================================================================ FAILURES ================================================================
_____________________________________ test_append_line_blocks_outside_server_root_without_repo_root ______________________________________
tmp_path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_append_line_blocks_outsid0')
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_append_line_blocks_outside_server_root_without_repo_root(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo_root = tmp_path / "external_repo"
log_path = repo_root / ".scribe" / "docs" / "dev_plans" / "x" / "PROGRESS_LOG.md"
with pytest.raises(SecurityError):
> await append_line(log_path, "blocked")
tests/test_multi_repo_file_ops.py:17:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
utils/files.py:519: in append_line
path = _ensure_safe_path(
utils/files.py:52: in _ensure_safe_path
return safe_file_operation(root, Path(path), operation=operation, context=context or {"component": "files"})
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8d9c0b50>, operation = 'append', context = {'component': 'logs'}
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'append' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
______________________________________ test_repo_root_override_allows_cross_repo_append_read_rotate ______________________________________
tmp_path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_repo_root_override_allows0')
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_repo_root_override_allows_cross_repo_append_read_rotate(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
repo_root = tmp_path / "external_repo"
log_path = repo_root / ".scribe" / "docs" / "dev_plans" / "x" / "PROGRESS_LOG.md"
> await append_line(log_path, "hello", repo_root=repo_root)
tests/test_multi_repo_file_ops.py:25:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
utils/files.py:519: in append_line
path = _ensure_safe_path(
utils/files.py:52: in _ensure_safe_path
return safe_file_operation(root, Path(path), operation=operation, context=context or {"component": "files"})
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8d804250>, operation = 'append', context = {'component': 'logs'}
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'append' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
_______________________________________________ test_read_file_search_default_max_matches ________________________________________________
tmp_path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_search_default_0')
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_read_file_search_default_max_matches(tmp_path):
token = _install_execution_context(tmp_path)
try:
target = tmp_path / "sample.txt"
target.write_text("\n".join("needle" for _ in range(_DEFAULT_MAX_MATCHES + 25)), encoding="utf-8")
> result = await read_file(path=str(target), mode="search", search="needle")
tests/test_read_file_tool.py:36:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
tools/read_file.py:614: in read_file
await log_read(
tools/read_file.py:427: in log_read
append_sentinel_event(
utils/sentinel_logs.py:107: in append_sentinel_event
_bounded_append(jsonl_path, line, repo_root=repo_root)
utils/sentinel_logs.py:35: in _bounded_append
with file_lock(path, mode="a+", timeout=timeout_seconds, repo_root=repo_root) as handle:
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/contextlib.py:137: in __enter__
return next(self.gen)
utils/files.py:95: in file_lock
lock_file.touch(exist_ok=True)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_search_default_0/.scribe/sentinel/2026-01-02/sentinel.jsonl.lock')
mode = 438, exist_ok = True
def touch(self, mode=0o666, exist_ok=True):
"""
Create this file with the given access mode, if it doesn't exist.
"""
if exist_ok:
# First try to bump modification time
# Implementation note: GNU touch uses the UTIME_NOW option of
# the utimensat() / futimens() functions.
try:
os.utime(self, None)
except OSError:
# Avoid exception chaining
pass
else:
return
flags = os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY
if not exist_ok:
flags |= os.O_EXCL
> fd = os.open(self, flags, mode)
E FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_search_default_0/.scribe/sentinel/2026-01-02/sentinel.jsonl.lock'
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/pathlib.py:1108: FileNotFoundError
_______________________________________________ test_read_file_invalid_regex_returns_error _______________________________________________
path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/sample.txt'), encoding = 'utf-8', pattern = '('
regex = True, context_lines = 0, max_matches = 200
def _search_file(
path: Path,
encoding: str,
pattern: str,
regex: bool,
context_lines: int,
max_matches: Optional[int],
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
matches: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
matcher = None
if regex:
try:
> matcher = re.compile(pattern)
tools/read_file.py:293:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/__init__.py:227: in compile
return _compile(pattern, flags)
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/__init__.py:294: in _compile
p = _compiler.compile(pattern, flags)
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/_compiler.py:745: in compile
p = _parser.parse(p, flags)
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/_parser.py:989: in parse
p = _parse_sub(source, state, flags & SRE_FLAG_VERBOSE, 0)
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/_parser.py:464: in _parse_sub
itemsappend(_parse(source, state, verbose, nested + 1,
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
source = <re._parser.Tokenizer object at 0x72ad8ced68d0>, state = <re._parser.State object at 0x72ad8ced6690>, verbose = 0, nested = 1
first = True
def _parse(source, state, verbose, nested, first=False):
# parse a simple pattern
subpattern = SubPattern(state)
# precompute constants into local variables
subpatternappend = subpattern.append
sourceget = source.get
sourcematch = source.match
_len = len
_ord = ord
while True:
this = source.next
if this is None:
break # end of pattern
if this in "|)":
break # end of subpattern
sourceget()
if verbose:
# skip whitespace and comments
if this in WHITESPACE:
continue
if this == "#":
while True:
this = sourceget()
