Catalog-cache guard for agent tool catalogs
Server Details
Cache guard: forced-private partitioning, TTL clamp, fingerprint diffing, exposure verdicts.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-03-26
- URL
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
guard_tools_list is clearly distinct, while cache_exposure_verdict and guard_diff_check both concern cache-vs-origin divergence could cause brief hesitation. Their descriptions distinguish output (verdict vs. fingerprint diff) and side effect (purge), so the overlap is minor.
All names use snake_case and descriptive noun phrases, but two tools share a guard_ prefix while the third uses cache_, a minor inconsistency. The pattern remains readable and predictable enough to avoid confusion.
Three tools are well-scoped for a narrow cache-guard service: one returns exposure verdicts, one checks/diffs and purges, and one provides guarded listing. Each tool earns its place without bloat.
The core guard lifecycle is covered: checking exposure, diffing cache against origin with purging, and serving guarded tools/list. Minor gaps such as explicit origin registration or manual purge are either external or handled by guard_diff_check.
Available Tools
3 toolscache_exposure_verdictBInspect
Per-partition cache-exposure verdict (OK/DIVERGENT/STALE/CROSS_TENANT_RISK/UNSEEN). $0.001/query; first verdict free once per operator; included on Fleet/Fleet Pro.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full disclosure burden. It does add genuinely useful non-schema behavior: per-query cost ($0.001), a free first verdict per operator, and inclusion on Fleet/Fleet Pro plans. However, it omits read-only vs mutating nature, auth requirements, rate limits, and whether verdicts are cached or recomputed, which leaves real gaps for a zero-annotation tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Compact and front-loaded: the verdict semantics lead, with pricing supplementary. Every clause carries information, though the pricing sentence is dense and slightly tangential to the tool's function.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema and no annotations, the description partially compensates by enumerating the verdict values (OK/DIVERGENT/STALE/CROSS_TENANT_RISK/UNSEEN), which is the most important return-value information. It falls short on the meaning of the sole parameter (server vs. partition), auth/cost prerequisites, and any notion of when the verdict is stale.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0% and the single required parameter 'server' is undocumented in both schema and description. The description says 'per-partition' but never explains how the server argument maps to partitions or what format the server identifier takes, so it fails to compensate for the coverage gap.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description names the resource precisely ('per-partition cache-exposure verdict') and enumerates the exact verdict values it can return, so an agent knows the output domain. The verb is implicit (it never says 'computes/returns'), and it does not differentiate itself from guard_diff_check or guard_tools_list, but the noun-plus-enum phrasing is specific enough to distinguish the tool's role.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no statement of when to reach for this tool versus the sibling guard tools, and no prerequisites or preconditions are given. Pricing tiers are mentioned but that is billing context, not usage guidance.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
guard_diff_checkCInspect
Cache-vs-origin fingerprint diff; divergence purges the divergent partition only.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden. It does disclose a significant behavioral trait—divergence purges only the divergent partition—but lacks detail on permissions, reversibility, timing, rate limits, or return behavior.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single concise sentence front-loaded with the diff operation. However, the semicolon compresses two distinct ideas and the extreme brevity borders on cryptic, reducing clarity for an agent.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no output schema, no annotations, and one required parameter at 0% schema coverage, the description omits parameter semantics, usage context, and return behavior. It provides only high-level behavioral hints, which is not enough for correct invocation.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 0% and the sole required parameter 'server' is not mentioned in the description. The agent gets no meaning for what 'server' represents, its scope, or the expected format.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states it performs a cache-vs-origin fingerprint diff and that divergence purges the divergent partition. That is a specific technical operation, but it uses jargon and does not clearly distinguish the tool from siblings like cache_exposure_verdict or guard_tools_list.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No indication is given for when to use this tool versus alternatives such as cache_exposure_verdict or guard_tools_list. There are no prerequisites, exclusions, or contextual triggers for invocation.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
guard_tools_listCInspect
Guarded tools/list through the cache guard for a registered origin.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| server | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It hints at a guard/cache mechanism but does not explain what is checked, whether the operation is read-only, what happens on failure, or what a 'registered origin' requires. The behavioral context is too thin for a tool with no structured annotations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single short sentence and is front-loaded with the tool's resource, which is structurally efficient. However, its brevity comes at the cost of under-specification, leaving key terms undefined. It is concise but not sufficiently informative.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
With no annotations, no output schema, and 0% parameter description coverage, the description should compensate by explaining behavior and the 'server' parameter. It only provides a vague guarded-list statement, leaving the agent without enough information to invoke the tool confidently. It is not misleading, but it is materially incomplete.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has one required parameter, 'server', with 0% description coverage, and the description never mentions it. The phrase 'registered origin' loosely suggests an origin/server concept but does not map to the parameter or explain acceptable values. An agent cannot determine what to pass for 'server' from the definition.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description identifies the resource as 'tools/list' and qualifies it as 'guarded' through a 'cache guard' for a 'registered origin'. However, 'guarded' and 'cache guard' are unexplained jargon, so the actual effect of the tool is only vaguely conveyed. It does distinguish itself from siblings by being a list operation, but an agent may still not know exactly what it returns.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description gives no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as cache_exposure_verdict or guard_diff_check. It also does not state prerequisites, exclusions, or the meaning of a 'registered origin'. The agent must infer usage entirely from the name and vague context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
3 tool updates
- First observed
cache_exposure_verdict - First observed
guard_diff_check - First observed
guard_tools_list
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