Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence MCP
Server Details
CVE search, vulnerability database, EPSS exploit prediction, KEV, IP reputation & threat feed.
- Status
- Unhealthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
- Repository
- FoundryNet/cyber-intel-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence MCP
Glama MCP Gateway
Connect through Glama MCP Gateway for full control over tool access and complete visibility into every call.
Full call logging
Every tool call is logged with complete inputs and outputs, so you can debug issues and audit what your agents are doing.
Tool access control
Enable or disable individual tools per connector, so you decide what your agents can and cannot do.
Managed credentials
Glama handles OAuth flows, token storage, and automatic rotation, so credentials never expire on your clients.
Usage analytics
See which tools your agents call, how often, and when, so you can understand usage patterns and catch anomalies.
Tool Definition Quality
Average 4.4/5 across 9 of 9 tools scored.
Each tool targets a distinct resource: domain, IP, CVE, threat feed, daily brief, product scan, and meta-info. The only closely related pair (brief_summary vs daily_brief) is explicitly differentiated as a cheap sample vs full brief, so no real ambiguity exists.
All tool names use lowercase snake_case, but the grammatical pattern is mixed: some are verb_noun (check_domain, check_ip, search_cve) while others are noun_noun or adjective_noun (cve_detail, daily_brief, threat_feed, vulnerability_scan, mint_info, brief_summary). The style is consistent, but the verb-first convention is not uniform.
Nine tools cover the core threat-intelligence workflows without bloat: reputation lookups, CVE search/details, vulnerability scanning, briefs, and a live feed. This is a well-scoped count for the domain.
The server covers IP and domain reputation, CVE research, product scanning, and daily briefs, but lacks a single-tool lookup for hash or URL reputation (only available via the generic threat_feed). This is a workable minor gap since the feed can filter by those types, but a dedicated check_hash or check_url tool would make the surface fully complete.
Available Tools
9 toolsbrief_summaryAInspect
Get the top 5 signals from today's threat brief as structured JSON — a cheap sample of the full daily_brief. Returns the day's highest-priority items (no prose) so an agent can decide whether to buy the full brief.
PAID: $0.50 (vs $15 for the full daily_brief). Defaults to today (UTC). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses payment.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| date | No | brief date YYYY-MM-DD (default today, UTC). | |
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description fully discloses behavior: returns top 5 priority items in JSON, no prose, defaults to today UTC, costs $0.50, and has a specific payment/402 retry flow. It also reveals the auth bypass, which is a critical behavioral trait not inferable from other fields.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose in the first sentence, then efficiently bundles payment, defaults, and error handling into a compact paragraph. No wasted words; every sentence adds actionable detail.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite an output schema existing, the description covers all operational nuances: payment cost, 402 workflow, authentication bypass, default date, and the granularity of the returned data. The tool's complexity (payment, retry logic) is fully addressed within the description.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Although schema coverage is 100%, the description adds essential context beyond the schema: it explains the purpose of payment_tx (for re-calling after a 402), clarifies agent_id as scoping the free-tier counter, and reinforces the default date behavior. This enriches the bare parameter descriptions.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Get the top 5 signals from today's threat brief as structured JSON'. It clearly distinguishes itself from the sibling daily_brief by labeling itself a 'cheap sample' and explaining its role in helping decide whether to buy the full brief.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explicitly positions this as a cheaper alternative to daily_brief ('vs $15 for the full daily_brief'), implying when to use it for sampling. It also gives detailed instructions for handling 402 responses: settle the payment request and re-call with payment_tx=<reference>, and mentions the bearer key bypass.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_domainAInspect
Check domain reputation — threat indicators, OTX pulse associations, and threat classification for a domain. Threat intel from AlienVault OTX.