if this is None or this == "\n":
break
continue
if this[0] == "\\":
code = _escape(source, this, state)
subpatternappend(code)
elif this not in SPECIAL_CHARS:
subpatternappend((LITERAL, _ord(this)))
elif this == "[":
here = source.tell() - 1
# character set
set = []
setappend = set.append
## if sourcematch(":"):
## pass # handle character classes
if source.next == '[':
import warnings
warnings.warn(
'Possible nested set at position %d' % source.tell(),
FutureWarning, stacklevel=nested + 6
)
negate = sourcematch("^")
# check remaining characters
while True:
this = sourceget()
if this is None:
raise source.error("unterminated character set",
source.tell() - here)
if this == "]" and set:
break
elif this[0] == "\\":
code1 = _class_escape(source, this)
else:
if set and this in '-&~|' and source.next == this:
import warnings
warnings.warn(
'Possible set %s at position %d' % (
'difference' if this == '-' else
'intersection' if this == '&' else
'symmetric difference' if this == '~' else
'union',
source.tell() - 1),
FutureWarning, stacklevel=nested + 6
)
code1 = LITERAL, _ord(this)
if sourcematch("-"):
# potential range
that = sourceget()
if that is None:
raise source.error("unterminated character set",
source.tell() - here)
if that == "]":
if code1[0] is IN:
code1 = code1[1][0]
setappend(code1)
setappend((LITERAL, _ord("-")))
break
if that[0] == "\\":
code2 = _class_escape(source, that)
else:
if that == '-':
import warnings
warnings.warn(
'Possible set difference at position %d' % (
source.tell() - 2),
FutureWarning, stacklevel=nested + 6
)
code2 = LITERAL, _ord(that)
if code1[0] != LITERAL or code2[0] != LITERAL:
msg = "bad character range %s-%s" % (this, that)
raise source.error(msg, len(this) + 1 + len(that))
lo = code1[1]
hi = code2[1]
if hi < lo:
msg = "bad character range %s-%s" % (this, that)
raise source.error(msg, len(this) + 1 + len(that))
setappend((RANGE, (lo, hi)))
else:
if code1[0] is IN:
code1 = code1[1][0]
setappend(code1)
set = _uniq(set)
# XXX: <fl> should move set optimization to compiler!
if _len(set) == 1 and set[0][0] is LITERAL:
# optimization
if negate:
subpatternappend((NOT_LITERAL, set[0][1]))
else:
subpatternappend(set[0])
else:
if negate:
set.insert(0, (NEGATE, None))
# charmap optimization can't be added here because
# global flags still are not known
subpatternappend((IN, set))
elif this in REPEAT_CHARS:
# repeat previous item
here = source.tell()
if this == "?":
min, max = 0, 1
elif this == "*":
min, max = 0, MAXREPEAT
elif this == "+":
min, max = 1, MAXREPEAT
elif this == "{":
if source.next == "}":
subpatternappend((LITERAL, _ord(this)))
continue
min, max = 0, MAXREPEAT
lo = hi = ""
while source.next in DIGITS:
lo += sourceget()
if sourcematch(","):
while source.next in DIGITS:
hi += sourceget()
else:
hi = lo
if not sourcematch("}"):
subpatternappend((LITERAL, _ord(this)))
source.seek(here)
continue
if lo:
min = int(lo)
if min >= MAXREPEAT:
raise OverflowError("the repetition number is too large")
if hi:
max = int(hi)
if max >= MAXREPEAT:
raise OverflowError("the repetition number is too large")
if max < min:
raise source.error("min repeat greater than max repeat",
source.tell() - here)
else:
raise AssertionError("unsupported quantifier %r" % (char,))
# figure out which item to repeat
if subpattern:
item = subpattern[-1:]
else:
item = None
if not item or item[0][0] is AT:
raise source.error("nothing to repeat",
source.tell() - here + len(this))
if item[0][0] in _REPEATCODES:
raise source.error("multiple repeat",
source.tell() - here + len(this))
if item[0][0] is SUBPATTERN:
group, add_flags, del_flags, p = item[0][1]
if group is None and not add_flags and not del_flags:
item = p
if sourcematch("?"):
# Non-Greedy Match
subpattern[-1] = (MIN_REPEAT, (min, max, item))
elif sourcematch("+"):
# Possessive Match (Always Greedy)
subpattern[-1] = (POSSESSIVE_REPEAT, (min, max, item))
else:
# Greedy Match
subpattern[-1] = (MAX_REPEAT, (min, max, item))
elif this == ".":
subpatternappend((ANY, None))
elif this == "(":
start = source.tell() - 1
capture = True
atomic = False
name = None
add_flags = 0
del_flags = 0
if sourcematch("?"):
# options
char = sourceget()
if char is None:
raise source.error("unexpected end of pattern")
if char == "P":
# python extensions
if sourcematch("<"):
# named group: skip forward to end of name
name = source.getuntil(">", "group name")
source.checkgroupname(name, 1, nested)
elif sourcematch("="):
# named backreference
name = source.getuntil(")", "group name")
source.checkgroupname(name, 1, nested)
gid = state.groupdict.get(name)
if gid is None:
msg = "unknown group name %r" % name
raise source.error(msg, len(name) + 1)
if not state.checkgroup(gid):
raise source.error("cannot refer to an open group",
len(name) + 1)
state.checklookbehindgroup(gid, source)
subpatternappend((GROUPREF, gid))
continue
else:
char = sourceget()
if char is None:
raise source.error("unexpected end of pattern")
raise source.error("unknown extension ?P" + char,
len(char) + 2)
elif char == ":":
# non-capturing group
capture = False
elif char == "#":
# comment
while True:
if source.next is None:
raise source.error("missing ), unterminated comment",
source.tell() - start)
if sourceget() == ")":
break
continue
elif char in "=!<":
# lookahead assertions
dir = 1
if char == "<":
char = sourceget()
if char is None:
raise source.error("unexpected end of pattern")
if char not in "=!":
raise source.error("unknown extension ?<" + char,
len(char) + 2)
dir = -1 # lookbehind
lookbehindgroups = state.lookbehindgroups
if lookbehindgroups is None:
state.lookbehindgroups = state.groups
p = _parse_sub(source, state, verbose, nested + 1)
if dir < 0:
if lookbehindgroups is None:
state.lookbehindgroups = None
if not sourcematch(")"):
raise source.error("missing ), unterminated subpattern",
source.tell() - start)
if char == "=":
subpatternappend((ASSERT, (dir, p)))
else:
subpatternappend((ASSERT_NOT, (dir, p)))
continue
elif char == "(":
# conditional backreference group
condname = source.getuntil(")", "group name")
if condname.isidentifier():
source.checkgroupname(condname, 1, nested)
condgroup = state.groupdict.get(condname)
if condgroup is None:
msg = "unknown group name %r" % condname
raise source.error(msg, len(condname) + 1)
else:
try:
condgroup = int(condname)
if condgroup < 0:
raise ValueError
except ValueError:
msg = "bad character in group name %r" % condname
