epistemic-guard
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPISTEMIC_GUARD_MCP_KEY_HEX | No | Ed25519 signing key in hex format. Stays inside the mcp-proxy OS process and is stripped before spawning the child MCP server. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| prompts | {
"listChanged": false
} |
| resources | {
"listChanged": false
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| verify_narrationA | Audit an assistant draft reply clause-by-clause against in-memory turn receipts to flag fabricated tool-action claims, unlike verify_receipt_log and inspect_receipt which read on-disk JSONL logs. Call before sending a tool-using reply (pass receipts=[] when zero tools ran to reject any claimed side effects); do not use for RAG citation checking (use corroborate_sources) or log-file cryptography. Runs offline with zero network calls: ungrounded claims return is_valid=false with character offsets and retry_prompt rather than raising an error, whereas malformed receipt objects return isError=true. |
| verify_receipt_logA | Validate whole-file cryptographic integrity of an on-disk JSONL receipt log written by epistemic-guard mcp-proxy, returning aggregate chain and Merkle root status rather than individual entries (use inspect_receipt to fetch entries). Call in CI gates or post-session audits; do not use to check assistant prose (use verify_narration) or mint receipts (signing is confined to the isolated mcp-proxy parent process). Passing both pubkey_file and expected_pubkey_hex requires them to encode the identical 32-byte key (omitting both checks self-consistency against entry 0), and any missing file, key conflict, sequence gap, or tampered digest returns isError=true naming the failing seq. |
| inspect_receiptA | Retrieve individual signed receipt records, standalone RFC 6962 Merkle inclusion proofs, and optional AER-1 envelopes from an on-disk JSONL receipt log, whereas verify_receipt_log returns only a whole-log summary. Call when auditing a specific tool invocation or exporting portable inclusion proofs; do not use for a fast whole-file pass/fail check (use verify_receipt_log) or assistant reply checking (use verify_narration). Cryptographically verifies the entire log before returning data: filters seq, call_id, and tool combine via logical AND (omitting all three lists from seq=0 truncated to limit), while a missing/tampered file, key mismatch, or out-of-range seq returns isError=true. |
| corroborate_sourcesA | Evaluate independent evidentiary support across retrieved RAG or web snippets by collapsing syndicated wire-copy duplicates and checking cross-domain contradictions. Call before answering factual queries from retrieved passages; do not use to fetch web URLs (URLs are parsed offline solely for domain grouping and never contacted over the network) or to audit tool-execution prose (use verify_narration). Supply at least two sources from distinct domains to reach multi-source proof standards (sources=[] yields speculation with meets_casual_burden=false); contradictions set disputed=true without failing, whereas an empty query or malformed sources item returns isError=true. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
Each tool targets a distinct epistemic check: in-memory narration audit, whole-log crypto integrity, individual receipt/proof retrieval, and source corroboration. Descriptions explicitly delimit boundaries by naming the sibling tool to use instead, leaving no realistic chance of misselection.
All four names are snake_case verb_noun (verify_narration, verify_receipt_log, inspect_receipt, corroborate_sources). The differing verbs are meaningful rather than arbitrary, and even the shared verify_ prefix maps to a shared notion of validation.
Four tools is on the lean side but each maps to a genuinely separate concern (narration, log integrity, entry export, evidence corroboration), with no filler. Receipt signing is deliberately excluded to the proxy process, so the surface is not artificially padded.
Covers the full read/verify lifecycle: verify narration, verify whole log, inspect entries plus Merkle proofs, and corroborate retrieved sources. The main omission is key discovery/rotation or any tooling around the mcp-proxy signing identity, which agents must handle out of band.