AgentsID Guard
Official<p align="center">
<h1 align="center">AgentsID Guard</h1>
<p align="center">
<strong>One MCP server. Every operation protected.</strong>
</p>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://agentsid.dev"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/powered%20by-AgentsID-f59e0b?style=flat-square" alt="AgentsID" /></a>
<a href="https://github.com/AgentsID-dev/shell-guard/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-f59e0b?style=flat-square" alt="License" /></a>
</p>
---
Your AI agent has access to your shell, file system, database, git repos, and the internet. Right now, nothing controls what it can do with any of them.
**AgentsID Guard fixes that.** 11 tools across 5 categories — shell, files, database, git, HTTP — every operation validated against per-agent permission rules before execution.
## How It Works
```
Agent: shell_run("ls -la /src")
→ Classified: shell.read.ls
→ AgentsID: ALLOWED ✓
→ Executes normally
Agent: shell_run("rm -rf /data")
→ Classified: shell.danger.rm
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executes
Agent: db_query("DROP TABLE users")
→ Classified: db.danger.ddl
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executes
Agent: git_run("push origin main")
→ Classified: git.write.push
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executes
```
## Quick Start
### 1. Install
```bash
npx @agentsid/guard
```
### 2. Get your keys
Sign up at [agentsid.dev/dashboard](https://agentsid.dev/dashboard) — free tier: 25 agents, 10K events/month.
### 3. Add to Claude Code
```bash
claude mcp add guard \
-e AGENTSID_PROJECT_KEY=aid_proj_your_key \
-e AGENTSID_AGENT_TOKEN=aid_tok_your_token \
-- npx @agentsid/guard
```
### 4. Set permissions
```bash
npx agentsid register-agent --name "my-agent" \
--permissions "shell.read.*" "file.read" "file.list" "git.read.*" "http.get"
```
## Tools
AgentsID Guard exposes 11 MCP tools:
| Tool | What it does | Permission pattern |
|------|-------------|-------------------|
| `shell_run` | Execute a shell command | `shell.read.*`, `shell.write.*`, `shell.danger.*`, `shell.admin.*` |
| `file_read` | Read a file | `file.read` |
| `file_write` | Write/create a file | `file.write` |
| `file_delete` | Delete a file | `file.delete` |
| `file_list` | List directory contents | `file.list` |
| `file_info` | Get file metadata | `file.info` |
| `db_query` | Run a SQL query | `db.read`, `db.write.*`, `db.danger.*` |
| `git_run` | Run a git command | `git.read.*`, `git.write.*`, `git.danger.*` |
| `http_request` | Make an HTTP request | `http.get`, `http.post`, `http.put`, `http.delete` |
| `check_permission` | Check if an action would be allowed | — |
| `list_categories` | List all permission categories | — |
## Permission Categories
### Shell
| Pattern | Commands | Risk |
|---------|----------|------|
| `shell.read.*` | ls, cat, grep, find, ps, df, curl, ping | Safe |
| `shell.write.*` | mkdir, touch, cp, mv | Moderate |
| `shell.danger.*` | rm, chmod, chown, kill | High |
| `shell.admin.*` | sudo, docker, apt, npm, systemctl | Critical |
### Files
| Pattern | Operations | Risk |
|---------|-----------|------|
| `file.read` | Read file contents | Safe |
| `file.list` | List directories | Safe |
| `file.info` | File metadata | Safe |
| `file.write` | Create/write files | Moderate |
| `file.delete` | Delete files | High |
### Database
| Pattern | Statements | Risk |
|---------|-----------|------|
| `db.read` | SELECT, SHOW, DESCRIBE, EXPLAIN | Safe |
| `db.write.insert` | INSERT | Moderate |
| `db.write.update` | UPDATE | Moderate |
| `db.write.create` | CREATE | Moderate |
| `db.danger.delete` | DELETE | High |
| `db.danger.ddl` | DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER | Critical |
### Git
| Pattern | Commands | Risk |
|---------|----------|------|
| `git.read.*` | status, log, diff, branch, show, blame | Safe |
| `git.write.*` | add, commit, push, pull, merge, checkout, stash | Moderate |
| `git.danger.*` | reset, force-push | Critical |
### HTTP
| Pattern | Methods | Risk |
|---------|---------|------|
| `http.get` | GET | Safe |
| `http.post` | POST | Moderate |
| `http.put` | PUT | Moderate |
| `http.delete` | DELETE | High |
## Permission Examples
**Read-only research agent:**
```
shell.read.* → allow
file.read → allow
file.list → allow
db.read → allow
git.read.* → allow
http.get → allow
```
**Developer agent (read + write, no destructive):**
```
shell.read.* → allow
shell.write.* → allow
file.read → allow
file.write → allow
file.list → allow
db.read → allow
db.write.* → allow
git.read.* → allow
git.write.* → allow
http.get → allow
http.post → allow
```
**Full access with approval gates:**
```
shell.read.* → allow
shell.write.* → allow
shell.danger.* → allow (requires approval)
shell.admin.* → allow (requires approval)
file.* → allow
db.read → allow
db.write.* → allow
db.danger.* → allow (requires approval)
git.* → allow
http.* → allow
```
## Environment Variables
| Variable | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `AGENTSID_PROJECT_KEY` | Yes | Your AgentsID project key |
| `AGENTSID_AGENT_TOKEN` | Yes | Agent token for permission checks |
| `AGENTSID_BASE_URL` | No | API URL (default: https://agentsid.dev) |
| `GUARD_CWD` | No | Working directory (default: cwd) |
| `GUARD_TIMEOUT` | No | Command timeout in ms (default: 30000) |
| `GUARD_ALLOWED_DIRS` | No | Comma-separated allowed directories for file ops (default: cwd) |
| `GUARD_DB_URL` | No | Database connection string for db_query (postgresql://, mysql://, or .db path) |
## Security
- **Deny-first** — unknown commands and tools are blocked by default
- **Path containment** — file operations restricted to allowed directories
- **Fail-closed** — network errors to AgentsID result in denial, not bypass
- **Audit trail** — every allow and deny logged to AgentsID's tamper-evident hash chain
- **No shell injection** — commands executed via `execSync` with no shell interpolation of user input in tool arguments
## Dashboard
Every operation appears in your [AgentsID dashboard](https://agentsid.dev/dashboard):
- Which agent ran which command
- Whether it was allowed or denied and why
- Full audit trail across all 5 categories
## Links
- [AgentsID](https://agentsid.dev) — Identity & auth for AI agents
- [Documentation](https://agentsid.dev/docs)
- [Dashboard](https://agentsid.dev/dashboard)
## License
MIT
TDQS
Scored across 50 tools
Most tools are clearly separated by domain and action, but several run commands (shell, git, aws, kubectl, ssh) could be confused. Descriptions help by scoping each to a specific system, but the overlapping purpose makes misselection possible.
All tool names are lowercase with underscores and consistently use a domain prefix plus a noun or verb (e.g., file_read, env_list, secrets_delete). The pattern is highly predictable and uniform across the set.
With 50 tools, the server is heavy and covers many distinct subsystems. While each tool has a purpose, the count exceeds typical MCP server scopes and may overwhelm agents with too many options.
The tool set provides broad lifecycle coverage for secrets, files, processes, containers, and more. Minor gaps exist (e.g., no explicit update for cron jobs), but agents can work around them without dead ends.