raise source.error(msg, len(condname) + 1) from None
if not condgroup:
raise source.error("bad group number",
len(condname) + 1)
if condgroup >= MAXGROUPS:
msg = "invalid group reference %d" % condgroup
raise source.error(msg, len(condname) + 1)
if condgroup not in state.grouprefpos:
state.grouprefpos[condgroup] = (
source.tell() - len(condname) - 1
)
if not (condname.isdecimal() and condname.isascii()):
import warnings
warnings.warn(
"bad character in group name %s at position %d" %
(repr(condname) if source.istext else ascii(condname),
source.tell() - len(condname) - 1),
DeprecationWarning, stacklevel=nested + 6
)
state.checklookbehindgroup(condgroup, source)
item_yes = _parse(source, state, verbose, nested + 1)
if source.match("|"):
item_no = _parse(source, state, verbose, nested + 1)
if source.next == "|":
raise source.error("conditional backref with more than two branches")
else:
item_no = None
if not source.match(")"):
raise source.error("missing ), unterminated subpattern",
source.tell() - start)
subpatternappend((GROUPREF_EXISTS, (condgroup, item_yes, item_no)))
continue
elif char == ">":
# non-capturing, atomic group
capture = False
atomic = True
elif char in FLAGS or char == "-":
# flags
flags = _parse_flags(source, state, char)
if flags is None: # global flags
if not first or subpattern:
raise source.error('global flags not at the start '
'of the expression',
source.tell() - start)
verbose = state.flags & SRE_FLAG_VERBOSE
continue
add_flags, del_flags = flags
capture = False
else:
raise source.error("unknown extension ?" + char,
len(char) + 1)
# parse group contents
if capture:
try:
group = state.opengroup(name)
except error as err:
raise source.error(err.msg, len(name) + 1) from None
else:
group = None
sub_verbose = ((verbose or (add_flags & SRE_FLAG_VERBOSE)) and
not (del_flags & SRE_FLAG_VERBOSE))
p = _parse_sub(source, state, sub_verbose, nested + 1)
if not source.match(")"):
> raise source.error("missing ), unterminated subpattern",
source.tell() - start)
E re.error: missing ), unterminated subpattern at position 0
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/re/_parser.py:874: error
The above exception was the direct cause of the following exception:
path = '/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/sample.txt', mode = 'search', chunk_index = None
start_chunk = None, max_chunks = None, start_line = None, end_line = None, page_number = None, page_size = None, search = '('
search_mode = 'regex', context_lines = 0, max_matches = 200
@app.tool()
async def read_file(
path: str,
mode: str = "scan_only",
chunk_index: Optional[List[int]] = None,
start_chunk: Optional[int] = None,
max_chunks: Optional[int] = None,
start_line: Optional[int] = None,
end_line: Optional[int] = None,
page_number: Optional[int] = None,
page_size: Optional[int] = None,
search: Optional[str] = None,
search_mode: str = "literal",
context_lines: int = 0,
max_matches: Optional[int] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
exec_context = server_module.get_execution_context()
if exec_context is None:
return {"ok": False, "error": "ExecutionContext missing"}
repo_root = Path(exec_context.repo_root)
requested_mode = mode.lower()
target = Path(path).expanduser()
if not target.is_absolute():
target = (repo_root / target).resolve()
else:
target = target.resolve()
try:
rel_path = str(target.relative_to(repo_root))
except ValueError:
rel_path = None
audit_meta = {
"execution_id": exec_context.execution_id,
"session_id": exec_context.session_id,
"intent": exec_context.intent,
"agent_kind": exec_context.agent_identity.agent_kind,
"agent_instance_id": exec_context.agent_identity.instance_id,
"agent_sub_id": exec_context.agent_identity.sub_id,
"agent_display_name": exec_context.agent_identity.display_name,
"agent_model": exec_context.agent_identity.model,
}
async def get_reminders(read_mode: str) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
try:
context = await resolve_logging_context(
tool_name="read_file",
server_module=server_module,
agent_id=exec_context.agent_identity.instance_id,
require_project=False,
reminder_variables={"read_mode": read_mode},
)
return list(context.reminders or [])
except Exception:
return []
async def finalize_response(payload: Dict[str, Any], read_mode: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
payload.setdefault("mode", read_mode)
payload["reminders"] = await get_reminders(read_mode)
return payload
async def log_read(event_type: str, data: Dict[str, Any], *, include_md: bool = True) -> None:
payload = {**audit_meta, **data}
if exec_context.mode == "sentinel":
append_sentinel_event(
exec_context,
event_type=event_type,
data=payload,
log_type="sentinel",
include_md=include_md,
)
else:
await _log_project_read(
exec_context,
message=event_type,
meta=payload,
)
policy_error = _enforce_path_policy(target, repo_root)
if policy_error:
await log_read(
"scope_violation",
{"reason": policy_error, "path": str(target)},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response({
"ok": False,
"error": "read_file denied",
"reason": policy_error,
"absolute_path": str(target),
"repo_relative_path": rel_path,
}, requested_mode)
if not target.exists() or not target.is_file():
await log_read(
"read_file_error",
{"reason": "file_not_found", "path": str(target)},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response({
"ok": False,
"error": "file not found",
"absolute_path": str(target),
"repo_relative_path": rel_path,
}, requested_mode)
scan = _scan_file(target)
scan_payload = {
"absolute_path": str(target),
"repo_relative_path": rel_path,
**scan,
}
encoding = scan["encoding"]
response: Dict[str, Any] = {"ok": True, "scan": scan_payload, "mode": mode}
mode = mode.lower()
if chunk_index is None and mode == "chunk":
chunk_index = [0]
elif isinstance(chunk_index, (int, str)):
chunk_index = [int(chunk_index)]
if mode == "scan_only":
await log_read("read_file", {"read_mode": "scan_only", **scan_payload}, include_md=True)
return await finalize_response(response, "scan_only")
if mode == "chunk":
if not chunk_index:
return await finalize_response({
"ok": False,
"error": "chunk_index required for chunk mode",
"absolute_path": str(target),
"repo_relative_path": rel_path,
}, "chunk")
try:
wanted = {int(x) for x in chunk_index}
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return await finalize_response({
"ok": False,
"error": "chunk_index must be integers",
