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PG1 Sovereign Threat Intelligence

get_threat_actor_profile

PG1 Sovereign Threat Intelligence: returns a dossier for a known threat actor / APT group — aliases, description, associated MITRE ATT&CK techniques, and associated malware/tooling. Sourced from MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise. Payment required: $0.01 via x402, sent in params._meta['x402/payment'] (the PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header is also accepted), or a valid Gumroad license key (X-API-KEY header). SIBLING DIFFERENTIATION: Use for actor/group-level profiling. Do NOT use for single-indicator lookups (use get_ioc_context) or vulnerability data (use get_cve_details / get_cve_batch). USAGE EXCLUSIONS: Coverage is limited to groups tracked in MITRE ATT&CK — not all threat actors have an entry. BEHAVIOR: Returns 404 if no matching group or alias is found.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actor_nameYesGroup name or known alias, e.g. 'APT29' or 'Cozy Bear'. Matching is case-insensitive against both the group's primary name and its known aliases.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Added

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

No annotations are provided, so the description carries full burden and does so well: it discloses paid access ($0.01 via x402 in params._meta['x402/payment'] or PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header), Gumroad license key auth (X-API-KEY), data source (MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise), and 404 error behavior for unknown groups/aliases. This is unusually complete for a tool with no annotations.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with purpose and return contents, followed by payment, sibling differentiation, exclusions, and error behavior. It is information-dense and structured with caps labels, though the branding prefix and some payment detail make it longer than strictly necessary.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema and no annotations, the description still covers return fields, data source, payment/auth requirements, coverage limits, and error behavior. An agent has enough to decide when to call it and how to authenticate.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, and the actor_name parameter already documents case-insensitive matching against primary names and aliases with examples. The description adds no syntax, format, or matching detail beyond the schema, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('returns a dossier') and resource ('known threat actor / APT group'), enumerates returned fields (aliases, description, MITRE ATT&CK techniques, malware/tooling), and explicitly distinguishes from get_ioc_context, get_cve_details, and get_cve_batch. An agent can route correctly without opening any other schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Explicitly says to use it for actor/group-level profiling and names three alternatives for adjacent tasks: get_ioc_context for single-indicator lookups, get_cve_details / get_cve_batch for vulnerability data. It also states a coverage exclusion (only groups tracked in MITRE ATT&CK), making the when-not condition concrete.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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