HiveAttest
Server Details
Pre-action attestation perimeter for AI agents — 8 primitives, signed C18 receipt per call.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over the last 24 hours
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2024-11-05
- URL
- Repository
- srotzin/hive-mcp-attest
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- hive-mcp-attest
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 18 tools
Each tool is clearly distinct, with a unique resource domain (absence, cargo, custody, passport, warranty, etc.) and a specific action (build, prove, verify, issue, etc.). The multiple 'verify' tools are easily distinguishable by their target artifacts, and no two tools appear to perform the same operation.
All tools follow the consistent 'attest_<domain>_<action>' naming pattern, making it predictable and easy to navigate. The only minor deviation is 'attest_meta', but it still fits the domain prefix pattern and is a sensible outlier for metadata introspection.
With 18 tools, the count is on the higher end but appropriate for the server's broad scope covering multiple attestation subdomains. Each tool serves a specific purpose and contributes to a comprehensive attestation workflow, so the set feels well-scoped rather than bloated.
The tool surface covers the core lifecycle for each domain: build/prove/verify for absence, register/snapshot/validate for cargo, append/proof/verify for custody, issue/verify for passports, and issue/get/breach for warranties. The lack of update/delete is acceptable given the immutable nature of attestation, and minor listing tools are the only conceivable additions.
Available Tools
18 toolsattest_absence_buildBInspect
Build a sorted Merkle tree for an audit window (enables cryptographic non-membership proofs, C13: prov-absence). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: events (required), window_id (required).
attest_absence_proveCInspect
Prove that a query event is NOT a member of a previously-built audit window (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: query (required), window_id (required).
attest_absence_verifyBInspect
Verify a non-membership proof against an expected Merkle root (C13). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: proof (required), root_hex (required).
attest_cargo_registerAInspect
Register a versioned cargo type in the HiveAttest registry (C17: hive-cargo-taxonomy). Pins a definition hash for version-anchoring. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: id (required), name (required), schema (required), version (required), +2 more.
attest_cargo_snapshotAInspect
Get a registry snapshot with Merkle root for version pinning (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: no named parameters.
attest_cargo_validateAInspect
Validate a payload against a registered cargo type schema (C17). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: payload (required), version (required), cargo_type_id (required).
attest_custody_appendAInspect
Append a node to a custody chain (C16: hive-custody). Taint propagates: once tainted, always tainted. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: chain_id (required), agent_did (required), transform_id (required), payload, +1 more.
attest_custody_proofAInspect
Retrieve a Merkle inclusion proof for a specific node in a custody chain (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: index (required), chain_id (required).
attest_custody_verifyAInspect
Verify a custody chain: hash linkage, Ed25519 signatures, and taint propagation (C16). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: nodes (required).
attest_gate_evaluateAInspect
THE HEADLINE TOOL. Evaluate whether an agent may proceed through the HiveAttest gate (C19: hive-gate-enforcer). Verifies passport signature + expiry, cargo registry membership, and warranty status. Every response (allow OR deny) includes a signed C18-format receipt of the gate decision. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: passport_manifest (required), context, custody_root, warranty_ids, +1 more.
attest_inspect_sampleAInspect
Probabilistic secondary inspection of a record batch (C20: hive-secondary-inspection). Returns a signed inspection record. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: records (required), sample_id (required), seed, sample_rate.
attest_metaAInspect
Return HiveAttest layer/spec/patent metadata for all claims. Useful for agent introspection. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: no named parameters.
attest_passport_issueBInspect
Issue a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Signs with Ed25519 over RFC 8785 JCS-canonical body. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: action_id (required), agent_did (required), intended_op (required), target_resource (required), +2 more.
attest_passport_verifyAInspect
Verify a Pre-Action Attestation Manifest (C15: hive-passport). Checks Ed25519 signature, temporal validity, and optionally observed inputs hash. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: manifest (required), observed_inputs.
attest_smsh_verifyBInspect
Verify a SMSH-Stamp v1 receipt (C8/C12: smsh-stamp-verifier). Validates schema, version, algorithm, timestamp, and Ed25519 signature. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: receipt (required), pubkey_b64url, max_age_seconds.
attest_warranty_breachAInspect
Report a warranty breach. Marks the warranty as breached and returns a signed breach record (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: warranty_id (required), breach_description (required), evidence.
attest_warranty_getBInspect
Retrieve a warranty by ID (C18). Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: warranty_id (required).
attest_warranty_issueBInspect
Issue an attestation warranty committing an agent to a claim (C18: hive-attestation-warranty). Signed with Ed25519. Reference-grade implementation. Wire format normative; production-grade is Layer B.
Inputs: claim (required), action_id (required), agent_did (required), scope, +1 more.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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