"absolute_path": str(target),
"repo_relative_path": rel_path,
}, "chunk")
max_wanted = max(wanted) if wanted else -1
remaining = set(wanted)
chunks: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for chunk in _iter_chunks(target, encoding):
index = chunk["chunk_index"]
if index in remaining:
chunks.append(chunk)
remaining.remove(index)
if not remaining and index >= max_wanted:
break
response["chunks"] = chunks
await log_read(
"read_file",
{"read_mode": "chunk", "chunk_index": sorted(wanted), **scan_payload},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response(response, "chunk")
if mode == "line_range":
if start_line is None or end_line is None:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "start_line and end_line required for line_range"}, "line_range")
if start_line < 1 or end_line < start_line:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "invalid line range"}, "line_range")
chunk = _extract_line_range(target, encoding, int(start_line), int(end_line))
response["chunk"] = chunk
await log_read(
"read_file",
{"read_mode": "line_range", "line_start": start_line, "line_end": end_line, **scan_payload},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response(response, "line_range")
if mode == "page":
if page_number is None:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "page_number required for page mode"}, "page")
size = int(page_size or settings.default_page_size)
start = (int(page_number) - 1) * size + 1
end = start + size - 1
chunk = _extract_line_range(target, encoding, start, end)
response["chunk"] = chunk
response["page_number"] = page_number
response["page_size"] = size
await log_read(
"read_file",
{"read_mode": "page", "page_number": page_number, "page_size": size, **scan_payload},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response(response, "page")
if mode == "full_stream":
if start_chunk is not None and start_chunk < 0:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "start_chunk must be >= 0"}, "full_stream")
if max_chunks is not None and max_chunks <= 0:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "max_chunks must be >= 1"}, "full_stream")
start_index = int(start_chunk if start_chunk is not None else (chunk_index[0] if chunk_index else 0))
max_chunk_count = int(max_chunks if max_chunks is not None else (page_size or 1))
chunks: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for chunk in _iter_chunks(target, encoding):
if chunk["chunk_index"] < start_index:
continue
if len(chunks) >= max_chunk_count:
break
chunks.append(chunk)
next_index = None
if chunks:
next_index = chunks[-1]["chunk_index"] + 1
if next_index >= scan["estimated_chunk_count"]:
next_index = None
response["chunks"] = chunks
response["next_chunk_index"] = next_index
await log_read(
"read_file",
{"read_mode": "full_stream", "start_chunk": start_index, "max_chunks": max_chunk_count, **scan_payload},
include_md=True,
)
return await finalize_response(response, "full_stream")
if mode == "search":
if not search:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "search pattern required for search mode"}, "search")
if max_matches is None:
max_matches = _DEFAULT_MAX_MATCHES
if max_matches <= 0:
return await finalize_response({"ok": False, "error": "max_matches must be >= 1"}, "search")
regex = search_mode.lower() == "regex"
try:
> matches = _search_file(target, encoding, search, regex, int(context_lines), max_matches)
tools/read_file.py:591:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/sample.txt'), encoding = 'utf-8', pattern = '('
regex = True, context_lines = 0, max_matches = 200
def _search_file(
path: Path,
encoding: str,
pattern: str,
regex: bool,
context_lines: int,
max_matches: Optional[int],
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
matches: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
matcher = None
if regex:
try:
matcher = re.compile(pattern)
except re.error as exc:
> raise ValueError(f"invalid regex: {exc}") from exc
E ValueError: invalid regex: missing ), unterminated subpattern at position 0
tools/read_file.py:295: ValueError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
tmp_path = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0')
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_read_file_invalid_regex_returns_error(tmp_path):
token = _install_execution_context(tmp_path)
try:
target = tmp_path / "sample.txt"
target.write_text("alpha\nbeta\ngamma\n", encoding="utf-8")
> result = await read_file(path=str(target), mode="search", search="(", search_mode="regex")
tests/test_read_file_tool.py:54:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
tools/read_file.py:593: in read_file
await log_read(
tools/read_file.py:427: in log_read
append_sentinel_event(
utils/sentinel_logs.py:107: in append_sentinel_event
_bounded_append(jsonl_path, line, repo_root=repo_root)
utils/sentinel_logs.py:35: in _bounded_append
with file_lock(path, mode="a+", timeout=timeout_seconds, repo_root=repo_root) as handle:
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/contextlib.py:137: in __enter__
return next(self.gen)
utils/files.py:95: in file_lock
lock_file.touch(exist_ok=True)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = PosixPath('/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/.scribe/sentinel/2026-01-02/sentinel.jsonl.lock')
mode = 438, exist_ok = True
def touch(self, mode=0o666, exist_ok=True):
"""
Create this file with the given access mode, if it doesn't exist.
"""
if exist_ok:
# First try to bump modification time
# Implementation note: GNU touch uses the UTIME_NOW option of
# the utimensat() / futimens() functions.
try:
os.utime(self, None)
except OSError:
# Avoid exception chaining
pass
else:
return
flags = os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY
if not exist_ok:
flags |= os.O_EXCL
> fd = os.open(self, flags, mode)
E FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/.scribe/sentinel/2026-01-02/sentinel.jsonl.lock'
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/pathlib.py:1108: FileNotFoundError
________________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_path_traversal_with_dots _________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f7290>
def test_path_traversal_with_dots(self):
"""Test that path traversal using ../ is blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test various path traversal attempts
malicious_paths = [
