Kevscope

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint and destructiveHint=false, so safety is covered. The description adds real behavioral value beyond that: the 1-20 batch limit and the fact that results are sorted most urgent first, which the agent needs to interpret the response.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the verdict and its scope, then the evidence list. Every clause carries information about what is returned; the enumeration is long but justified for a tool with no output schema.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description must carry the return shape, and it does by naming KEV/EPSS/CVSS/SSVC/vendor/link fields plus the sort order. The gap is the unexplained 'full' parameter and the absence of any guidance on choosing this tool over its siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 50%: 'cves' is documented with a format example, but the 'full' boolean has no description in either the schema or the description, so its effect is undocumented. The description's '1-20 CVE IDs' marginally reinforces the schema's min/max but adds nothing for 'full', landing at the baseline 3 for partial coverage.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource ('Patch-priority verdict for 1-20 CVE IDs') and enumerates the evidence it returns (KEV, EPSS, CVSS, SSVC, vendor/product, links), so the agent knows exactly what it produces. It does not name or distinguish itself from the siblings epss_watchlist or kev_recent, so it falls short of a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by 'patch-priority verdict' and the input/output shape — this is the tool for ranking a batch of CVEs against multiple sources — but there is no explicit when-to-use statement and no direction on when to prefer it over epss_watchlist or kev_recent. The agent must infer the boundary from sibling names alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, openWorldHint, and destructiveHint=false, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful domain context — that entries are filtered out of KEV and ranked by 30-day exploitation likelihood — but says nothing about result size behavior, ordering guarantees (is it sorted by EPSS descending?), or truncation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two sentences, the selection rule first and the default second. No filler, no repetition of the title, front-loaded with the distinguishing filter.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

There is no output schema, so the description could reasonably say more about what a returned entry looks like. With three parameters and only one documented in the schema, the description leaves minEpss and limit semantics entirely to inference, though the annotations do carry the safety profile.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is only 33%: 'year' is documented in the schema, while 'limit' and 'minEpss' are not. The description partially compensates by explaining the default year scoping, but it never explains what minEpss thresholds do or how limit interacts with the maximum of 50. Partial compensation, not full.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific resource and selection rule: highest-EPSS CVEs excluded from CISA KEV, with a 30-day exploitation horizon. This is far more than a restatement of the name. It does not, however, explicitly contrast itself with the siblings cve_priority or kev_recent, so sibling differentiation is left implicit.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

"Defaults to this year's CVE IDs" implies the common usage and gives a default behavior, which is useful. But there is no explicit statement of when to reach for this tool instead of cve_priority or kev_recent, and no exclusions or preconditions. Usage is inferable rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the read-only, idempotent, open-world safety profile, so the description rightly focuses elsewhere and adds ordering (newest first) and result content (due date, ransomware use, EPSS). It does not mention the 30-day default window, pagination, or result caps, which are minor gaps given annotation coverage.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence with the scope and ordering front-loaded and no wasted words. The phrase 'ransomware use' is slightly overloaded, blurring whether it refers to output content or the filter, which keeps it out of the top band.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a 4-parameter tool with no output schema and no schema descriptions, the definition covers what the tool returns and how results are ordered, which is the key missing context. It falls short on the untyped limit/ransomware parameters and lacks any guidance for choosing among the three sibling tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must carry all parameter meaning, and it only partially does: 'last N days' loosely maps to days and 'optional vendor/product text filter' maps to vendor. The limit parameter (default 50, max 100) and the ransomware boolean filter are never explained, leaving half the parameters ambiguous.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states a specific verb+resource (CVEs added to the CISA KEV catalog) with scope (last N days), ordering (newest first), and returned fields. It implicitly separates itself from siblings like epss_watchlist by anchoring on the KEV catalog, but never names or contrasts an alternative explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to choose this over cve_priority or epss_watchlist, and no stated prerequisites or exclusions. The only usage hint is the bare mention of an 'optional' filter, which is implicit at best.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.