AgentsID Guard
OfficialClick on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@AgentsID Guard list directory contents of /data"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Your AI agent has access to your shell, file system, database, git repos, and the internet. Right now, nothing controls what it can do with any of them.
AgentsID Guard fixes that. 11 tools across 5 categories — shell, files, database, git, HTTP — every operation validated against per-agent permission rules before execution.
How It Works
Agent: shell_run("ls -la /src")
→ Classified: shell.read.ls
→ AgentsID: ALLOWED ✓
→ Executes normally
Agent: shell_run("rm -rf /data")
→ Classified: shell.danger.rm
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executes
Agent: db_query("DROP TABLE users")
→ Classified: db.danger.ddl
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executes
Agent: git_run("push origin main")
→ Classified: git.write.push
→ AgentsID: BLOCKED ✗
→ Never executesRelated MCP server: gov-mcp
Quick Start
1. Install
npx @agentsid/guard2. Get your keys
Sign up at agentsid.dev/dashboard — free tier: 25 agents, 10K events/month.
3. Add to Claude Code
claude mcp add guard \
-e AGENTSID_PROJECT_KEY=aid_proj_your_key \
-e AGENTSID_AGENT_TOKEN=aid_tok_your_token \
-- npx @agentsid/guard4. Set permissions
npx agentsid register-agent --name "my-agent" \
--permissions "shell.read.*" "file.read" "file.list" "git.read.*" "http.get"Tools
AgentsID Guard exposes 11 MCP tools:
Tool | What it does | Permission pattern |
| Execute a shell command |
|
| Read a file |
|
| Write/create a file |
|
| Delete a file |
|
| List directory contents |
|
| Get file metadata |
|
| Run a SQL query |
|
| Run a git command |
|
| Make an HTTP request |
|
| Check if an action would be allowed | — |
| List all permission categories | — |
Permission Categories
Shell
Pattern | Commands | Risk |
| ls, cat, grep, find, ps, df, curl, ping | Safe |
| mkdir, touch, cp, mv | Moderate |
| rm, chmod, chown, kill | High |
| sudo, docker, apt, npm, systemctl | Critical |
Files
Pattern | Operations | Risk |
| Read file contents | Safe |
| List directories | Safe |
| File metadata | Safe |
| Create/write files | Moderate |
| Delete files | High |
Database
Pattern | Statements | Risk |
| SELECT, SHOW, DESCRIBE, EXPLAIN | Safe |
| INSERT | Moderate |
| UPDATE | Moderate |
| CREATE | Moderate |
| DELETE | High |
| DROP, TRUNCATE, ALTER | Critical |
Git
Pattern | Commands | Risk |
| status, log, diff, branch, show, blame | Safe |
| add, commit, push, pull, merge, checkout, stash | Moderate |
| reset, force-push | Critical |
HTTP
Pattern | Methods | Risk |
| GET | Safe |
| POST | Moderate |
| PUT | Moderate |
| DELETE | High |
Permission Examples
Read-only research agent:
shell.read.* → allow
file.read → allow
file.list → allow
db.read → allow
git.read.* → allow
http.get → allowDeveloper agent (read + write, no destructive):
shell.read.* → allow
shell.write.* → allow
file.read → allow
file.write → allow
file.list → allow
db.read → allow
db.write.* → allow
git.read.* → allow
git.write.* → allow
http.get → allow
http.post → allowFull access with approval gates:
shell.read.* → allow
shell.write.* → allow
shell.danger.* → allow (requires approval)
shell.admin.* → allow (requires approval)
file.* → allow
db.read → allow
db.write.* → allow
db.danger.* → allow (requires approval)
git.* → allow
http.* → allowEnvironment Variables
Variable | Required | Description |
| Yes | Your AgentsID project key |
| Yes | Agent token for permission checks |
| No | API URL (default: https://agentsid.dev) |
| No | Working directory (default: cwd) |
| No | Command timeout in ms (default: 30000) |
| No | Comma-separated allowed directories for file ops (default: cwd) |
| No | Database connection string for db_query (postgresql://, mysql://, or .db path) |
Security
Deny-first — unknown commands and tools are blocked by default
Path containment — file operations restricted to allowed directories
Fail-closed — network errors to AgentsID result in denial, not bypass
Audit trail — every allow and deny logged to AgentsID's tamper-evident hash chain
No shell injection — commands executed via
execSyncwith no shell interpolation of user input in tool arguments
Dashboard
Every operation appears in your AgentsID dashboard:
Which agent ran which command
Whether it was allowed or denied and why
Full audit trail across all 5 categories
Links
AgentsID — Identity & auth for AI agents
License
MIT
Available Tools
50 toolsaws_runA
Run an AWS CLI command. Read ops (ls, describe) require aws.read.{service}. Write ops require aws.write.{service}. Destructive ops (delete, terminate) require aws.danger.{service}.
Inputs: command (required).
check_permissionA
Check if a tool/action would be allowed without executing it.
Inputs: tool (required).
container_inspectA
Get detailed info about a Docker container. Requires container.read permission.
Inputs: id (required).
container_listA
List Docker containers. Requires container.read permission.
Inputs: all.
container_logsB
View Docker container logs. Requires container.read permission.
Inputs: id (required), tail.
container_removeA
Remove a Docker container. Requires container.danger permission.
Inputs: id (required), force.
container_startA
Start a stopped Docker container. Requires container.write permission.
Inputs: id (required).
container_stopA
Stop a running Docker container. Requires container.write permission.
Inputs: id (required).
cron_addA
Add a cron job. Requires cron.write permission.
Inputs: command (required), schedule (required).
cron_listA
List current user's cron jobs. Requires cron.read permission.
