Skip to main content
Glama
AIops-tools

compliance-aiops

sign_bundle

Destructive

Attach an HMAC signature over a bundle's seal using the stored signing key, making compliance evidence tamper-evident.

Instructions

[WRITE][risk=medium] Attach an HMAC signature over a bundle's seal (uses stored key).

Requires a signing key in the encrypted store ('compliance-aiops secret set signing-key'). Medium risk because it reads the encrypted secret store.

Args: bundle_path: Path to a bundle .json.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
bundle_pathYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.6.0

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=false, idempotentHint=false, and destructiveHint=true. The description goes beyond them by disclosing the dependency on the encrypted secret store, the prerequisite setup command, and the stated risk rationale ('reads the encrypted secret store'). It does not, however, explain what the destructive aspect actually does to the bundle.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The tag prefix front-loads write status and risk level, and the body is short. There is minor redundancy between 'Requires a signing key in the encrypted store' and 'reads the encrypted secret store', but overall it is efficient.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter mutation with annotations covering the safety profile and no output schema, the description supplies the key missing context: the secret-store dependency and risk rationale. Return behavior is unaddressed, but that is a minor gap for a signing operation.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry the load. It does identify bundle_path and adds a format hint ('Path to a bundle .json'), which is more than the bare schema title, but it omits constraints such as whether the path must be absolute or how the seal is located.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb and resource: 'Attach an HMAC signature over a bundle's seal'. This clearly distinguishes it from verify_bundle and generate_evidence_bundle by operation, though it does not name a sibling explicitly, keeping it just short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It states a prerequisite (a signing key must exist in the encrypted store, with the command to set one) but gives no explicit when-to-use or when-not-to-use guidance relative to alternatives like verify_bundle or export_bundle. Usage is only implied by the operation name.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.