Skip to main content
Glama

Agent Reserve Protocol Authorization Firewall

Server Details

Advisory policy preflight for AI-agent spend requests; never executes payments or accesses wallets.

If you are the author of this connector, you can claim ownership with GitHub, an HTTP challenge, or a DNS record. Claimed connector authors can inspect health checks, view analytics, and manage their listing.
Status
Healthy
Last Tested
Transport
Streamable HTTP
URL

TDQS

A4/5.0

Scored across 1 tool

Disambiguation5/5

Only one tool exists, so there is no possibility of confusing it with another. The purpose is clearly scoped to spend request evaluation.

Naming Consistency5/5

With a single tool, naming consistency is trivially maintained. The verb_noun pattern is clear and appropriate.

Tool Count3/5

One tool feels thin for a component titled 'Authorization Firewall,' but the advisory-only scope may justify a minimal surface. It borders on reasonable but lacks supporting operations.

Completeness2/5

The tool only performs preflight authorization checks. There are no tools for managing the owner-defined mandate, policy configuration, or enforcement, leaving significant gaps for the implied domain.

Available Tools

1 tool
evaluate_agent_spend_requestEvaluate agent spend requestA
Read-onlyIdempotent
Inspect

Return eligible, escalate, or block under an owner-defined mandate. Advisory preflight only; never executes payment or accesses a wallet.

ParametersJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
amountYes
mandateValidYesWhether a current owner-approved mandate exists.
vendorStatusYes
receiptStatusYes
dailyRemainingYes
perRequestLimitYes

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true, idempotentHint=true, and destructiveHint=false. The description adds valuable behavioral context beyond those hints: it is advisory-only, does not execute payment, does not access a wallet, and returns one of three triage labels. No contradiction with annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The description is a single compact sentence with no filler. It front-loads the core behavior (what it returns) and then adds the critical safety qualifier (advisory, no payment/wallet access). Every clause earns its place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 6-parameter decision tool with no output schema, the description states the return categories and assures no side effects. The parameter names and enums are mostly self-explanatory, and the closed-world/read-only annotations cover safety. It stops short of explaining the mapping of inputs to outputs, but that is plausibly intentional since the mandate is owner-defined.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters2/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 17% (only mandateValid has a description). The description references the mandate concept but does not explain the meaning of vendorStatus, receiptStatus, amount, perRequestLimit, or dailyRemaining, nor how they combine to produce a decision. With such low schema coverage, the description needed to compensate and largely does not.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and result—'Return eligible, escalate, or block'—and identifies the resource as an agent spend request under an owner-defined mandate. It also disambiguates the tool's nature with 'Advisory preflight only', making its role unmistakable even with no sibling tools to differentiate.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There are no sibling tools, so no alternative routing is needed. The description gives clear usage context: this is a preflight evaluation tool. It also provides an explicit when-not boundary with 'never executes payment or accesses a wallet', which helps an agent avoid misuse. A 5 would require an explicit 'use when' statement or explicit alternative names.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 1 tool update
    • First observedevaluate_agent_spend_request

Related MCP Connectors

Related MCP Servers

  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    B
    maintenance
    Autonomous financial policy engine and budget guard for AI agent fleets. It verifies payment payloads, velocity caps, escrow release terms, and slippage inflation, returning risk verdicts and signed attestations.
    1
    MIT
  • F
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    C
    maintenance
    Enables AI agents to propose wallet payments while a local, human-authored policy decides whether each transaction is approved, requires human confirmation, or is refused, and records every decision in a signed, append-only ledger.
    -
  • A
    license
    Not graded
    quality
    C
    maintenance
    Enables AI agents to verify proposed payments against their assigned task, budgets, permitted categories, and counterparties, returning an ALLOW or DENY decision with a tamper-evident audit trail.
    MIT
Try in Browser

Glama MCP Gateway

Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.

Resources