Which integrations are available for this server?

Provides tools for scanning Solana tokens for risk, simulating and checking Solana transactions, executing trades and transfers through Sentinel, and managing guarded Solana wallets with on-chain policy enforcement. It uses live Solana mainnet data and supports guarded wallet operations via Squads v4 multisig. Sends owner approval alerts to Telegram with action buttons to approve, reject, unfreeze, or revoke an agent, enabling remote oversight and control of guarded wallet decisions.

How do I use Sentinel?

1. Click on "Deploy Server". 2. Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state. 3. In the chat, type @ followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Sentinel buy 2 SOL of BONK, but scan and simulate before signing" That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed. Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.

Sentinel

by 0xNickdev

Overview Schema Source Related Servers Discussions Admin

TypeScript

Remote

Sentinel

The security gateway between an AI agent and its Solana wallet.

Sentinel checks the token, simulates the transaction and applies the owner's policy before anything is signed. On a guarded wallet the rules are enforced on-chain: the agent cannot move funds without Sentinel's vote.

Live npm License: MIT Solana Squads MCP TypeScript ClawPump

Website · Quickstart · API · Architecture · Security

Related MCP server: chain-signer

Why Sentinel

AI agents now trade, launch tokens and move money on Solana with their own keys. That key will sign whatever the agent asks it to sign.

Risk	What happens
Scams at scale	Thousands of launches a day. Bundles, snipers, dev dumps and honeypots are invisible in a DEX interface.
Prompt injection	Agents read tweets and token descriptions. One malicious line can make the key sign away the whole wallet.
Piecemeal protection	A token checker does not stop a transfer to the wrong address. Security has to cover the whole path.
Blind signing	Nobody shows the agent or its owner what a transaction will actually do before it is signed.

Sentinel is one layer across that whole path, from the agent's decision to the money in the wallet.

How it works

The agent calls sentinel.execute(intent) instead of signing directly. Everything else happens inside the gateway.

flowchart LR
    A["Agent intent<br/>buy token X for 2 SOL"] --> S["Scan<br/>token score 0-100"]
    S -->|critical flag or<br/>score below policy| B1["Block"]
    S --> T["Build<br/>Jupiter route / transfer"]
    T --> SIM["Simulate & decode<br/>what leaves, what arrives,<br/>which programs run"]
    SIM --> P["Policy engine<br/>limits · allowlist · slippage<br/>new recipients · frequency"]
    P --> D{Decision}
    D -->|allow| OK["Unsigned tx<br/>for the agent key"]
    D -->|confirm| C["Owner approves<br/>web page · Telegram"]
    D -->|block| B2["Reason returned"]
    D -->|freeze| F["Kill-switch<br/>wallet frozen"]

Every decision is logged with its reasons and the rules version that produced it, so the owner can see exactly why the wallet said no.

Features

Module	What it does
Scan	0-100 risk score for any Solana token from live mainnet data: creator history, holder concentration and funding clusters, bundles and snipers, mint / freeze authority, liquidity and LP lock, a Jupiter sell test for honeypots, metadata impersonation.
Bastion	Simulates the exact transaction before signing and decodes balance changes, recipients and invoked programs. Applies the owner's policy and detects drainer patterns (token approvals to strangers, owner changes, account takeover).
Gateway	`sentinel.execute(intent)`: builds the transaction (Jupiter for swaps), runs Scan and Bastion, returns a decision and an unsigned transaction. Non-custodial: it never signs.
Guard	On-chain enforcement through a Squads v4 multisig. The agent can only propose, Sentinel can only approve, the owner keeps full control. A compromised agent cannot move funds.
Kill-switch	A drain attempt, a size spike or abnormal frequency freezes the wallet. The freeze persists until the owner lifts it with a signed message.
Owner approval	A review page and Telegram alerts with action buttons: approve, reject, unfreeze, revoke the agent. Every action is signed by the owner's own wallet.
MCP server	Eight tools over Streamable HTTP for Claude, Cursor, ClawPump and any MCP client.
SDK	`clawpump-sentinel` on npm: one line to ask Sentinel, then sign and send only when allowed.
Decision log	Every verdict with reasons and rules version, stored in Postgres and queryable by wallet.

Guarded wallets

A guarded wallet is a Squads v4 multisig with three members and a threshold of one vote:

Member	Initiate	Vote	Execute	Can it move funds alone?
Owner	✓	✓	✓	Yes. Full control, always.
Agent	✓		✓	No. It has no vote.
Sentinel		✓		No. It cannot propose anything.

The agent's transaction executes only after a vote, and the only votes belong to the owner and to Sentinel. Sentinel votes only for what passes Scan and Bastion. Refusing to vote is the kill-switch. This is enforced by the Squads program, not by Sentinel's server.

