Boundra
Click on "Deploy Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Boundrashould my agent pay $25 to api.openai.com for API credits?"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Boundra · Payment approval gateway for AI agents
Boundra (boundra.io) — Boundaries for agent payments. The boundary layer for agent payments: before any money moves, answer "should this payment happen at all?"
Our thesis: the opportunity in agent payments is not "how to pay" (protocols solved that) but "whether to pay."
One natural-language rule → compiled into a policy → every payment the agent attempts is genuinely evaluated → allow / ask a human / veto, with a full audit trail.
Two run modes:
Offline simulation (
demo.py): stdlib only, self-contained mock merchant and wallets, zero dependencies, zero networkReal protocol (
demo/demo_real.py): standard MCP server + real x402 SDK + Base Sepolia testnet
Data flow

Policies and keys stay with the user; the gateway is read-only; only hash commitments go on-chain. Revocation is free — forever, no exceptions.
Related MCP server: Cerberus
See it run in 60 seconds
# 1. Hit the hosted evaluation API — a real, public x402 merchant
curl -X POST https://api.boundra.io/evaluate/basic \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"intent":{"amount":0.01,"recipient":"api.weather.com","purpose":"weather data"}}'
# → {"decision":"ALLOW",...} · semantic layer: 100 free calls per agent, then $0.003 via x402
# 2. Local end-to-end simulation — a data-procurement agent's day
.venv/bin/python demo/simulate_agent.py
# signed policy publish → ALLOW / DENY (limit) / ASK → user-signed approval token
# → prompt-injection blocked → audit trail, plus a dogfood call to api.boundra.io
# 3. One-line MCP install + 2-minute policy wizard
uvx --from git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra boundra-mcp # stdio server
uvx --from git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra boundra-init # wallet → template → sign → anchor
uvx --from git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra boundra-approve # sign an ASK challengeThe complete flow, step by step
Zero to a signed, enforced policy in ~10 minutes. No accounts, no dashboards — your wallet key is your identity.
0 · Try the hosted API (30 seconds, nothing to install)
curl -X POST https://api.boundra.io/evaluate/basic \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"intent":{"amount":0.01,"recipient":"api.weather.com","purpose":"weather data"}}'1 · Bind your identity — the wallet is the account
uvx --from git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra boundra-initCreates or imports a Base wallet. No signup, no email — the private key never leaves your device, and your address is your identity everywhere in the system.
2 · Set your policy
The wizard offers templates (personal assistant / travel / dev API / procurement) or lets you write your own rule in plain English, then compiles it and shows you exactly what will be enforced — before anything is signed.
3 · Sign & publish
You sign the policy document with your wallet key (EIP-191). It is published as a versioned document and a hash commitment is anchored on-chain. From this moment the gateway is read-only for every agent — changing the policy without your key is impossible.
4 · Mount the MCP server into your agent
{ "mcpServers": { "boundra": { "command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra", "boundra-mcp"] } } }5 · Every payment gets a verdict before signing
Your agent calls evaluate_payment; the 5-stage pipeline answers
ALLOW (sign & settle) / DENY (aborted pre-signature, zero on-chain
trace) / ASK (a challenge bound to this exact payment).
6 · When the agent asks, you decide
uvx --from git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra boundra-approvePaste the ASK challenge, sign it on your device — the agent retries with the signed approval token. Forged, rebound, or replayed tokens are rejected.
7 · Watch, update, revoke
get_spend_report / get_audit_trail / get_policy_versions keep you in
control day to day. Every policy change is a new signed version
(set_policy); revoke_policy is instant default-deny and free forever.
