List IAM groups with their members and attached policies, and return any group read failures in groupErrors instead of dropping them.
[READ][risk=low] IAM groups with members and attached policies.
Groups whose read fails are listed in groupErrors rather than dropped.
Args: limit: Maximum groups to return (envelope reports truncation). target: MinIO target name from config; omit for the default.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | ||
| target | No |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
v0.11.0Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Consistent with readOnlyHint=true and adds genuine behavioral detail beyond the annotation: per-group read failures surface in groupErrors instead of being dropped, and truncation is reported by the envelope. It does not cover auth/permission requirements, but for a read tool this is solid disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Front-loaded with the risk/read tag and the resource, then a short note on failure handling, then a compact Args block. Every sentence earns its place; only the Args formatting is slightly boilerplate.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
No output schema exists, yet the description explains the notable return behaviors (groupErrors, truncation reporting), which is what an agent most needs to interpret results. The remaining gap is permission/auth context for IAM reads.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the full burden and does so: limit is defined as a cap with truncation reported in the envelope, and target is defined as a MinIO target name from config with omission meaning the default. Both parameters gain meaning not present in the schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States a specific resource (IAM groups) and scope (members and attached policies), which distinguishes it from siblings iam_users and iam_policies. The verb is implied via the [READ] tag rather than stated, so it is clear but slightly less explicit than a 5.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The [READ][risk=low] tag implies a safe read operation, and the content description implies when it is useful (enumerating groups with their memberships and policies). However, no alternative is named and no when/when-not guidance is given, leaving routing to inference.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.