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant Agent
    participant Sentinel
    participant Squads as Squads program
    participant Owner

    Agent->>Sentinel: guard_execute(intent)
    Sentinel->>Sentinel: Scan + simulate the vault transaction + policy
    alt allow
        Sentinel-->>Agent: proposal tx carrying Sentinel's vote
        Agent->>Squads: create proposal (+ approval)
        Agent->>Squads: execute
        Squads-->>Agent: funds move
    else confirm
        Sentinel-->>Agent: proposal tx without a vote
        Sentinel-->>Owner: Telegram: review and approve
        Owner->>Squads: approve + execute (owner wallet)
    else block or freeze
        Sentinel-->>Agent: reasons, no transaction
        Sentinel-->>Owner: Telegram alert (freeze: unfreeze / revoke)
    end
    Note over Agent,Squads: An agent that proposes on its own cannot execute:<br/>Squads rejects it with InvalidProposalStatus.

Verified on devnet with real transactions, including a bypass attempt where the agent proposed a drain directly in Squads and the program rejected the execution.

Decision model

The strictest reason wins: freeze > block > confirm > allow.

Decision	Meaning	Gateway returns	Guarded wallet
`allow`	Passed every check	Unsigned transaction	Sentinel votes, agent executes
`confirm`	Needs the owner, for example a new recipient	Unsigned transaction + flag	Proposal waits for the owner
`block`	Failed a check, for example a rug token or an over-limit trade	Reasons only	No vote
`freeze`	Looks like a compromised agent	Reasons only	Wallet frozen until the owner unfreezes

In warn mode the same analysis runs and the decision is returned as a recommendation (enforced: false).

Quickstart

Model Context Protocol

Add the server as a custom connector in Claude, Cursor or any MCP client:

https://sentinel-clawpump.vercel.app/api/mcp

Tool	Purpose
`scan_token`	Risk score for a token before buying it
`execute_intent`	Trade or transfer through Sentinel, returns decision + unsigned tx
`check_transaction`	Judge a transaction the agent built itself
`guard_setup`	Create a guarded wallet (owner signs)
`guard_execute`	Trade from a guarded wallet
`guard_finalize`	Execute an approved guarded transaction
`guard_status`	Members, balance, enforcement, freeze state
`decision_log`	Recent decisions with reasons

TypeScript SDK

npm i clawpump-sentinel @solana/web3.js

import { Sentinel } from 'clawpump-sentinel';

const sentinel = new Sentinel({ policy: { limits: { per_tx_sol: 2, per_day_sol: 10 } } });

const res = await sentinel.executeAndSend(
  { type: 'buy', wallet: agent.publicKey.toBase58(), mint, sol: 0.5 },
  agent,       // the agent's Keypair: Sentinel never sees it
  connection,
);
// signed and sent only when res.decision === 'allow'

Guarded wallet in one call per trade:

const run = await sentinel.guard.run({ multisig, intent: { type: 'buy', agent: agentKey.publicKey.toBase58(), mint, sol: 0.5 } }, agentKey, connection);
run.executed;     // true when Sentinel approved and it ran on-chain
run.approvalUrl;  // set when the owner must approve

REST

curl -X POST https://sentinel-clawpump.vercel.app/api/execute \
  -H 'content-type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "intent": { "type": "buy", "wallet": "<agent wallet>", "mint": "<token CA>", "sol": 0.5 },
    "policy": { "limits": { "per_tx_sol": 2, "per_day_sol": 10 }, "mode": "enforce" }
  }'

Policy

{
  "limits": { "per_tx_sol": 2, "per_day_sol": 10 },
  "programs": ["pump.fun", "jupiter"],
  "min_token_score": 60,
  "max_slippage_bps": 300,
  "new_recipient": "confirm",
  "max_tx_per_hour": 20,
  "recipients": [],
  "mode": "enforce"
}

Every field is optional and merged over these defaults (GET /api/policy/default).

API reference

Base URL: https://sentinel-clawpump.vercel.app

Method	Endpoint	Description
`GET`	`/api/scan/:mint`	Token risk score with flags and per-block breakdown
`POST`	`/api/execute`	`sentinel.execute(intent)`: decision + unsigned transaction
`POST`	`/api/bastion/check`	Judge a serialized transaction before signing
`POST`	`/api/guard/setup`	Create a guarded wallet (owner signs the returned tx)
`POST`	`/api/guard/execute`	Guarded intent: proposal with Sentinel's vote when allowed
`POST`	`/api/guard/finalize`	Execute transaction for an approved proposal
`POST`	`/api/guard/status`	Members, roles, balance, enforcement, freeze
`POST`	`/api/guard/proposal`	Decoded proposal with Bastion's analysis
`POST`	`/api/guard/approve` · `/reject`	Owner approval or rejection transaction
`POST`	`/api/guard/revoke`	Owner removes the agent (owner-side kill-switch)
`POST`	`/api/guard/unfreeze`	Lift a freeze with the owner's signed message
`GET`	`/api/journal?wallet=`	Decision log
`POST`	`/api/mcp`	MCP server (Streamable HTTP, stateless)
`GET`	`/api/health`	Service status

Guard endpoints accept "cluster": "devnet" for testing. Errors are JSON { "error": "..." } with 400 for bad input, 401/403 for authorization, 404 for missing accounts, 409 for state conflicts, 429 for rate limits and 502 when an upstream data source fails.

Scan scoring rules

Rules version scan-v1.0. Seven blocks, 100 points.

