fsguard-mcp
Provides tools for interacting with Git repositories, including initializing repositories, checking status, staging files, creating commits, generating diffs, and viewing commit history.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@fsguard-mcp show me the git status and recent commits"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
fsguard-mcp
A filesystem + git MCP server that confines every operation to an allowed directory tree using symlink-resolved path containment, not string prefix matching.
Why this exists
Anthropic's own official filesystem and git MCP servers (@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem, part of modelcontextprotocol/servers, 89.7k★) have carried five separate path-confinement CVEs across two servers in ten months, and the pattern is still active:
CVE-2025-53109 / CVE-2025-53110 (filesystem, CVSS 8.4/7.3) — the "allowed directory" check used naive
startsWith()prefix matching, defeated by symlinks and by sibling directories that merely share a string prefix (e.g. an allowed/home/user-safealso matches/home/user-safe-evil), giving filesystem-wide read/write and a documented RCE path.CVE-2025-68143 / CVE-2025-68144 / CVE-2025-68145 (git) —
git_initaccepted arbitrary unvalidated paths,git_diff/git_checkoutpassed user-controlled arguments straight to thegitCLI (argument injection), and--repository-confined mode didn't actually verifyrepo_pathstayed inside the confined directory.CVE-2026-27735 (git, disclosed ~2 months before this project started) —
git_add, implemented via GitPython'srepo.index.add(), doesn't enforce working-tree boundaries for../-style paths, allowing staging and exfiltrating files outside the repo.A documented RCE chain:
git_initin a writable directory → a malicious.git/configwith a "clean" filter → a.gitattributesthat applies it →git_addtriggers the filter → arbitrary shell command runs.
Every one of these was patched with another string/prefix check bolted onto that one function. Nobody moved the boundary enforcement to a place a new tool can't simply forget to include — which is exactly how the fourth CVE landed four months after the first three were "fixed."
Related MCP server: Secure Local Workspace MCP
How fsguard-mcp is different
One safety primitive, used everywhere. Every tool — filesystem or git — resolves its target path through the same
ConfinedRoot(seeconfined_path.py) before doing anything else. There's no per-tool path check to forget.Symlink-resolved, component-based containment — not string matching. A path is only inside the root if its fully resolved real path (every symlink followed) is a real ancestor-relative subpath of the root's own resolved real path, checked with
Path.is_relative_to()on resolved paths — neverstartswith()on a string. This alone closes CVE-2025-53109/53110's exact failure mode:/allowed-evilcannot pass a containment check against a resolved root of/allowed, because path-component comparison isn't string-prefix comparison.No shelling out to
gitfor content, ever. Git operations run throughdulwich— a pure-Python git implementation with no subprocess and no argv built from user input for anything content-related, and (critically) no clean/smudge filter execution, which is what the documented RCE chain depends on. There is no argument-injection surface here because there's no argument list being handed to an external process for reading/writing file content. (dulwich does still runpre-commit/commit-msg/post-commithooks viasubprocess.call()if they exist — real process execution, unrelated to content filtering.git_commitalways passesno_verify=Trueto skip them categorically, rather than relying on them happening not to be runnable.)Write operations validate the parent directory too, not just an existing target — closing the class of bug where a target doesn't exist yet (so "does this path resolve inside the root" was checked against a path that doesn't exist, and therefore couldn't be symlink-resolved) but its parent directory is itself a symlink pointing outside. Non-existent path segments are lexically normalized (
./..collapsed as pure path algebra) before any of this, independent of what happens to exist on disk — an earlier version of this project checked containment before normalizing, which happened to pass all its tests on Windows (whose path APIs normalize..for you) while being bypassable on Linux/macOS. It's fixed now, and there are tests for the exact case, but it's the reason this project treats "the test suite is green on my machine" with real suspicion..git/configcan't redirect operations outside the root. dulwich honors a repo's owncore.worktreeconfig entry, and every git operation re-opens aRepofrom a path string internally — so a caller could write a.git/configwithcore.worktreepointing anywhere, and every subsequent git tool would silently operate outside the confined root, invisible to the per-path check (which only ever sees the confined repo directory, never wherever dulwich actually redirected itself to). This was found in this project's own second-round security review — a real read/exfiltration primitive using nothing but this server's own exposed tools, more severe than any CVE it was built to fix. Every git tool now refuses to open a repo whose config setscore.worktreeat all, and independently re-verifies that theRepoobject it actually opened reports its working path as the exact directory that was validated.UNC paths and cross-drive paths are rejected before touching the network or disk at all. Resolving a
\\host\share\...path makes Windows actually attempt an SMB connection — and Windows will try to authenticate that connection as the server process, which is the "forced NTLM auth via UNC path" credential-theft technique, on top of blocking the server for a full connection timeout against an unreachable host. A candidate anchored on a different drive or host than the confined root is now rejected by a cheap string comparison, before any filesystem or network call. NTFS Alternate Data Streams (file.txt:hidden) are also rejected outright — they're invisible to directory listings but fully readable/writable through the same path string, and can forge the absence of Windows' download-warning "Mark of the Web."