PAID: $0.01 per query after the daily free allowance (25/day). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | the domain to check, e.g. "example.com". | |
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses paid quota details, free daily allowance, 402 retry semantics, payment_tx requirements, an Authorization bearer bypass, and the external data source. This is rich, non-obvious behavioral context.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The first sentence is concise and front-loaded. The payment paragraph is longer but every clause carries necessary operational detail. Minor redundancy exists ('Threat intel from AlienVault OTX' could be merged), but overall it is tight.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
An output schema is present, so return-value details need not be in the description. The description covers purpose, data source, pricing, retry logic, authentication, and parameter semantics, making it complete for an agent to select and invoke the tool successfully.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so parameters are already documented. The description adds value by explaining that agent_id scopes the free-tier counter and by clarifying payment_tx's role in 402 re-calls, which goes beyond the raw schema text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb+resource: 'Check domain reputation' and enumerates concrete outputs (threat indicators, OTX pulse associations, threat classification). The domain focus clearly distinguishes it from the sibling check_ip tool.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No explicit alternatives or when-not-to-use guidance is given, but the described use case is clear: checking a domain's reputation via AlienVault OTX. It also provides actionable conditional guidance for the 402 payment retry flow, which is a meaningful usage instruction.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
check_ipAInspect
Check IP reputation — abuse reports, threat type, confidence, ISP, and OTX pulse associations for an IP. Threat intel combining AbuseIPDB and AlienVault OTX.
PAID: $0.01 per query after the daily free allowance (25/day). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| ip_address | Yes | the IPv4 address to check. | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full behavioral burden and excellently discloses payment requirements, daily free limit, 402 handling, and Bearer key bypass. This goes beyond typical descriptions and gives the agent actionable operational knowledge.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise, front-loaded with the purpose, and structured into two clear paragraphs. Every sentence earns its place, including the necessary payment/retry note.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has an output schema, so return values are covered. The description fully addresses the complex payment flow, free allowance, and retry logic, making it highly complete for the tool's complexity.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3. The description adds minor context around payment_tx (re-call with same args plus reference) but does not provide additional parameter semantics beyond what the schema already states.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states 'Check IP reputation' with specific data types (abuse reports, threat type, confidence, ISP, OTX pulses). It distinguishes itself from sibling tools like check_domain by explicitly targeting IP addresses.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context on when to use the tool (when IP reputation is needed) and includes operational guidance on free allowance, payment, and retry behavior. It does not explicitly list alternative tools, but the domain focus is evident.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cve_detailAInspect
Get the full record for a single CVE from the vulnerability database — CVSS v3 breakdown (score/severity/vector/attack vector/complexity), EPSS exploit-prediction probability + percentile, CISA KEV status + due date, CWE, affected products, and references. Sources: NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, GHSA. FREE.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | e.g. "CVE-2021-44228". |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It conveys the data sources and that the operation is 'FREE,' but does not mention authentication needs, rate limits, or failure behavior. For a read-only lookup, the omission is less critical, but the description could be more transparent about prerequisites and limitations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, dense sentence that front-loads the purpose and then lists the detailed contents efficiently. It contains no fluff and is appropriately sized for the complexity of the tool, though it is somewhat long due to the enumerated fields.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the purpose, return data fields, data sources, cost, and the single-CVE scope, making it highly informative. Since an output schema exists and the tool is a straightforward read operation, this description is complete enough for an agent to select and invoke it correctly without additional context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already covers the only parameter (cve_id) with a descriptive example, giving 100% schema description coverage. The tool description does not add additional meaning about the parameter itself, so it aligns with the baseline score of 3 for high schema coverage.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool retrieves the full record for a single CVE, enumerating specific data fields like CVSS, EPSS, and CISA KEV. The verb 'Get' and resource 'full record for a single CVE' are explicit, and the listed fields distinguish it from sibling tools such as search_cve or brief_summary.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies usage by stating it gets the full record, making it clear that this tool is for deep details when a specific CVE ID is known. However, it does not explicitly compare to alternatives or state exclusions, such as 'use search_cve to find IDs first,' so it lacks a full when-to-use/when-not-to-use explanation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
daily_briefAInspect
Get the curated daily threat-intelligence brief — the day's most significant signals in one package: critical CVEs with high EPSS exploit-prediction, new CISA KEV additions, the most-exploitable vulnerabilities, and active threat indicators. Threat intel from NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS, GHSA, AbuseIPDB, and OTX. Each brief carries verifiable provenance so a buyer can confirm it was produced by this server, unaltered.
