Threatist
Server Details
Vulnerability records: CVE, GHSA, CISA KEV, EPSS and vendor fixes in one place. No key needed.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool targets a distinct resource: advisories, vendors, individual vulnerabilities, exploited vulnerabilities, and search results. The only mild overlap is between get_vendor and search_vulnerabilities, since both return vulnerability records and accept similar filters, but get_vendor is clearly vendor-scoped.
All names follow a consistent snake_case verb_noun pattern: get_advisory, get_vendor, get_vulnerability, list_exploited, and search_vulnerabilities. The verbs accurately signal the operation type.
Five tools is a well-scoped surface for a read-only vulnerability intelligence service. Each tool covers a meaningful access pattern without redundant or filler operations.
The set covers search, direct retrieval by ID, advisory lookup, vendor-scoped retrieval, and the CISA KEV catalogue, which are the core workflows. Minor gaps exist around discovering vendor names or browsing by product/CPE, but agents can work around these via search filters.
Available Tools
5 toolsget_advisoryCRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
A Red Hat RHSA or Microsoft KB or ADV with its CVEs and records.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | An advisory id such as RHSA-2024:0001, KB5034441 or ADV240001 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and openWorldHint=false, so safety and idempotency are covered. The description adds that the result bundles the advisory's CVEs and records, which is useful return-content context in the absence of an output schema, but says nothing about lookup failure behavior (e.g., unknown id) or result size.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
It is short and front-loaded with the supported advisory types, but it is a sentence fragment that reads as a label rather than an instruction, so the brevity comes at the cost of clarity. No filler, but also no actionable framing.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a one-parameter read tool with full annotations and full schema coverage, the essential lookup contract is implied and the return contents are sketched. Missing is any routing guidance against the similarly-scoped siblings, which is the main thing an agent still needs.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% and the single id parameter is documented with concrete examples (RHSA-2024:0001, KB5034441, ADV240001). The description adds no further meaning about the id format or accepted prefixes, so the schema does all the work and baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names the resource scope (Red Hat RHSA, Microsoft KB/ADV advisories) but is a bare noun phrase with no verb, so the agent must infer that this is a fetch-by-id operation from the name and schema. It does not differentiate itself from siblings like get_vulnerability or get_vendor, which also return CVE-related data.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no when-to-use guidance at all: no statement of when to pick this over get_vulnerability, get_vendor, or search_vulnerabilities, and no prerequisite or exclusion conditions. The agent must deduce routing from the resource names alone.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_vendorARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
A vendor's records, highest priority first. Takes the same filters as search_vulnerabilities.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | No | Words to look for in the title, description, products and ids | |
| cwe | No | CWE ids such as CWE-79, any of | |
| band | No | Priority bands, any of | |
| sort | No | Order of the results; relevance needs q | |
| limit | No | Records per page, 1 to 100 (default 10) | |
| cursor | No | The next value of the previous page | |
| signal | No | Signals, all of: kev (in CISA KEV), fix (a fix is listed), nofix (no fix listed), cve (has a CVE id) | |
| vendor | Yes | A vendor key such as microsoft, apache or schneider-electric (lowercase, spaces as hyphens) | |
| product | No | Product names, any of | |
| component | No | A component of the vendor, as on the vendor's page; needs vendor | |
| exploited | No | Only records in CISA KEV | |
| fixStatus | No | Fix states, any of | |
| published | No | Published within the last 7 days, 30 days or 12 months | |
| impactType | No | Impact types, any of | |
| privileges | No | none: no privileges required | |
| attackVector | No | Attack vectors from the CVSS vector, any of | |
| userInteraction | No | none: no user interaction required |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already state readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and closed-world, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds ordering behavior ("highest priority first"), but that sits awkwardly next to the sort parameter without clarifying whether it is a default or a hard rule, and it says nothing about pagination despite a cursor parameter.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two sentences, no filler, with the scope stated before the filter reference. Nothing needs to be trimmed.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With 17 parameters, only one required, and no output schema, the description is thin: it never says what a "record" is, what fields come back, or how pagination behaves. Delegating filter explanation to search_vulnerabilities is efficient but leaves the return shape entirely undocumented.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100% and every parameter, including vendor formatting and cursor semantics, is documented in the schema. The description only adds the pointer that the filter set mirrors search_vulnerabilities, which is marginally useful but not new semantics; baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