"../etc/passwd",
"../../etc/passwd",
"../../../etc/passwd",
"../../../../etc/shadow",
"../root/.ssh/id_rsa",
"../../.ssh/authorized_keys",
]
for malicious_path in malicious_paths:
full_path = repo_root / malicious_path
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, full_path, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:38:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8d9dff90>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f7290>
def test_path_traversal_with_dots(self):
"""Test that path traversal using ../ is blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test various path traversal attempts
malicious_paths = [
"../etc/passwd",
"../../etc/passwd",
"../../../etc/passwd",
"../../../../etc/shadow",
"../root/.ssh/id_rsa",
"../../.ssh/authorized_keys",
]
for malicious_path in malicious_paths:
full_path = repo_root / malicious_path
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, full_path, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked path traversal: {malicious_path}")
except SecurityError:
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for {malicious_path}: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:43:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f7290>
message = "Unexpected error for ../etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for ../etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
____________________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_symlink_hijacking ____________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f6a50>
def test_symlink_hijacking(self):
"""Test that symlink hijacking attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Create external file we want to access
external_file = Path(temp_dir) / "external" / "secret.txt"
external_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
external_file.write_text("secret data")
# Create symlink inside repo pointing to external file
internal_symlink = repo_root / "safe_looking_link.txt"
internal_symlink.symlink_to(external_file)
# Try to access through symlink - should be blocked
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, internal_symlink, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:62:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72af4c540650>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f6a50>
def test_symlink_hijacking(self):
"""Test that symlink hijacking attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Create external file we want to access
external_file = Path(temp_dir) / "external" / "secret.txt"
external_file.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
external_file.write_text("secret data")
# Create symlink inside repo pointing to external file
internal_symlink = repo_root / "safe_looking_link.txt"
internal_symlink.symlink_to(external_file)
# Try to access through symlink - should be blocked
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, internal_symlink, "read")
self.fail("Should have blocked symlink escape")
except SecurityError:
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for symlink test: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:67:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f6a50>
message = "Unexpected error for symlink test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for symlink test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
__________________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_absolute_path_escape ___________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f5d10>
def test_absolute_path_escape(self):
"""Test that absolute paths outside repo are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test absolute paths outside repository
forbidden_paths = [
"/etc/passwd",
"/etc/shadow",
"/root/.ssh/id_rsa",
"/home/user/.bashrc",
]
for forbidden_path in forbidden_paths:
path_obj = Path(forbidden_path)
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:86:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8ce4bbd0>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f5d10>
def test_absolute_path_escape(self):
"""Test that absolute paths outside repo are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test absolute paths outside repository
forbidden_paths = [
"/etc/passwd",
"/etc/shadow",
"/root/.ssh/id_rsa",
"/home/user/.bashrc",
]
for forbidden_path in forbidden_paths:
path_obj = Path(forbidden_path)
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked absolute path: {forbidden_path}")
except SecurityError:
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for {forbidden_path}: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:91:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478f5d10>
message = "Unexpected error for /etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for /etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
_____________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_environment_variable_injection ______________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fc350>
def test_environment_variable_injection(self):
"""Test that environment variable injection attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test paths that include environment variables
env_injection_attempts = [
"$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa",
"${HOME}/.ssh/authorized_keys",
]
for injection_attempt in env_injection_attempts:
try:
# Expand path as a user might
expanded_path = Path(injection_attempt).expanduser()
# Try to access through expanded path
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, expanded_path, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:133:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8d9cb110>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fc350>
def test_environment_variable_injection(self):
"""Test that environment variable injection attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test paths that include environment variables
env_injection_attempts = [
"$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa",
"${HOME}/.ssh/authorized_keys",
]
for injection_attempt in env_injection_attempts:
try:
# Expand path as a user might
expanded_path = Path(injection_attempt).expanduser()
# Try to access through expanded path
safe_file_operation(repo_root, expanded_path, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked env injection: {injection_attempt}")
