cloud-pathfinder
Enables integration with GitHub code scanning by outputting SARIF reports, showing attack chains inline on pull requests.
Supports Helm charts as input for attack path analysis across resources and relationships.
Analyzes Kubernetes manifests for exposure via LoadBalancer/NodePort services, privileged pods, cluster-admin ServiceAccounts, and mounted secrets.
Analyzes OpenTofu configurations for attack paths, similar to Terraform support, detecting multi-hop chains to sensitive resources.
Analyzes Pulumi programs (TypeScript and Python) for attack paths, enabling auditing before deployment.
Analyzes Terraform configurations for multi-hop attack paths from the public internet to crown jewels, such as data stores and secrets.
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@cloud-pathfinder audit main.tf and k8s.yaml for internet to admin attack paths"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
cloud-pathfinder π°οΈ
Attack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code β Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM.
Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.
Example chain it finds:
open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) β EC2 instance-profile role β iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin β S3 exfiltration
Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).
π Privacy & data model (read this first)
Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive β so here is exactly what happens:
Your IaC is never stored and never logged. Every audit runs in memory on the hosted service and is discarded when the response is sent. No database of your templates, no retention, no analytics on file contents.
What is sent: only the IaC text you pass (the
filesmap orsourceblob). Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials β cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the declared templates only.Free tier vs deep tier β both run server-side, here's why and what differs:
The thin npm client ships zero analysis logic (no graph engine, no IAM privesc knowledge base). It is a pure HTTP caller. So even the free verdict + counts are computed on the hosted service, then your IaC is dropped. This is the honest tradeoff that keeps the moat off your machine β we say so plainly rather than claim a fake "100% local" mode.
Deep analysis is strictly opt-in (
deep: true, behind payment). Only then are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the same IaC either way β nothing extra leaves your machine for the deep tier.
Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app β all analysis runs server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.
Related MCP server: aegis
β‘ How it works (30 seconds)
Your MCP agent calls
audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.The thin client POSTs the IaC text to
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.The hosted engine builds a typed resource graph, runs a BFS from an
INTERNETnode to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM privilege-escalation reachability along each hop β in memory.The IaC is discarded; nothing is persisted.
The deep tier returns every full chain with per-hop
file:lineevidence; the free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.
The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller β so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.
π Why this isn't a linter (and why a local one can't replace it)
A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect β work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:
Capability | Local linter | cloud-pathfinder |
Flag one open SG / one broad role | β | β |
Graph β which SG attaches to which instance, which role it assumes, what it reads | β | β |
Reachability BFS internet β crown jewel, full multi-hop chain + file:line | β | β |
IAM privilege-escalation KB (20+ primitives: PassRole, CreatePolicyVersionβ¦) | β | β |
Multi-cloud β AWS / GCP / Azure in one graph | β | β |
Choke-point analysis (the one hop that, fixed, cuts the most paths) | β | β |
Diff mode β what a PR INTRODUCES / ELIMINATES / AGGRAVATES | β | β |
Kubernetes LB/NodePort β privileged pod β cluster-admin SA β Secret | β | β |
SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (inline chains on the Security tab) | β | β |
π Graph, not lint. Builds a typed resource graph and resolves the real relationships across files and clouds.
π§ Reachability search. BFS from
INTERNETto every data store / secret / admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.π IAM privilege-escalation knowledge base. Knows AWS managed-policy permissions and 20+ privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole+RunInstances, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, SSM SendCommand, UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateAssumeRolePolicyβ¦).
βΈοΈ Kubernetes attack surface. LoadBalancer/NodePort exposure β privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork pods, cluster-admin ServiceAccounts, and mounted Secrets.
Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together β mix .tf,
CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.
π Quickstart β add it to your MCP client
{
"mcpServers": {
"cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] }
}
}No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the
audit_iac_attack_paths + diff_attack_paths tools appear. (Remote server:
https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)
Tool: audit_iac_attack_paths
{
"files": {
"main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...",
"k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..."
}
// or: "source": "<a single IaC blob>", "filename": "main.tf"
}Example β input β output
audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +
EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
β FREE: verdict: BREACHABLE Β· risk 86/100 Β· 1 attack path Β· 1 crown jewel Β· 3 misconfigs
β DEEP (deep:true): verdict: BREACHABLE
PATH #1 (internet β admin):
[1] INTERNET β aws_security_group.web (main.tf:4 β ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0)
[2] β aws_instance.app (main.tf:19 β attaches sg web)
[3] β aws_iam_role.app_role (main.tf:31 β instance profile)
[4] β iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances (privesc β launch instance as admin role)
[5] β s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data (main.tf:52 β exfiltration sink)
CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress β cuts this entire path.
FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.
Tool: diff_attack_paths β the CI/CD gate
Give it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it
reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internetβcrown-jewel
chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES β with
an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.
{
"before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } },
"after": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } }
// deep: true β full introduced/eliminated chains + beforeβafter exploitability + which choke points now matter
}A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph
privesc reachability on both states and a semantic cross-state path match. HTTP:
POST /diff(free, counts only) /POST /pro/diff(deep).
Free HTTP API
POST /audit
Content-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.
Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize,
Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK β both the synthesized
cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python),
so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.
SARIF 2.1.0 β GitHub code scanning
Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff
or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning β
every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.
Each chain is one SARIF
resultwith acodeFlow(a step-through walk: internet β SG β instance role β privesc β S3), anchored to the IaCfile:line, plussecurity-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.The diff SARIF only fails the check on introduced/aggravated routes (error-level); eliminated/eased land as
note.The free tier returns a redacted-but-schema-valid SARIF (counts only β no chains, no code-flows, no route file:line); the full code-flows are premium.
# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)
- run: curl -s -X POST "$CPF/pro/diff?format=sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \
--data @payload.json -o cloud-pathfinder.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
with: { sarif_file: cloud-pathfinder.sarif }π³ Unlock /pro β two ways to pay (dual-pay)
The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence,
privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:
Lane | For | How |
π³ Card (Stripe) | Humans / teams | Buy a prepaid key at |
πͺ x402 (USDC) | AI agents with a wallet | Pay $0.30 per call automatically. Settles on Base. No signup, no key. |
POST /pro/audit # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) β pay β resultWhat it catches (selected)
Class | Detail |
Public β role β data | Open SG on a sensitive port (SSH/RDP/DB) β instance role that can read S3/Dynamo/RDS/Secrets β exfiltration |
IAM privilege escalation |
|
Public data stores |
|
Kubernetes | LoadBalancer/NodePort β privileged pod β cluster-admin ServiceAccount β Secret |
CloudFormation |
|
How it stays honest
The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package β the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.
Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.
Available Tools
2 toolsaudit_iac_attack_pathsAInspect
Find real ATTACK PATHS in Infrastructure-as-Code (Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes) β not a linter. Give it your IaC files (a map of filenameβcontent, or a single source blob) and it parses them into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource relationships, and searches for chains from the public INTERNET to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete multi-hop routes an attacker would walk β e.g. 'open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) β EC2 instance-profile role β iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin β S3 exfiltration'. Understands AWS managed-policy permissions, 20+ IAM privilege-escalation primitives, public security groups / RDS, and Kubernetes LoadBalancer/NodePort exposure + privileged pods + cluster-admin ServiceAccounts. Use it before applying IaC or in a PR to catch breach paths a per-resource linter misses. Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC.
Inputs: deep, files, source, filename.
diff_attack_pathsAInspect
DIFFERENTIAL attack-path analysis for a change to Infrastructure-as-Code β the CI/CD gate. Give it the IaC BEFORE and AFTER a change (e.g. a pull request's base and head trees, each a map of filenameβcontent) and it builds the full resource graph + runs the internetβcrown-jewel reachability search on BOTH states, then reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which breach chains it INTRODUCES (e.g. 'this PR opens a NEW Internetβadmin route via a newly-public security group + an over-broad IAM grant'), which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES (makes more exploitable). Returns an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict β the single check to wire into PR review so a change that opens a path to your data/secrets/admin is caught before merge. This is something a per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer: it needs both graphs and a semantic cross-state path match. Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC.
Inputs: after (required), before (required), deep.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelogβ¦
TDQS
Scored across 2 tools
Each tool targets a distinct task: audit_iac_attack_paths performs a single-state static scan, while diff_attack_paths analyzes changes between two states. Their descriptions clearly separate use cases (pre-apply/PR vs. CI/CD gate), leaving no ambiguity.
Both tool names follow the verb_noun pattern (audit_attack_paths, diff_attack_paths) with a consistent suffix. The inclusion of 'iac' in one name is a minor, non-disruptive variation that still aligns with the overall naming scheme.
With only two tools, the set feels minimal, but each tool is essential and non-redundant for the server's narrow purpose of IaC attack-path analysis. The count is at the borderline of what is considered appropriate.
The two tools cover the complete lifecycle: a static snapshot audit and a differential change analysis. No obvious gaps exist, as both core operations for the domain are represented and no dead ends are apparent.
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