"A vendor's records" names the resource and the scope (per-vendor) and the phrase "takes the same filters as search_vulnerabilities" positions it against a named sibling. However, "records" is vague about what is returned (vulnerabilities? advisories?), so the agent must infer the entity type.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Referencing search_vulnerabilities implies this is the vendor-scoped variant of that search, which hints at when to pick it. But there is no explicit "use this when you want results limited to one vendor; use search_vulnerabilities otherwise" statement, and no exclusions versus get_vulnerability or list_exploited.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
get_vulnerabilityARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
A record for a TI id or an alias such as a CVE or GHSA id. Merged ids give the surviving record. By default the record is shortened: no CPE matches, at most 20 references (exploits and patches first) and the 10 newest advisories; trimmed says what was cut.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| id | Yes | A Threatist id such as TI-2021-19919, or an alias such as CVE-2021-44228 or GHSA-jfh8-c2jp-5v3q | |
| full | No | true: the whole record, as the REST API gives it, with every CPE match, reference and advisory |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already cover read-only and idempotent, so the bar is lower, but the description goes further: it discloses that results are truncated by default (no CPE matches, max 20 references with exploits and patches prioritized, 10 newest advisories) and that a 'trimmed' indicator reports what was removed. This is exactly the kind of non-obvious output-shaping behavior an agent needs before deciding whether to set full=true.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three tight sentences with no filler; the truncation default and the trimmed indicator are front-loaded before the parameter note. The opening fragment lacks a verb, which slightly hurts immediate parseability but costs no padding.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a two-parameter read-only lookup with no output schema, the description covers the lookup keys, alias handling, merged-id resolution, default truncation, and the trimmed metadata field. Remaining gaps (error behavior for unknown ids, exact structure of the trimmed field) are minor.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so baseline is 3, and the description earns an extra point by explaining the default state of the optional full parameter (shortened record) and what 'full' restores, plus the accepted alias forms for id. It adds semantics about the default that the schema only implies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description identifies the resource precisely (a vulnerability record retrievable by Threatist id or by an alias like CVE/GHSA) and explains the merged-id case. It is a noun phrase rather than a verb, but the resource and lookup key are unambiguous enough to distinguish it from siblings like search_vulnerabilities or get_advisory.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage is only implied: an agent can infer this is the direct-lookup tool versus a search tool, but the description never states when to prefer it over search_vulnerabilities, list_exploited, or get_advisory. The only explicit when-condition is the indirect hint that the default is trimmed unless full detail is needed.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
list_exploitedARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Recent additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue. Newest first, each with its Threatist record.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | Entries per page, 1 to 100 (default 10) | |
| since | No | Added within the last 7, 30 or 90 days, or all (default 7d) | |
| cursor | No | The next value of the previous page |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent and closed-world, so the description doesn't need to restate safety. It adds genuine value by disclosing the sort order (newest first) and that each entry carries its Threatist record, which is context the annotations cannot supply.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with the resource and immediately followed by ordering and payload. The phrase "its Threatist record" is unexplained jargon, the only minor drag.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Three optional parameters and no output schema mean the description should hint at return shape, and it does only vaguely ("each with its Threatist record"). Pagination via cursor and the effect of the since window on results are left entirely to the schema.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100% with per-parameter descriptions including defaults and the since enum, so the schema does the heavy lifting. The description adds nothing about limit, since or cursor semantics; baseline 3 applies.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
Names a specific resource — recent additions to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue — and states ordering (newest first). It is clearly distinct from get_vulnerability and search_vulnerabilities, though it never explicitly contrasts itself with them.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
"Recent additions" implies a browse-the-newest use case, which is enough to infer intent, but there is no explicit when-to-use-this vs search_vulnerabilities guidance and no statement of what it cannot do (e.g. query by keyword or vendor).