PAID: $15 per brief. Defaults to today (UTC); a brief expires at the next midnight UTC. On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses payment.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| date | No | brief date YYYY-MM-DD (default today, UTC). | |
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. | |
| stripe_token | No | Stripe Checkout Session id (cs_…), when re-calling after paying the Stripe payment link (alternative to the metered rail). Can also be supplied via the X-Stripe-Token header. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full disclosure weight. It discloses paywall behavior ($15/brief), expiry at midnight UTC, the 402 retry protocol with payment_tx, and the Authorization Bearer bypass, giving the agent essential operational knowledge.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two paragraphs: one for content/provenance and one for payment/expiry. It is dense but each sentence adds useful information; slightly lengthy but not wasteful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description covers the tool's purpose, data sources, provenance, payment, default behavior, and retry logic. Given the number of optional parameters and that an output schema exists, this is fully sufficient for an agent to select and invoke the tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema already documents all four parameters with descriptions, so the schema coverage is 100%. The description adds context for payment_tx and stripe_token in the billing flow but doesn't add much beyond the schema, so a baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Get the curated daily threat-intelligence brief' and enumerates the bundled content (critical CVEs, CISA KEV, active threats), which clearly states what the tool does and distinguishes it from the narrower sibling tools like cve_detail or search_cve.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
It gives clear context on when to use (daily aggregation) and covers the payment flow and re-call instructions, but it does not explicitly name alternative tools or state when not to use this tool.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
mint_infoAInspect
Get FoundryNet Data Network info and result-provenance details. FREE.
Returns how this server attaches verifiable provenance to your agent's security/threat-intelligence analysis, plus the sister data servers (gov-contracts, brand-intel, patent-intel, financial-signals, weather-intel, compliance, academic-intel, fact-check, oss-intel, social-intel).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No parameters | |||
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It discloses that the tool returns provenance details and lists sister servers, making it clear this is a read-only informational endpoint. However, it doesn't explicitly state safety, rate limits, or any side effects, which is a minor gap given the lack of annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is concise with two sentences: the first front-loads the core purpose and a 'FREE' note, while the second enumerates the sister servers. Every sentence adds value with no redundancy or fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool has no parameters and an output schema exists, the description doesn't need to detail return values. It gives a high-level overview of what to expect (provenance details and sister server info), which is complete enough for such a metadata tool. Slightly more detail on the output schema could be added, but it's not necessary.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The tool has zero parameters, so the description needs to add no parameter semantics. Baseline is 4, and the description appropriately focuses on explaining the purpose and return value rather than parameters.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb 'Get' and clearly states the resource: FoundryNet Data Network info and result-provenance details. It distinguishes itself from sibling tools by focusing on network and provenance metadata rather than specific threat data like CVEs or IP checks.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description explains what the tool returns (provenance details and sister data servers) but does not explicitly state when to use this tool versus alternatives. Since it's a unique metadata/info tool, the implied usage is clear, but there's no direct guidance or exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
search_cveAInspect
Search CVEs in the vulnerability database by keyword, CVSS severity/score, EPSS exploit-prediction likelihood, attack vector, recency, or CISA KEV status. Returns CVSS, EPSS, KEV flag, and affected products, newest first. Threat intel from NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, and GHSA.
PAID: $0.01 per query after a daily free allowance (25/day). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. agent_id scopes your allowance; an Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| limit | No | max rows (1-200, default 50). | |
| is_kev | No | true → only CISA Known-Exploited Vulnerabilities. | |
| keyword | No | text matched against the CVE description. | |
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| min_cvss | No | minimum CVSS v3 base score (0-10). | |
| min_epss | No | minimum EPSS exploit probability (0-1). | |
| severity | No | critical | high | medium | low. | |
| days_back | No | only CVEs published in the last N days. | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. | |
| attack_vector | No | network | adjacent | local | physical. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries full burden and delivers: it discloses the paid nature ($0.01/query after 25/day free), how to recover from a 402 (settle and re-call with payment_tx), the role of agent_id in scoping allowances, optional auth bypass, and what fields are returned (CVSS, EPSS, KEV flag, affected products, newest first).
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is four sentences, each earning its place: purpose, return fields, data sources, and payment/usage details. It is front-loaded with the core action and avoids fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a 10-parameter tool with no annotations and an output schema, the description covers the essential context: what it searches, key filters, result ordering, output fields, data sources, and cost/failure handling. The presence of an output schema means return structure need not be spelled out.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has 100% coverage with descriptive parameter comments. The description adds high-level filter categories but does not go beyond the schema's parameter details (e.g., it does not specify value formats beyond what the schema already provides). Baseline 3 is appropriate when schema carries the descriptive burden.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description leads with a specific verb+resource ('Search CVEs in the vulnerability database') and enumerates the main filter dimensions (keyword, CVSS, EPSS, attack vector, recency, KEV status), clearly distinguishing it from sibling tools like cve_detail (which likely targets a single CVE).