Quick start (from source)
cd boundra
# Mode 1: offline simulation (run this first — the full flow in 30 seconds)
python demo/demo.py
# Mode 2: real x402 + MCP
python -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install \
"x402[evm,httpx]" mcp eth-account fastapi uvicorn
.venv/bin/python tests/test_mcp_client.py # MCP protocol-level tests
.venv/bin/python demo/setup_wallets.py # generate Base Sepolia test wallets + faucet guide
.venv/bin/python demo/demo_real.py # real protocol end-to-end (settles on-chain after funding)Architecture: where the gateway stands
Agent framework (Claude / custom)
│ MCP protocol (stdio)
▼
mcp_server.py ──→ policy.py 5-stage evaluation pipeline
(policy decision semantic → whitelist → limit → approval → budget
point)
▲
│ on_before_payment_creation hook (x402 SDK v2 native interception point)
x402_buyer.py ──sign (EIP-3009)──→ x402 server ──→ facilitator ──→ Base SepoliaKey finding: x402 SDK v2 natively provides the on_before_payment_creation
hook plus register_policy / set_spend_controls — the policy layer is not a
bolt-on; it is the slot the official protocol stack reserves. This validates
the wedge.
File map
boundra/
├── policy.py intent compilation (NL→Policy, bilingual CN/EN) + 5-stage pipeline + platform red lines
├── signed_policy.py ★ signed policy documents + version chain + revocation (keccak)
├── approval.py ★ signed approval tokens (challenge → user signs → gateway verifies)
├── mandate.py ★ task Mandates: single-use authorization, burned after use (pipeline layer 4)
├── templates.py ★ policy template library (personal assistant / travel / dev API / procurement)
├── chain_anchor.py ★ anchor backends: local simulation + real Base Sepolia (web3)
├── gateway.py gateway core v3: 4-layer stacking + token verification + Mandate + revocation
├── rail_adapters.py ★ rail adapter layer: evaluation core decoupled from settlement rails (x402 first)
├── mcp_server.py ★ standard MCP server (11 tools, stdio)
├── boundra_cli.py ★ boundra-init (policy wizard) + boundra-approve (challenge signer)
├── contracts/
│ └── PolicyAnchor.sol ★ on-chain commitment contract (owner-write, anyone-read)
├── demo/
│ ├── simulate_agent.py ★ end-to-end user journey simulation (MCP + hosted API dogfood)
│ ├── demo_policy.py signed-policy demo (impersonation / unsigned / tampering attacks all blocked)
│ ├── demo_real.py real-protocol end-to-end orchestration
│ ├── x402_resource_server.py real x402 paywall server (FastAPI middleware)
│ ├── x402_buyer.py real x402 buyer, evaluated by the MCP gateway before signing
│ ├── setup_wallets.py Base Sepolia test wallet generation
│ └── demo.py / merchant.py / agent.py offline simulation (zero dependencies)
├── tests/
│ ├── test_product.py ★ product tests (22 assertions)
│ └── test_mcp_client.py MCP protocol-level tests
├── docs/
│ ├── dataflow.png data-flow diagram (English)
│ └── render_*.py diagram renderers (architecture / flow / use-case / data flow)
└── state/audit.jsonl audit trail (generated at runtime, gitignored)Signed policies: the root of trust is the user's key, not the gateway's database (v2)
A policy is a document signed by the user's wallet, not a row in the gateway's configuration:
user private key signature ──→ PolicyDocument (NL rule + compiled artifact + prev_hash + version)
│ three checks: signer == owner, versions sequential, prev_hash unbroken
▼
PolicyStore (version chain) ──→ LocalAnchor (simulated commitment; production writes to contract)
│
▼ check_integrity before every evaluation (signature + anchor)
5-stage pipeline; audit records cite policy version + hashRead-only for agents: without the user's private key,
set_policyalways fails — impersonation, unsigned, and tampered submissions are all blocked (seven scenarios indemo/demo_policy.py)Two stacked scopes: user-level (rules for all agents) × agent-level (per-agent rules); the strictest verdict wins
Every version bump is a signature: v2 must reference v1's hash; tampering with any historical version → signature invalid + chain broken
Privacy shape: only hash commitments go on-chain; policy plaintext never leaves the device unless the user chooses to disclose
Run: .venv/bin/python demo/demo_policy.py
MCP server tools
Tool | Purpose | Caller |
| Pre-payment evaluation. ALLOW proceeds / DENY aborts / ASK returns a challenge the user signs; retry with | Agent |
| Privileged: submit a new policy version; requires the owner's EIP-191 signature | User only |
| Privileged: revoke a policy chain (default-deny immediately, free forever) | User only |
| Policy version history (chain + hashes, comparable with on-chain commitments) | Anyone |
| View the legacy fallback policy | Anyone |
| Today's spend / remaining budget | Agent |
| Approval audit records | Agent |
| Agent asks the user for a policy change (queued, never self-applied) | Agent |
| Policy template helpers | Agent |
Mount into Claude Desktop
One line — uvx resolves dependencies and starts the server:
{
"mcpServers": {
"boundra": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": ["--from", "git+https://github.com/gobeyondfj-cmd/boundra", "boundra-mcp"]
}
}
}On first run, use the boundra-init wizard (same package): create/import a
wallet → pick a policy template → sign → publish via MCP, about 2 minutes.
