create_control_attestation

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries full burden. It explains that each obligation is pinned to its current version and integrity hash at signing time, and that the record is tamper-evident. However, it does not disclose potential side effects, storage behavior, or retrieval mechanisms beyond what is implied.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is two sentences plus a brief note, all front-loaded. First sentence gives the main action, second adds detail, third provides contrast. No fluff or redundancy.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

Given no output schema, the description does not explain return values, success/failure indicators, or how to retrieve the created attestation. It also omits guidance on handling the max 50 nodes constraint. While the purpose is clear, missing return information reduces completeness for a tool with 9 parameters.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds context for the overall purpose but does not significantly augment the parameter descriptions (e.g., it repeats the api_key requirement already in schema). No additional semantics are provided for individual parameters.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description clearly states the tool signs a tamper-evident record of a control/policy and its mapped obligation nodes. It explicitly contrasts design-side evidence with operating-side evidence (run receipts), distinguishing it from sibling tools like record_run_entry.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description indicates when to use (for design-side evidence) and contrasts with run receipts, implying when not to use. It also mentions the requirement for a Bidda subscription key. However, it does not explicitly list alternative tools or conditions for avoidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.