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
search_vulnerabilitiesCRead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Records matching a text and filters, a page at a time. Pass next as cursor for the next page.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| q | No | Words to look for in the title, description, products and ids | |
| cwe | No | CWE ids such as CWE-79, any of | |
| band | No | Priority bands, any of | |
| sort | No | Order of the results; relevance needs q | |
| limit | No | Records per page, 1 to 100 (default 10) | |
| cursor | No | The next value of the previous page | |
| signal | No | Signals, all of: kev (in CISA KEV), fix (a fix is listed), nofix (no fix listed), cve (has a CVE id) | |
| vendor | No | A vendor key such as microsoft or schneider-electric | |
| product | No | Product names, any of | |
| component | No | A component of the vendor, as on the vendor's page; needs vendor | |
| exploited | No | Only records in CISA KEV | |
| fixStatus | No | Fix states, any of | |
| published | No | Published within the last 7 days, 30 days or 12 months | |
| impactType | No | Impact types, any of | |
| privileges | No | none: no privileges required | |
| attackVector | No | Attack vectors from the CVSS vector, any of | |
| userInteraction | No | none: no user interaction required |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, and openWorldHint=false, so safety and repeatability are covered. The description adds the paging contract (results come page by page, continue via cursor), which is genuinely useful context beyond the annotations. It does not disclose ordering defaults, result size defaults, or whether the search is exhaustive, so it remains thin for a 17-filter query tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Two short sentences, front-loaded with the result description and followed immediately by the pagination instruction; no filler or repetition. The terseness costs some clarity ("Records" instead of "vulnerabilities") but nothing is wasted.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 17-parameter, zero-required search tool with no output schema, the description covers pagination but leaves the shape and termination of results implicit, and never clarifies that all filters are optional and combinable. The 100% schema coverage carries most of the burden, so this is adequate rather than complete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so every one of the 17 filters is already documented in the input schema, justifying the baseline 3. The description only adds the cross-reference that the previous page's "next" value goes into the cursor parameter — helpful but phrased with a field name ("next") that does not appear in the input schema and is unexplained without an output schema.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description gives a verb-less framing ("Records matching a text and filters, a page at a time") and never names the resource as vulnerabilities, so the reader must infer the domain from the tool name. It also does not distinguish this from siblings like get_vulnerability or list_exploited. It is understandable but vague on scope.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to use this search versus get_vulnerability, list_exploited, or get_advisory. The only actionable instruction is pagination-related ("Pass next as cursor for the next page"), which addresses how to continue, not when to choose this tool. No prerequisites, no exclusion of overlapping tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
5 tool updates
- First observed
get_advisory - First observed
get_vendor - First observed
get_vulnerability - First observed
list_exploited - First observed
search_vulnerabilities
Related MCP Connectors
CVE with EPSS and CISA KEV, package risk, software EOL, domain and IP reports, pay per call
CVE, KEV, EPSS, SBOM and advisory lookups; per-CVE exposure from Shodan data (© Shodan). Keyless.
CVE search, vulnerability database, EPSS exploit prediction, KEV, IP reputation & threat feed.
Is a CVE exploited? CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, CVSS and SSVC with a patch-first verdict. Free, no key.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides multi-source vulnerability intelligence for AI-powered security operations, combining NVD CVSS, CISA KEV, and EPSS scores without requiring an API key.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides unified access to vulnerability data from NVD, MITRE, and GitHub Security Advisories for cybersecurity intelligence.28 npm19MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceSearch and filter public CVEs and read any of them in full, with CVSS scores, CISA KEV and EPSS, and profile vendors. Read-only, free and open source.6MIT
- AlicenseBqualityBmaintenanceEnables vulnerability lookup and triage across NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, OSV, and many other sources, while tracking an estate's exposure changes from SBOMs and lockfiles through snapshots and prioritized diffs.32Apache 2.0
Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.