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear context for when to use the tool (searching vulnerabilities by various criteria) and notes that results are newest first. It does not explicitly mention alternatives or exclusions, but the distinct focus of search_cve is evident from the description and sibling names.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
threat_feedAInspect
Pull the recent threat-intelligence feed — real-time threat indicators (IPs, domains, hashes, URLs) from AlienVault OTX pulses and reputation checks, filterable by type, threat, confidence, and recency.
PAID: $0.01 per query after the daily free allowance (25/day). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| hours_back | No | only indicators seen in the last N hours. | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. | |
| threat_type | No | malware | phishing | botnet | scanner | spam. | |
| indicator_type | No | ip | domain | hash | url. | |
| min_confidence | No | minimum confidence 0-100. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It discloses the paid pricing model, the 25/day free allowance, the exact retry sequence on a 402 (re-call with same args plus payment_tx), and the optional Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypass—far more transparency than typically expected.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the core purpose in the first sentence, followed by a compact, well-separated payment/retry note. Both paragraphs are dense with necessary information and contain no filler or repetition.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has six optional parameters, a full input schema, an output schema, and no annotations; the description covers the data source, filtering capabilities, payment edge cases, and authentication bypass. Since an output schema exists, the description need not enumerate return values, making the tool fully contextualized.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, with each parameter already clearly described (e.g., hours_back, threat_type, min_confidence), so the description adds limited new parameter semantics. It does reinforce that the tool is 'filterable by type, threat, confidence, and recency' and clarifies the payment_tx retry flow, but this is mostly redundant with the schema text.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with 'Pull the recent threat-intelligence feed'—a specific verb and resource—and details the indicator types (IPs, domains, hashes, URLs) and sources (AlienVault OTX pulses, reputation checks). This clearly distinguishes it from sibling single-lookup tools like check_ip, check_domain, and cve_detail, which focus on one entity rather than an aggregate feed.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies when to use the tool (fetching a recent, filterable threat feed) but does not explicitly state when to choose it over siblings or when not to use it. No alternatives are mentioned, so the agent must infer the appropriate context from the described functionality and sibling names.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
vulnerability_scanAInspect
Scan a product/vendor/CPE for all known vulnerabilities, sorted by EPSS exploit-prediction likelihood with CISA KEV flags — the "should I be worried about this dependency?" security scanning tool. Threat intel from NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, and GHSA. Premium.
PAID: $0.02 per query after the daily free allowance (25/day). On a 402, settle the returned payment request and re-call with the SAME args plus payment_tx=. An Authorization: Bearer fnet_ key bypasses it.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cpe | No | a CPE string to match exactly. | |
| vendor | No | vendor name, e.g. "apache". | |
| agent_id | No | stable id for your agent (scopes the free-tier counter). | |
| payment_tx | No | payment transaction reference, when re-calling after a 402. | |
| product_name | No | product/library/software name, e.g. "log4j". |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
No output parameters | ||
Tool Definition Quality
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full burden and discloses key behavioral traits: it is paid ($0.02 per query, 25/day free), handles 402 responses with payment_tx, and supports a Bearer key bypass. It also explains the data sources and output ordering. Missing explicit read-only/side-effect statements, but the scan nature implies non-mutating.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is front-loaded with the primary action and purpose in the first clause. The payment paragraph is necessary operational guidance. It is a bit verbose but every sentence adds value; no fluff.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The output schema exists, so return details are covered elsewhere. The description covers purpose, data sources, sorting, cost, error handling, and auth. Given the tool's complexity (5 parameters, paid, external sources), this is a thorough description, though it could hint at parameter combinations or output structure if the schema were absent.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the description doesn't need to restate parameter meanings. It does add context for payment_tx (re-call after 402) and indirectly clarifies that vendor, product_name, and cpe are alternate identifiers. This is sufficient for baseline 3, but no deeper parameter semantics are provided.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool scans a product/vendor/CPE for known vulnerabilities, sorted by EPSS likelihood with CISA KEV flags. The tagline 'should I be worried about this dependency?' and the mention of threat intel sources distinguish it from sibling tools like search_cve or cve_detail.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description provides clear usage context ('security scanning tool', 'dependency?' use case) and specifies the payment workflow. However, it does not explicitly mention when not to use it or name alternative sibling tools, so it stops short of a 5.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
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{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"maintainers": [{ "email": "your-email@example.com" }]
}The email address must match the email associated with your Glama account. Once published, Glama will automatically detect and verify the file within a few minutes.
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