XposedOrNot Breach Intelligence

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, openWorld and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful behavior beyond that: only breach names are returned and passwords are never returned, which sets expectations about result sensitivity and scope.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences, front-loaded with the core action, followed by the return-content and privacy clause. Every sentence earns its place with no filler.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a low-complexity, single-parameter read-only lookup, the description covers purpose, safety context, and return content, while annotations handle the side-effect profile. Absent an output schema, the explicit statement that only breach names are returned fills the remaining gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

There is a single required 'email' parameter with 100% schema description coverage, so the schema fully documents the input. The description adds no format, normalization, or validation detail beyond what the schema already provides, making the baseline 3 correct.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (check) plus the exact resource and scope: an email address against the XposedOrNot index of known public data breaches. The email-level framing implicitly separates it from domain-level siblings like domain_breach_summary and from list_breaches.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied by the name and the 'email address' scope, which is enough to infer this is the per-email lookup rather than a bulk or domain tool. However, there is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or named alternative (e.g. versus domain_breach_summary), so the agent must infer routing on its own.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint and non-destructive, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely useful scope context: it enumerates what the aggregate contains (breach count, affected accounts, pastes, most recent date) and explicitly notes it returns only counts, not individual email addresses.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences, front-loaded with the aggregate purpose and followed by the return-scope caveat. No filler and every clause carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description compensates by naming the returned metrics and clarifying the count-only granularity. For a single-parameter read tool with full annotation coverage this is nearly complete; only edge behavior (e.g. unknown or malformed domains) is unstated.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% for the single 'domain' parameter, so the schema already documents it. The description adds only the implied notion of domain scoping, no format or syntax detail beyond the schema, making the baseline 3 appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (aggregate/summarize) and resource (breach exposure for a domain), and the domain-level scope clearly separates it from check_email_breaches and list_breaches. It does not explicitly distinguish itself from the closest cousins, get_breach_analytics and get_breach_metrics, so an agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer this is the domain-level rollup rather than a per-email or raw-list lookup. There is no explicit when-to-use, when-not-to-use, or naming of an alternative sibling, which matters here given five closely related breach tools.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the safety profile (readOnly, idempotent, non-destructive, openWorld), so the bar is lower. The description adds genuinely useful context beyond that: a privacy/security guarantee ('Never returns passwords') and a preview of what the response contains, which is valuable since there is no output schema.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence that front-loads the verb and scope before enumerating outputs; every clause earns its place. Slightly list-heavy but not padded.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so well by enumerating breaches, exposure breakdowns, risk scoring, and paste exposure. The only missing piece is routing guidance against siblings, which is a usage rather than completeness gap.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and there is a single well-documented 'email' parameter, so the schema carries the semantics. The description restates 'one email address' consistent with the schema but adds no format, validation, or edge-case detail. Baseline 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb (get) and resource (breach analytics) scoped to 'one email address', and enumerates the return contents (breaches, dates, descriptions, industry/year exposure, risk scoring, paste exposure). This is clear and concrete, but it never distinguishes itself from the similarly-scoped sibling check_email_breaches, leaving an agent to guess which to pick.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies a single-email scope but gives no explicit when-to-use guidance, no exclusions, and never names the alternative check_email_breaches (or any other sibling). The agent must infer selection from the name alone.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false, and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuine value beyond that by enumerating the returned metrics (totals, per-year, per-industry, largest, most recent, freshness timestamp), which matters because no output schema exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single front-loaded sentence that leads with the verb and scope, then lists the returned dimensions. Dense but every clause names a distinct returned metric, so nothing reads as padding.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description carries the return-value burden and does so adequately by listing the metric categories. The remaining gap is sibling disambiguation against get_breach_analytics, which the description never addresses.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so there is nothing for the description to disambiguate; baseline 4 applies. The description correctly implies no filtering inputs are accepted, consistent with a system-wide aggregate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (get) and resource (breach metrics) and enumerates the exact statistics returned, so the agent knows what payload to expect. However, it does not differentiate itself from close siblings like get_breach_analytics or get_recent_breaches, whose scopes overlap with the 'largest and most recent breaches' items listed here.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'System-wide' implies an aggregate overview role versus the per-domain and per-email siblings, which is an implicit usage signal. But there is no explicit statement of when to choose this tool over get_breach_analytics, which sounds nearly identical in purpose, so routing is left to inference.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint, idempotentHint, destructiveHint=false and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is fully covered structurally. The description adds the ordering behavior and the shape of each returned item, but says nothing about rate limits, whether the set is paginated, or how far back 'recent' reaches.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences, zero filler. The scope and ordering constraint are front-loaded, and the return contents are summarized compactly in the second sentence.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single optional-parameter read tool with no output schema, the description covers the essential facts: it names the source, the ordering, and the per-item fields. The remaining gap is the absence of any tie-break against the other breach-listing siblings.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and the single 'limit' parameter is fully documented in the schema, including default and 1-50 bounds. The description adds no additional parameter meaning, so the baseline of 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Get the breaches most recently added to XposedOrNot') plus the ordering guarantee ('newest first'), which is concrete. However, it never distinguishes itself from the sibling 'list_breaches', leaving the agent to guess how the two differ.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied through 'most recently added, newest first' — an agent can infer this is for recent-breach lookups rather than a generic listing. There is no explicit when-to-use statement, no exclusions, and no named alternative such as list_breaches or domain_breach_summary.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnly, idempotent, openWorld and non-destructive behavior, so the safety profile is covered. The description adds genuinely new context by enumerating the returned fields (name, date, industry, record count, exposed categories, reference URL), which matters because no output schema exists.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences: the core action and its filter options come first, followed by the return payload. No filler or repetition of the title.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

With no output schema, the description usefully compensates by listing return fields, and the filters cover the optional-parameter surface. The only real gap is routing guidance relative to the sibling tools.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so all three parameters are already documented in the schema itself, and the description's mention of domain and breach_id filtering adds no syntax or format detail beyond that. Baseline 3 applies when the schema carries the parameter burden.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ("List breaches in the XposedOrNot catalog") plus its optional filter dimensions, so the agent knows exactly what the tool returns. It does not, however, distinguish itself from siblings like get_recent_breaches or domain_breach_summary, which is the only thing keeping it from a 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description explains what can be filtered but never says when to choose this tool over get_recent_breaches, domain_breach_summary, or check_email_breaches. An agent must infer from sibling names alone that this is the broad catalog-browse tool.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.