except (OSError, RuntimeError, SecurityError):
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for env test: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:138:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fc350>
message = "Unexpected error for env test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for env test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
___________________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_device_file_access ____________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fd6d0>
def test_device_file_access(self):
"""Test that access to device files is blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test attempts to access device files
device_paths = [
"/dev/null",
"/dev/zero",
"/dev/random",
]
for device_path in device_paths:
path_obj = Path(device_path)
if path_obj.exists(): # Only test existing device files
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:157:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8cd48250>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fd6d0>
def test_device_file_access(self):
"""Test that access to device files is blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Test attempts to access device files
device_paths = [
"/dev/null",
"/dev/zero",
"/dev/random",
]
for device_path in device_paths:
path_obj = Path(device_path)
if path_obj.exists(): # Only test existing device files
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked device access: {device_path}")
except SecurityError:
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for device test: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:162:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fd6d0>
message = "Unexpected error for device test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for device test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
_______________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_temporary_directory_escape ________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fdd50>
def test_temporary_directory_escape(self):
"""Test that attempts to escape through temporary directories are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Create temp directory outside repo
external_temp = Path(temp_dir) / "external_temp"
external_temp.mkdir()
# Try to access external temp
escape_attempts = [
f"../../../{external_temp.name}/malicious",
]
for escape_attempt in escape_attempts:
path_obj = Path(escape_attempt)
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:182:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8e2cb650>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fdd50>
def test_temporary_directory_escape(self):
"""Test that attempts to escape through temporary directories are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Create temp directory outside repo
external_temp = Path(temp_dir) / "external_temp"
external_temp.mkdir()
# Try to access external temp
escape_attempts = [
f"../../../{external_temp.name}/malicious",
]
for escape_attempt in escape_attempts:
path_obj = Path(escape_attempt)
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, path_obj, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked temp escape: {escape_attempt}")
except (OSError, FileNotFoundError, SecurityError):
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for temp escape test: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:187:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fdd50>
message = "Unexpected error for temp escape test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for temp escape test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
_________________________________________ TestSandboxBypassAttempts.test_unicode_encoding_bypass _________________________________________
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fe3d0>
def test_unicode_encoding_bypass(self):
"""Test that Unicode encoding bypass attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Various encoding bypass attempts
bypass_attempts = [
"../etc/passwd\x00.txt", # Null byte injection
"..%2fetc%2fpasswd", # URL encoding
]
for bypass_attempt in bypass_attempts:
full_path = repo_root / bypass_attempt
try:
> safe_file_operation(repo_root, full_path, "read")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:204:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
security/sandbox.py:358: in safe_file_operation
return get_safety_instance().safe_file_operation(repo_root, file_path, operation, context)
security/sandbox.py:281: in safe_file_operation
permission_checker.validate_operation(operation, context)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionChecker object at 0x72ad8d922b50>, operation = 'read', context = None
def validate_operation(self, operation: str, context: Dict[str, Any] = None) -> None:
"""
Validate an operation, raising an exception if not allowed.
Args:
operation: Operation type
context: Additional context
Raises:
PermissionError: If operation is not allowed
"""
if not self.check_permission(operation, context):
> raise PermissionError(f"Operation '{operation}' is not allowed for this repository")
E scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
security/sandbox.py:203: PermissionError
During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fe3d0>
def test_unicode_encoding_bypass(self):
"""Test that Unicode encoding bypass attempts are blocked."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:
repo_root = Path(temp_dir)
config = RepoConfig.defaults_for_repo(repo_root)
# Various encoding bypass attempts
bypass_attempts = [
"../etc/passwd\x00.txt", # Null byte injection
"..%2fetc%2fpasswd", # URL encoding
]
for bypass_attempt in bypass_attempts:
full_path = repo_root / bypass_attempt
try:
safe_file_operation(repo_root, full_path, "read")
self.fail(f"Should have blocked Unicode bypass: {bypass_attempt}")
except (OSError, SecurityError):
pass # Expected - good
except Exception as e:
> self.fail(f"Unexpected error for Unicode test: {e}")
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:209:
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
self = <test_sandbox_bypass.TestSandboxBypassAttempts object at 0x72af478fe3d0>
message = "Unexpected error for Unicode test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository"
def fail(self, message):
"""Simple failure method."""
