binary |
| get_stringsC | Extract and classify strings from binary (credentials, URLs, paths, etc.) |
| check_securityA | Check binary security mitigations (PIE, NX, canary, RELRO, FORTIFY) |
| disassembleC | Disassemble binary or specific function |
| get_sectionsB | List binary sections with sizes and attributes |
| get_headersC | Extract binary headers (architecture, entry point, etc.) |
| find_dangerous_patternsC | List unverified imports, strings, and mitigation signals for manual review |
| trace_callsC | Observed direct native call instructions; flow and exploitability remain unknown |
| inspect_carrierC | Bounded file/container metadata only; does not claim vulnerability analysis |
| inspect_flow_fixtureC | Reproduce in-memory flow in a bounded .flow.json fixture only; not native evidence |
| find_gadget_candidatesC | Byte-verified ELF64 x86_64 gadget candidates, not runtime exploit addresses |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 12 tools
Most tools target distinct analysis aspects, but analyze_binary is a broad superset that overlaps heavily with get_symbols, get_strings, check_security, get_sections, and get_headers. find_dangerous_patterns also duplicates parts of the string/security tools, so an agent may hesitate between aggregate and granular calls.
The names are consistently snake_case and mostly follow a verb_noun pattern (get_symbols, check_security, find_gadget_candidates, inspect_carrier). The bare verb 'disassemble' is a minor deviation, but the overall convention is predictable and readable.
Twelve tools is well within the expected range for a binary analysis server and appears appropriately scoped. Each tool maps to a recognizable analysis capability, even if some outputs overlap.
The surface covers core static binary analysis: metadata, headers, sections, symbols, strings, security mitigations, disassembly, calls, gadgets, and some containment/fixture inspection. Minor gaps remain, such as explicit cross-reference or call-graph analysis and byte-pattern search, but most workflows have an available path.