Inputs: no named parameters.
cron_removeA
Remove cron jobs matching a pattern. Requires cron.danger permission.
Inputs: pattern (required).
db_queryA
Run a SQL query. SELECT/SHOW requires db.read. INSERT/UPDATE requires db.write.. DELETE/DROP requires db.danger.. Supports PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite.
Inputs: query (required), database.
disk_usageB
Get disk usage for a path. Requires system.read.
Inputs: path.
env_getA
Get a specific environment variable. Secret-named vars (KEY, TOKEN, PASSWORD) require env.read.secret permission.
Inputs: name (required).
env_listA
List environment variables (secrets auto-filtered). Requires env.read permission.
Inputs: no named parameters.
env_setA
Set an environment variable. Requires env.write permission.
Inputs: name (required), value (required).
file_deleteA
Delete a file. Requires file.delete permission.
Inputs: path (required).
file_infoA
Get file metadata (size, type, permissions, timestamps). Requires file.info permission.
Inputs: path (required).
file_listA
List files in a directory with size and type info. Requires file.list permission.
Inputs: path.
file_readA
Read a file's contents. Restricted to allowed directories. Requires file.read permission.
Inputs: path (required).
file_writeA
Write content to a file. Creates parent directories if needed. Requires file.write permission.
Inputs: path (required), content (required).
git_runA
Run a git command. Read operations (status, log, diff) require git.read.. Write operations (commit, push) require git.write..
Inputs: command (required).
http_requestB
Make an HTTP request. GET requires http.get. POST requires http.post. PUT requires http.put. DELETE requires http.delete.
Inputs: url (required), body, method, headers.
kubectl_runA
Run a kubectl command. Read ops (get, describe, logs) require k8s.read.. Write ops (apply, create) require k8s.write.. Destructive ops (delete, drain) require k8s.danger.*.
Inputs: command (required).
list_categoriesA
List all permission categories and what they control.
Inputs: no named parameters.
log_readB
Read last N lines of a log file. Requires log.read.
Inputs: path (required), lines.
log_searchB
Search a log file for a pattern. Requires log.read.
Inputs: path (required), pattern (required), lines.
memory_usageB
Get memory usage breakdown. Requires system.read.
Inputs: no named parameters.
network_dnsA
DNS lookup for a domain. Requires network.read permission.
Inputs: domain (required), type.
network_pingA
Ping a host. Requires network.read permission.
Inputs: host (required), count.
network_portsA
List listening network ports. Requires network.read permission.
Inputs: no named parameters.
network_tracerouteA
Traceroute to a host. Requires network.read permission.
Inputs: host (required).
package_infoC
Get info about a package. Requires package.read.
Inputs: name (required), manager.
package_installB
Install a package. Requires package.danger.install (high risk).
Inputs: name (required), manager.
package_listA
List installed packages. Requires package.read.
Inputs: manager.
process_infoA
Get detailed info about a specific process. Requires process.read permission.
Inputs: pid (required).
process_killA
Send a signal to a process. Requires process.kill permission.
Inputs: pid (required), signal.
process_listA
List running processes sorted by CPU usage. Requires process.read permission.
Inputs: no named parameters.
secrets_anomaliesA
Detect vault anomalies: expired secrets, broad scopes, stale keys, unusual access patterns. Requires secrets.read.
Inputs: no named parameters.
secrets_auditA
View access log for secrets — who accessed what, when, for what purpose. Requires secrets.read.
Inputs: name.
secrets_deleteB
Delete a secret from the vault. Requires secrets.danger.
Inputs: name (required).
secrets_expireA
Set a time-to-live on a secret. After expiry, proxy injection will refuse to use it. Requires secrets.write.
Inputs: name (required), ttlMinutes (required).
secrets_historyB
View rotation history for a secret. Requires secrets.read.
Inputs: name (required).
secrets_injectA
Make an HTTP request with vault secrets injected server-side. The agent NEVER sees the raw secret — Guard substitutes placeholders like {{API_KEY}} with the real value, makes the call, and scrubs secrets from the response. Requires secrets.proxy.
Inputs: url (required), secretMappings (required), body, method, +1 more.
secrets_listA
List secret names (values never exposed). Requires secrets.read.
Inputs: no named parameters.
secrets_scopeA
Restrict which tools can use a secret. E.g., scope an API key to only http.post calls. Requires secrets.write.
Inputs: name (required), allowedTools (required).
secrets_storeA
Store a secret in the encrypted vault. Per-secret derived encryption keys. Requires secrets.write.
Inputs: name (required), value (required), metadata.
shell_runA
Run a shell command. Validated against AgentsID permissions. Read commands (ls, cat, grep) typically allowed. Destructive commands (rm, chmod) blocked unless permitted.
Inputs: command (required).
ssh_runA
Run a command on a remote host via SSH. Permission scoped per host (ssh.hostname). Requires SSH keys configured.
Inputs: host (required), command (required), port, user.
system_infoA
Get system overview: OS, CPU, memory, disk, uptime. Requires system.read.
Inputs: no named parameters.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 50 tools
Most tools are clearly separated by domain and action, but several run commands (shell, git, aws, kubectl, ssh) could be confused. Descriptions help by scoping each to a specific system, but the overlapping purpose makes misselection possible.
All tool names are lowercase with underscores and consistently use a domain prefix plus a noun or verb (e.g., file_read, env_list, secrets_delete). The pattern is highly predictable and uniform across the set.
With 50 tools, the server is heavy and covers many distinct subsystems. While each tool has a purpose, the count exceeds typical MCP server scopes and may overwhelm agents with too many options.
The tool set provides broad lifecycle coverage for secrets, files, processes, containers, and more. Minor gaps exist (e.g., no explicit update for cron jobs), but agents can work around them without dead ends.
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