> raise AssertionError(message)
E AssertionError: Unexpected error for Unicode test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py:251: AssertionError
___________________________________________ test_log_rotation_triggers_when_max_bytes_reached ____________________________________________
monkeypatch = <_pytest.monkeypatch.MonkeyPatch object at 0x72ad8cc54110>
isolated_state = <scribe_mcp.state.manager.StateManager object at 0x72ad8cf27150>
project_root = PosixPath('/home/austin/projects/MCP_SPINE/scribe_mcp/tmp_tests/ccd78bd5-904e-418f-821f-6475e6efea2c')
def test_log_rotation_triggers_when_max_bytes_reached(monkeypatch, isolated_state, project_root):
root = project_root
run(set_project.set_project("rotation-limit", str(root)))
# First, create a large log file that exceeds the threshold
result = run(append_entry.append_entry(
message="Initial large entry that exceeds max bytes threshold when combined with metadata" * 10,
status="info",
meta={"test": "large" * 20}
))
assert result["ok"]
log_path = Path(result["path"])
# Manually patch the log to be larger than threshold
initial_content = log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
large_content = initial_content + "\n" + "Large content to exceed max bytes" * 100
log_path.write_text(large_content, encoding="utf-8")
# Now set a very low threshold and patch settings
patched_settings = replace(
settings,
log_max_bytes=100, # Set higher than 10 to avoid edge cases but still low
)
monkeypatch.setattr(append_entry, "settings", patched_settings, raising=False)
append_entry._RATE_TRACKER.clear()
append_entry._RATE_LOCKS.clear()
# Add another entry - this should trigger rotation
result = run(
append_entry.append_entry(
message="Entry that should trigger rotation",
status="info",
)
)
assert result["ok"]
# Check for archive files
archives = list(log_path.parent.glob(f"{log_path.name}.*.md"))
> assert archives, "Expected rotated archive file to be created"
E AssertionError: Expected rotated archive file to be created
E assert []
tests/test_tools.py:306: AssertionError
____________________________________ TestEnhancedRotationEngine.test_enhanced_rotation_with_integrity ____________________________________
isolated_state = <test_tools.TestEnhancedRotationEngine object at 0x72af4776f290>
project_root = PosixPath('/home/austin/projects/MCP_SPINE/scribe_mcp/tmp_tests/be646793-b825-4701-a199-b845594d4c1a')
def test_enhanced_rotation_with_integrity(isolated_state, project_root):
"""Test enhanced rotation with SHA-256 integrity verification."""
# Set up project
root = project_root
result = run(
set_project.set_project(
name="enhanced-rotation-test",
root=str(root),
defaults={"emoji": "🧪", "agent": "TestAgent"},
)
)
assert result["ok"]
# Add test entries
run(
append_entry.append_entry(
message="Test entry 1 before rotation",
status="info",
meta={"phase": "1", "test": "true"}
)
)
run(
append_entry.append_entry(
message="Test entry 2 before rotation",
status="success",
meta={"phase": "1", "test": "true"}
)
)
# Test dry run rotation
dry_run_result = run(
rotate_log.rotate_log(dry_run=True)
)
assert dry_run_result["ok"]
assert dry_run_result["dry_run"] is True
assert "rotation_id" in dry_run_result
assert "file_hash" in dry_run_result
assert "entry_count" in dry_run_result
assert "sequence_number" in dry_run_result
# Test actual enhanced rotation
rotation_result = run(
rotate_log.rotate_log(suffix="test-enhanced", confirm=True)
)
if not rotation_result["ok"]:
print(f"Rotation failed with error: {rotation_result.get('error', 'Unknown error')}")
print(f"Full rotation result: {rotation_result}")
assert rotation_result["ok"]
print(f"✅ Rotation successful!")
print(f" Archive path: {rotation_result.get('archive_path', 'N/A')}")
print(f" Archive hash: {rotation_result.get('archive_hash', 'N/A')}")
print(f" Entry count: {rotation_result.get('entry_count', 'N/A')}")
> assert rotation_result["rotation_completed"] is True
E assert None is True
tests/test_tools.py:365: AssertionError
---------------------------------------------------------- Captured stdout call ----------------------------------------------------------
✅ Rotation successful!
Archive path: /home/austin/projects/MCP_SPINE/scribe_mcp/tmp_tests/be646793-b825-4701-a199-b845594d4c1a/.scribe/docs/dev_plans/enhanced_rotation_test/PROGRESS_LOG.test-enhanced.md
Archive hash: None
Entry count: None
______________________________________ TestVectorIntegration.test_complete_vector_indexing_workflow ______________________________________
self = <test_vector_integration.TestVectorIntegration object at 0x72ad8e26e7d0>, temp_repo_with_config = PosixPath('/tmp/tmp36e6xebd')
mock_settings = <MagicMock spec='Settings' id='126089719277072'>
async def test_complete_vector_indexing_workflow(self, temp_repo_with_config, mock_settings):
"""Test complete workflow from plugin initialization to search."""