Tools
Tool | Does |
| Read a text file |
| Create or overwrite a text file |
| List a directory's entries |
| Find files matching a glob pattern, recursively |
| Move/rename a file |
| Initialize a git repository |
| Staged/unstaged/untracked files |
| Stage files |
| Commit staged changes |
| Show a diff |
| Show commit history |
Setup
pip install fsguard-mcp
export FSGUARD_ROOT="/path/to/the/one/directory/tree/this/server/may/touch"
fsguard-mcpFSGUARD_ROOT is required — there is no default, and the server refuses to guess one. Point your MCP client at the fsguard-mcp command with FSGUARD_ROOT set in its env config.
Testing
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest tests/ -vAll 68 tests are self-contained (real temp directories, real symlinks, real git repos) — no external services needed.
Known limitation
Containment is checked, then a filesystem operation runs — there is an inherent TOCTOU (time-of-check-to-time-of-use) gap between the two. A concurrent process with write access to the confined root's own tree could in principle swap a symlink in that window (verified with a working proof-of-concept during review). Closing this fully needs an OS-level primitive (e.g. Linux openat2(RESOLVE_BENEATH), a real mount namespace) rather than anything achievable in portable Python; this project's guarantee is "correct containment logic, checked immediately before use," not "immune to a concurrent attacker who can already write inside the root."
Status
v0.1.0, live on PyPI. 68 passing tests (unit-level, with real symlinks and real git repos created on disk — not just string-logic assertions). Went through two rounds of adversarial security review before its first commit; both found real, working bypasses (a ..-traversal escape through not-yet-existing paths on POSIX, and the core.worktree redirection above, among smaller findings) that are now fixed, covered by tests written directly against the reported exploit, and re-verified against a fresh pip install of the published package.
License
MIT
Available Tools
11 toolsfs_listA
List the entries of a directory, each tagged file or directory.
Inputs: path.
fs_moveA
Move or rename a file/directory. Both source and destination must resolve within FSGUARD_ROOT. If destination already exists as a file, it is overwritten. If destination already exists as a directory, the call fails instead of moving source inside it.
Inputs: source (required), destination (required).
fs_readA
Read a text file's contents. path is relative to FSGUARD_ROOT.
Inputs: path (required).
fs_searchA
Find files matching a glob pattern (e.g. '*.py') under path, recursively. Any match that resolves outside FSGUARD_ROOT — e.g. via a symlink — is silently excluded rather than reported.
Inputs: pattern (required), path.
fs_writeA
Write (creating or overwriting) a text file. Parent directories are created as needed, but only within FSGUARD_ROOT.
Inputs: path (required), content (required).
git_commit_repoC
Commit staged changes. author must be 'Name '.
Inputs: author (required), message (required), repo_path (required).
git_diff_repoC
Show the diff for a repo's working tree (or staged changes).
Inputs: staged, repo_path.
git_init_repoA
Initialize a new git repository at repo_path (relative to FSGUARD_ROOT).
Inputs: repo_path (required).
git_log_repoC
Show recent commit history.
Inputs: repo_path, max_entries.
git_repo_statusB
Show staged, unstaged, and untracked files for a repo.
Inputs: repo_path.
git_stageA
Stage files for commit. Every path is validated against FSGUARD_ROOT before being staged — a path that would escape the root fails the whole call, staging nothing.
Inputs: paths (required), repo_path (required).
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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TDQS
Scored across 11 tools
Each tool targets a distinct operation: file read, write, list, search, move; git init, status, stage, commit, diff, log. There is no overlap or ambiguity between tools, enabling reliable selection.
The naming follows a consistent fs_/git_ prefix pattern with action-oriented verbs. Minor deviation like 'git_repo_status' vs 'git_stage' (noun-verb vs verb-only) creates slight inconsistency but remains predictable.
11 tools cover file system and git operations without redundancy. The scope is well-balanced—enough to handle common workflows without overwhelming the agent.
The file system layer includes create, read, update, list, search, and move, but lacks a delete operation, which is a notable gap. Git coverage is solid for basic workflows but omits branch operations. Overall, a reasonable surface for the intended guarded-root use case.
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