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websex_exploit_search

Search for exploits using searchsploit within a specified engagement namespace.

Instructions

Run exploit search from the WebSex exploitation toolkit. The container executes searchsploit directly with the supplied argv tokens; shell parsing is never used. Runs from the selected engagement namespace; use relative paths for engagement artifacts.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
stdinNo
argumentsYes
engagement_idYes
working_directoryNo.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No arguments

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.0

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are present, so the description carries the full behavioral burden. It usefully discloses that argv tokens are passed directly with no shell parsing (a meaningful security/quoting trait) and that it runs from the engagement namespace. However, it says nothing about permissions, side effects on the filesystem, rate limits, or execution environment beyond namespace scoping.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences with no redundancy, and the core action is front-loaded ahead of execution details. Efficient prose that earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be described. But with 0% schema coverage and no annotations, the description leaves gaps around engagement_id/stdin handling and the safety profile of running an exploit tool. Adequate but not complete for a 4-param execution tool.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate. It clarifies that `arguments` are argv tokens (not a shell string) and that the working directory should use relative paths for engagement artifacts, implicitly touching two of the four params. `engagement_id` and `stdin` semantics are left unexplained.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource: it runs an exploit search via `searchsploit` from the WebSex toolkit. This is identifiable and distinguishable from most siblings. It stops short of naming which catalog it queries or how it differs from websex_cve_lookup, so differentiation from the closest sibling is not explicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies usage (local exploit lookups against the searchsploit database within an engagement namespace) but gives no explicit when-to-use, when-not, or alternative routing. An agent must infer whether to pick this versus websex_cve_lookup or websex_metasploit.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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