with patch('scribe_mcp.plugins.registry.settings', mock_settings), \
patch('scribe_mcp.plugins.vector_indexer.settings', mock_settings), \
patch('scribe_mcp.plugins.vector_indexer.load_vector_config') as mock_load_config:
# Set project_root dynamically for sandbox validation
mock_settings.project_root = temp_repo_with_config
# Mock vector config
mock_config_obj = MagicMock()
mock_config_obj.enabled = True
mock_config_obj.backend = "faiss"
mock_config_obj.dimension = 384
mock_config_obj.model = "all-MiniLM-L6-v2"
mock_config_obj.gpu = False
mock_config_obj.queue_max = 100
mock_config_obj.batch_size = 5
mock_load_config.return_value = mock_config_obj
# Initialize plugins
config = MagicMock(spec=RepoConfig)
config.repo_root = temp_repo_with_config
config.plugins_dir = temp_repo_with_config / "plugins"
config.plugin_config = {"enabled": True}
config.repo_slug = "tmp" # Add repo_slug
initialize_plugins(config)
# Get plugin registry and check vector indexer is loaded
registry = get_plugin_registry(temp_repo_with_config)
> assert "vector_indexer" in registry.plugins
E AssertionError: assert 'vector_indexer' in {}
E + where {} = <scribe_mcp.plugins.registry.PluginRegistry object at 0x72ad8d829590>.plugins
tests/test_vector_integration.py:116: AssertionError
----------------------------------------------------------- Captured log call ------------------------------------------------------------
ERROR scribe_mcp.plugins.registry:registry.py:253 Sandbox violation for plugin vector_indexer: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
============================================================ warnings summary ============================================================
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/starlette/formparsers.py:12
/home/austin/miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/starlette/formparsers.py:12: PendingDeprecationWarning: Please use `import python_multipart` instead.
import multipart
../../../miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/faiss/loader.py:28
/home/austin/miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/faiss/loader.py:28: DeprecationWarning: distutils Version classes are deprecated. Use packaging.version instead.
if LooseVersion(numpy.__version__) >= "1.19":
tests/test_dual_parameter_integration.py::test_append_entry_integration
tests/test_dual_parameter_support.py::test_dual_parameter_support
/home/austin/miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/_pytest/python.py:183: PytestUnhandledCoroutineWarning: async def functions are not natively supported and have been skipped.
You need to install a suitable plugin for your async framework, for example:
- anyio
- pytest-asyncio
- pytest-tornasync
- pytest-trio
- pytest-twisted
warnings.warn(PytestUnhandledCoroutineWarning(msg.format(nodeid)))
tests/test_dual_parameter_logic.py::test_dual_parameter_logic
/home/austin/miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/_pytest/python.py:198: PytestReturnNotNoneWarning: Expected None, but tests/test_dual_parameter_logic.py::test_dual_parameter_logic returned False, which will be an error in a future version of pytest. Did you mean to use `assert` instead of `return`?
warnings.warn(
tests/test_dual_parameter_simple.py::test_dual_parameter_simple
/home/austin/miniconda3/envs/uap/lib/python3.11/site-packages/_pytest/python.py:198: PytestReturnNotNoneWarning: Expected None, but tests/test_dual_parameter_simple.py::test_dual_parameter_simple returned True, which will be an error in a future version of pytest. Did you mean to use `assert` instead of `return`?
warnings.warn(
tests/test_read_file_tool.py::test_read_file_search_default_max_matches
tests/test_read_file_tool.py::test_read_file_invalid_regex_returns_error
/home/austin/projects/MCP_SPINE/scribe_mcp/utils/sentinel_logs.py:106: RuntimeWarning: coroutine 'ensure_parent' was never awaited
ensure_parent(jsonl_path, repo_root=repo_root)
Enable tracemalloc to get traceback where the object was allocated.
See https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html#resource-warnings for more info.
-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
======================================================== short test summary info =========================================================
FAILED tests/test_multi_repo_file_ops.py::test_append_line_blocks_outside_server_root_without_repo_root - scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'append' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_multi_repo_file_ops.py::test_repo_root_override_allows_cross_repo_append_read_rotate - scribe_mcp.security.sandbox.PermissionError: Operation 'append' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_read_file_tool.py::test_read_file_search_default_max_matches - FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_search_default_0/.scribe/sent...
FAILED tests/test_read_file_tool.py::test_read_file_invalid_regex_returns_error - FileNotFoundError: [Errno 2] No such file or directory: '/tmp/pytest-of-austin/pytest-58/test_read_file_invalid_regex_r0/.scribe/sent...
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_path_traversal_with_dots - AssertionError: Unexpected error for ../etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_symlink_hijacking - AssertionError: Unexpected error for symlink test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_absolute_path_escape - AssertionError: Unexpected error for /etc/passwd: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_environment_variable_injection - AssertionError: Unexpected error for env test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_device_file_access - AssertionError: Unexpected error for device test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_temporary_directory_escape - AssertionError: Unexpected error for temp escape test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_sandbox_bypass.py::TestSandboxBypassAttempts::test_unicode_encoding_bypass - AssertionError: Unexpected error for Unicode test: Operation 'read' is not allowed for this repository
FAILED tests/test_tools.py::test_log_rotation_triggers_when_max_bytes_reached - AssertionError: Expected rotated archive file to be created
FAILED tests/test_tools.py::TestEnhancedRotationEngine::test_enhanced_rotation_with_integrity - assert None is True
FAILED tests/test_vector_integration.py::TestVectorIntegration::test_complete_vector_indexing_workflow - AssertionError: assert 'vector_indexer' in {}
============================= 14 failed, 708 passed, 6 skipped, 7 deselected, 8 warnings in 89.25s (0:01:29) =============================
(uap) austin@Nicolas:~/projects/MCP_SPINE/scribe_mcp$
