Check an npm/PyPI package before an AI agent installs it: 5 focused supply-chain tools.
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool targets a distinct signal: maintainer changes, repo health, typosquatting, vulnerabilities, plus one documented aggregator (supply_chain_check). The descriptions explicitly clarify the relationship between the combined verdict and the individual checks, so there is no realistic misselection.
All five tools end in the '_check' suffix with a consistent noun-modifier + check pattern (maintainer_change_check, repo_health_check, supply_chain_check, typosquat_check, vulnerability_check). The convention is uniform and predictable.
Five tools is well-scoped for a dependency risk-checking server: four focused signal checks plus one orchestrating aggregator. Every tool earns its place with no redundancy.
The surface covers the key supply-chain risk dimensions (existence, age, typosquatting, vulnerabilities, maintainer change, repo health) with a combined verdict. Minor gaps remain around license compliance and transitive/whole-tree scanning, but core workflows are covered.
Publisher-change analysis is npm only. Also reports whether the package exists (found) and its age (first_published, package_age_days, new_package if first published less than 30 days ago), for npm and for PyPI; on PyPI only existence and age are available. Flags a previously unseen human publisher taking over a package after 180+ days of inactivity, within the last 365 days (the event-stream attack pattern). npm trusted publishing (verified OIDC identity, not just a bot-like account name), pre-release, and handovers to a publisher who already maintains another widely used package (100k+ weekly downloads) are reported but not flagged. Does not detect hijacked existing accounts; a heuristic for review, not proof.
Inputs: package (required), ecosystem (required).
Maintenance signals for a GitHub repository given as owner/name: stars, forks, open issues, license, archived and fork flags, creation date and age, days since last push, topics. Use it to judge whether a dependency looks maintained or abandoned. For an npm or PyPI package whose repository you do not know, supply_chain_check resolves it from registry metadata and includes these signals. GitHub only; missing or private repositories return found: false.
Inputs: repo (required).
Call this before installing or adding a package (npm install, pip install, a new entry in a manifest), especially one whose name you recalled or that a model suggested. One-call risk check: combines vulnerability_check (OSV.dev), typosquat_check, maintainer_change_check (npm only) and repo_health_check (when the GitHub repo can be resolved) into one overall verdict. A package that does not exist on npm or PyPI gets overall_risk 'package_not_found': the name may be invented and should not be installed. A package first published less than 30 days ago gets the 'new_package' flag and overall_risk 'review_recommended': new packages are where invented and look-alike names get registered, so the name is worth confirming against the project's own documentation before installing (on PyPI the age is that of the oldest release still published; being new does not make a package malicious). Use the individual tools to investigate one signal. Vulnerabilities are checked for the given version, or the latest published one (version_checked, version_source). If a check could not run (rate limit, upstream error), it is listed in unavailable_checks and overall_risk is 'incomplete', never 'no_signals_found'. Also flags a version marked deprecated on npm or yanked on PyPI.
Inputs: package (required), ecosystem (required), version.
Call before installing a package whose name you typed or recalled. Checks whether an npm or PyPI package name is a near-miss of a well-known package (typosquatting), with an edit-distance threshold scaled to name length; names of 3 characters or fewer are not fuzzy-matched. Uses a curated list of popular names, so a clean result does not prove a package is safe. It does not check that the package exists: supply_chain_check does.
Inputs: package (required), ecosystem (required).
Checks a package (optionally a specific version) against OSV.dev for known vulnerabilities: npm, PyPI, Go, crates.io, Maven, RubyGems, Packagist and NuGet. For npm and PyPI, a name that does not exist returns found: false and vulnerable: null, never a clean result. Use supply_chain_check for a combined verdict.
Inputs: package (required), ecosystem (required), version.
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
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Verify npm packages before your AI agent installs them: hallucinations, advisories, API drift.
Check packages for CVEs, slopsquatting, and CISA KEV before your AI agent installs them.
Blocks typosquatted or hallucinated npm/PyPI packages before an AI agent installs them.
Supply chain risk scoring for npm, PyPI, Cargo, and Go. 9 tools. Behavioral signals.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.