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Server Details
Domain exposure counters: breaches, infostealers, ULP heap, cookies. Counts only, free.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 1 tool
The server has only one tool, so there is no possibility of choosing the wrong one. The tool's purpose is clearly delimited by its detailed description.
The tool name uses a clear, descriptive snake_case convention and accurately reflects its function. With a single tool, naming consistency is trivially perfect.
A single tool is on the thin side for an MCP server. While it is well-crafted, the server offers a minimal surface area, making the count borderline.
The tool fully covers its stated purpose of providing exposure counts for a domain. It explicitly documents scope, limitations, and semantics, leaving no obvious gaps or dead ends within its defined domain.
Available Tools
1 toolexposure_counts_for_domainAInspect
Credential-exposure counters for a domain. Counts only - no credential values or per-account detail. Sources: known breaches, infostealer infections, unattributed ULP bundles (heap), stolen cookies. All figures are INDEXATION dates, not incident dates: _month/_week mean 'newly indexed', never 'newly leaked' - the underlying leak may be months old. Windows nest (_total includes _month includes _week) - never sum them. Counters are rebuilt once daily, so figures are up to 24h old and never real-time. Repeated calls for the same input within a day return identical values — do not re-query to check for changes. Accepts a bare domain, URL or IDN in punycode (xn--) form normalized to the registrable domain. Free, no auth.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | Domain to check, e.g. example.com. |
Output Schema
| Name | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| domain | Yes | Normalized domain actually queried. May differ from the input - report this one to the user. |
| cookies_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of cookies_month. |
| breaches_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of breaches_month. |
| cookies_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of cookies_total. |
| cookies_total | Yes | Stolen browser session cookies, indexed all time. Non-zero means session-hijacking risk that a password reset alone does not fix. |
| breaches_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of breaches_total. |
| breaches_total | Yes | Records from known breach incidents, indexed all time. |
| heap_staff_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of heap_staff_month. |
| heap_users_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of heap_users_month. |
| heap_staff_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of heap_staff_total. |
| heap_staff_total | Yes | Staff logins in unattributed ULP bundles - no linkable breach, device or leak date. Credentials circulating in the wild. |
| heap_users_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of heap_users_total. |
| heap_users_total | Yes | Customer logins in unattributed ULP bundles - no linkable breach, device or leak date. |
| stealers_staff_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of stealers_staff_month. |
| stealers_users_week | Yes | Indexed in last 7d. Subset of stealers_users_month. |
| stealers_staff_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of stealers_staff_total. |
| stealers_staff_total | Yes | Staff logins from infostealer-infected devices, indexed all time. Implies a compromised machine, not just a leaked password. |
| stealers_users_month | Yes | Indexed in last 30d. Subset of stealers_users_total. |
| stealers_users_total | Yes | Customer logins for this domain's site from infostealer-infected devices, indexed all time. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so thoroughly. It discloses data sources, indexation-vs-incident date semantics, nesting rules, daily rebuild cadence, idempotence within a day, input normalization behavior, and auth requirements. This is exemplary behavioral disclosure.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is dense but every sentence carries necessary behavioral or semantic information. The core purpose is front-loaded, followed by critical caveats, and no sentence is redundant or filler.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Despite having only one parameter and an output schema, the tool has nontrivial semantics. The description covers freshness, date interpretation, aggregation nesting, idempotence, input normalization, and authentication status, leaving no significant gap for an agent to invoke it correctly.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema only says 'Domain to check, e.g. example.com,' so the description adds substantial meaning by explaining that URLs and punycode IDNs are accepted and normalized to the registrable domain. This goes well beyond the schema and is essential for correct input handling.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
States precisely that the tool returns credential-exposure counters for a domain and explicitly excludes credential values or per-account detail. This clearly distinguishes its scope from any value-returning alternative, and the domain/input normalization is specified.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Although no sibling tools are present, the description gives clear when-to-use and when-not-to-use guidance: use for counts only, not for credential details; treat months/weeks as indexation dates; never sum nested counters; and do not re-query within the same day. It also states free, no-auth usage conditions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
1 tool update
- First observed
exposure_counts_for_domain
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