Block	Weight	Signals	Source
Creator	20	Prior launches and dead-token rate, dev dump, wallet age	Helius DAS, DexScreener
Holders	20	Top-10 share excluding pools, burns and program vaults; largest wallet; clusters funded from one SOL source	Helius RPC, Enhanced Transactions
Bundles & snipers	15	Buyers in the creation block and the first three slots	Mint history
Authorities	15	Mint / freeze authority, mutable metadata, dangerous Token-2022 extensions	RPC, DAS
Liquidity	15	Depth on a log scale, LP lock (pump.fun curve, PumpSwap)	pump.fun curve, DexScreener
Trading anomalies	10	Jupiter sell test (honeypot), wash trading, crashes and spikes	Jupiter, DexScreener
Metadata	5	Reachable metadata, socials, ticker impersonation	IPFS, DexScreener

Critical flags block regardless of score: active mint authority, active freeze authority, permanent delegate, non-transferable, pausable, frozen-by-default, no sell route, liquidity under $500. A failing data source never fails the scan: the block gets half weight and an insufficient_data flag.

Bastion checks

Check	Decision
Simulation fails	`block`
Token approval to a stranger, token-account owner change, wallet reassignment	`block`, regardless of policy
Program outside the allowlist	`block`
Trade above `per_tx_sol`, 24h spend above `per_day_sol` (from on-chain history)	`block`
Received token has a critical Scan flag or scores below `min_token_score`	`block`
Actual slippage against a fresh Jupiter quote above `max_slippage_bps`	`block`
Transfer to an address the wallet never paid before	`new_recipient`: `confirm` / `block` / `allow`
Amount above 5× the limit, draining ≥ 90% of the balance, frequency at `max_tx_per_hour`	`freeze`

Fees and rent are separated from trade value, so they never read as slippage.

Self-hosting

git clone https://github.com/0xNickdev/sentinel.git && cd sentinel
npm install
cp .env.example .env    # fill in the values below
npm start               # API + website on http://127.0.0.1:8787

Variable	Required	Purpose
`HELIUS_API_KEY`	✓	Solana RPC, DAS and Enhanced Transactions (helius.dev)
`SENTINEL_APPROVER_SECRET`	for Guard	Sentinel's vote-only key (base58). It cannot propose or move funds.
`DATABASE_URL`	recommended	Postgres for the decision log, shared cache, rate limits, freezes, Telegram links. In-memory fallback without it.
`TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN`	optional	Owner alerts and the `/check` bot
`PUBLIC_URL`	optional	Base URL used in approval links

Deploy to Vercel:

npm run build:vercel   # bundles the API into api/index.mjs
vercel deploy --prod

Project structure

src/
├── scan/          token risk engine: context, seven scoring blocks, orchestrator
├── bastion/       simulation, decoder, policy engine, wallet history
├── gateway/       sentinel.execute(intent), decision journal
├── guard/         Squads guarded wallets, approvals, freezes
├── mcp/           MCP server and tools
├── notify/        Telegram alerts and bot commands
├── lib/           RPC and market clients, Postgres, cluster context
├── app.ts         HTTP API (Fastify)
├── server.ts      local server
└── vercel.ts      serverless entry
public/            website and owner approval page
sdk/               clawpump-sentinel npm package
scripts/           end-to-end and devnet verification
docs/              architecture notes

Testing

Command	What it verifies
`npm run typecheck`	Strict TypeScript across the codebase
`npm run e2e`	Nine gateway scenarios on mainnet data (simulation only, nothing is sent)
`npm run guard:devnet`	Guarded wallet with real devnet transactions: allowed transfer, injection freeze, persistent freeze and unfreeze, owner approval, bypass attempt rejected on-chain, agent revocation
`npm run mcp:check`	The MCP server through the official MCP client
`npm run scan -- <mint>`	Score any token from the terminal

All scripts accept API=<url> to run against a deployment.

Security model

Non-custodial. Sentinel never holds a private key that can move funds. The gateway returns unsigned transactions, and Sentinel's guard key can only vote.
On-chain enforcement. On guarded wallets the vote requirement is enforced by the Squads program. Sentinel's server going down blocks the agent, never the owner.
Owner supremacy. The owner can approve, execute, revoke the agent and withdraw at any time without Sentinel.
Explainable. Every decision carries its reasons and rules version and is written to the decision log.
Fail-safe data. Upstream failures degrade a single scoring block instead of producing a false verdict.

See SECURITY.md for the threat model and how to report a vulnerability.

License

MIT

Scores and decisions are risk indicators, not financial advice.

This server cannot be deployed

One endpoint for every MCP toolRayrun runs every MCP server behind one URL and holds the credentials. Each call is decided per client, tool, and argument, then recorded.ray.runAd

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained

ResponsivenessNo issues

Resources

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Sentinel

Contents

Why Sentinel

How it works

Features

Guarded wallets

Decision model

Quickstart

Model Context Protocol

TypeScript SDK

REST

Policy

API reference

Scan scoring rules

Bastion checks

Self-hosting

Project structure

Testing

Security model

License

Maintenance

Resources

Related MCP Connectors

Related MCP Servers

aegis-defi

chain-signer

WETH

Guardian MCP