When your agent hits ASK, run boundra-approve and paste the challenge to
produce a signed approval token.
⚠️ Known trust-boundary simplifications (must fix for production)
human_approvedself-attested by the agentsolved (v3): human approval is now a signed approval token (approval.py) — ASK returns a challenge bound to the exact payment intent; the user's device signs it; the gateway verifies signature + field-by-field intent match + nonce replay protection. The legacy self-attested path remains but is taggedapprove(legacy-deprecated).MCP-level interception is advisory — an agent framework can bypass the gateway and talk to the wallet directly. Mitigation: pair with x402's native hook (demonstrated in
demo/demo_real.py; the hook fires inside the SDK, before signing). Endgame: compile the deterministic parts of policy into a smart-contract wallet module, enforced at the settlement layer.Semantic detection is regex-based — production should swap in LLM evaluation + intent anchoring.
Anchoring defaults to a local log — the real contract (
contracts/PolicyAnchor.sol) and web3 client (chain_anchor.BaseSepoliaAnchor) are ready; setchain_config.jsonto switch to the real chain (deploy via Remix with test ETH).
Economic model: the evaluation API is itself an x402 merchant
Tiered pricing:
Operation | Price |
Deterministic evaluation ( | Free |
Semantic evaluation ( | 100 free calls per agent; then $0.003 USDC/call (real x402 charge) |
Policy anchoring / revocation | Free (revocation is free forever — a safety red line) |
Open core: the client, evaluation engine, and demos in this repo are
Apache-2.0. The hosted evaluation service (tiered pricing, free-quota
accounting, revenue ledger) runs from the private boundra-ops repo.
Verified / not yet verified
Verified (all of test_product.py 22 assertions + test_mcp_client.py pass):
4-layer policy stacking (platform red lines × user × agent × Mandate) with
strictest-wins; signed approval tokens (valid passes, forged rejected,
intent-rebinding rejected, replay rejected); Mandate single-use; revocation
defaults to deny and a signed v2 restores; template render+compile; all MCP
tools over the wire; gateway blocks an injection attack inside the real x402
402 round-trip before the SDK signs; the full tiered-pricing loop on Base
Sepolia (2026-10-16): free tier passes, paid tier settles $0.003 USDC for real
(buyer 20.000 → 19.997, platform address credited 0.003), dogfood hook
self-evaluates, semantic layer blocks the injection, /revenue ledger entry.
The settlement tx is publicly verifiable: 0x5ad8ef4b…c474bbe
(the hosted service code is closed by design — the chain is the receipt).
Not yet verified: real on-chain anchoring (contract ready, needs test ETH to deploy); real user demand; semantic layer false-positive rate under real LLM behavior distributions.
This server cannot be deployed
Maintenance
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