epistemic-guard
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- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceAppend-only evidence receipts for AI records: seal, verify, cite, chain-check, anchor status. A seal proves a record existed at a time, not that its contents are true. Five tools over stdio with npx -y apex-psi-mcp — no account, no key, verification free forever.5458 npm1MIT
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceContributors: dengyier & Tim Shing(成孝添) Check what an AI agent was authorized to do and what its signed evidence supports. Includes reference SOC alert review and a separately enabled Codex preview-directory Guard; installing MCP does not activate Guard.3297 PyPI261Apache 2.0
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- FlicenseNot gradedqualityNot gradedmaintenanceEnables AI agents and MCP clients to decompose text into atomic claims and cross-verify them against reference knowledge to flag ungrounded claims, numerical contradictions, and hallucinated entities. Runs deterministically with zero dependencies over JSON-RPC stdio, avoiding LLM round-trips for routine verification tasks.-
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- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to verify claims against evidence through MCP tools, returning approved, rejected, or needs_review verdicts with replayable receipts.MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables AI agents to commit and read shared memory facts that must cite a registered artifact SHA-256 receipt, with confidence that decays over time and a cascade rollback that quarantines a poisoned fact plus every downstream decision derived from it. Exposes provenance tracing (blame), evidence registration, and commit/revert tools over stdio so multi-agent teams can detect and unwind cascading memory poisoning.1MIT
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TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
Each tool targets a distinct epistemic check: in-memory narration audit, whole-log crypto integrity, individual receipt/proof retrieval, and source corroboration. Descriptions explicitly delimit boundaries by naming the sibling tool to use instead, leaving no realistic chance of misselection.
All four names are snake_case verb_noun (verify_narration, verify_receipt_log, inspect_receipt, corroborate_sources). The differing verbs are meaningful rather than arbitrary, and even the shared verify_ prefix maps to a shared notion of validation.
Four tools is on the lean side but each maps to a genuinely separate concern (narration, log integrity, entry export, evidence corroboration), with no filler. Receipt signing is deliberately excluded to the proxy process, so the surface is not artificially padded.
Covers the full read/verify lifecycle: verify narration, verify whole log, inspect entries plus Merkle proofs, and corroborate retrieved sources. The main omission is key discovery/rotation or any tooling around the mcp-proxy signing identity, which agents must handle out of band.