STIX 2.1 threat indicator feed: IPs, domains, URLs, file hashes from ThreatFox, OTX, NVD.
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Scored across 1 tool
With only one tool, there is no possibility of confusion or overlap. The tool's purpose is clearly defined as returning a STIX 2.1 bundle of threat indicators.
The single tool name 'get_threat_indicators' follows a clear verb_noun pattern. While there is no other tool to compare against, the naming is descriptive and consistent with common conventions.
A single tool for a threat intelligence server is extremely thin. The server's stated purpose suggests a broader domain (e.g., querying specific indicator types, submitting indicators, or retrieving reports) that cannot be covered by one tool.
The tool provides a single aggregated view of threat indicators, but the domain of threat intelligence typically requires more granular operations such as searching by indicator type, fetching recent vs. historical data, or retrieving details for a specific indicator. The surface is severely limited.
PG1 Sovereign Threat Intelligence: returns a STIX 2.1 bundle of verified threat indicators (IPs, domains, URLs, file hashes) sourced from ThreatFox, URLhaus, AbuseIPDB, OTX and NVD.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| type | No | Filter by indicator_type, e.g. 'IPv4', 'domain', 'URL'. | |
| limit | No | Max indicators to return (default 500, max 1000). | |
| since | No | ISO timestamp; only return indicators last seen after this time. | |
| min_score | No | Minimum confidence score (0-100). |
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses the output format (STIX 2.1), the indicator types, and the upstream sources. It does not mention rate limits, latency, authentication, or the meaning of 'verified', though the read-only nature is evident from 'returns'.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
A single, information-dense sentence with no filler. It front-loads the result type and then adds indicator categories and sources, making it easy to scan and immediately useful.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a read-only retrieval tool with no siblings, four well-documented parameters, and no output schema, the description provides the key context: output format, content types, and data provenance. Minor operational details like rate limits or pagination are absent, but not critical for invoking this tool correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all four parameters. The description does not add parameter-specific detail, but it also does not need to given the complete schema; baseline 3 is appropriate.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the action ('returns'), the exact resource ('STIX 2.1 bundle of verified threat indicators'), and the scope (IPs, domains, URLs, file hashes) plus specific data sources. This leaves no ambiguity about what the tool does.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The use case is implied by the content: an agent would use this when it needs verified threat intelligence in STIX format. However, there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, prerequisites, or exclusion criteria. With no sibling tools, explicit alternatives are not required, but a clearer usage cue would help.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
get_threat_indicatorsThreatFox MCP — abuse.ch indicator-of-compromise feed (free, key required)
IOCs (URLs, domains, IPs, hashes) shared by the infosec community on X/Twitter. No auth, CC0.
CVE search, vulnerability database, EPSS exploit prediction, KEV, IP reputation & threat feed.
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