Security Intel MCP
Server Details
CVE lookups (NVD) and dependency-manifest audits (OSV) for AI agents. No API keys.
- Status
- Healthy
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP
- URL
- Repository
- datakoot/security-intel-mcp
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- Server Listing
- Security Intel MCP
Available Tools
3 toolsaudit_dependenciesAInspect
Audit a whole dependency manifest for known vulnerabilities in one call. Paste a package.json (as 'manifest'), or pass a 'dependencies' array of {name, version} objects. Returns per-package findings and a summary. Ecosystem defaults to npm.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| manifest | No | Raw package.json contents | |
| ecosystem | No | Default npm | |
| dependencies | No | [{name, version}] entries |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the behavioral burden and does disclose meaningful behavior: it accepts a raw package.json or a dependencies array, returns per-package findings plus a summary, and defaults the ecosystem to npm. It does not cover edge-case behavior like what happens if both inputs are supplied or if the manifest is invalid, but the core behavior is transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
Three short sentences cover purpose, input modes, return behavior, and default ecosystem without repetition. The most important purpose statement is front-loaded, and every sentence contributes meaningful information.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description gives a solid high-level picture but leaves gaps: there is no output schema, and the return value is only described as 'per-package findings and a summary' with no detail on structure, severities, or counts. It also does not address ambiguous inputs, such as supplying both manifest and dependencies, or how errors like an invalid package.json manifest are handled.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema coverage is 100%, so the baseline is 3, but the description adds real value by clarifying that manifest and dependencies are alternative input modes rather than independent optional fields. It also contextualizes the ecosystem parameter by stating the npm default, which is not inferable from the raw schema alone.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description opens with a specific verb and resource: 'Audit a whole dependency manifest for known vulnerabilities in one call.' This clearly states what the tool does and its batch-oriented scope, but it does not explicitly differentiate it from the sibling tools cve_lookup or package_vulnerabilities.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The phrase 'in one call' and 'whole dependency manifest' imply this is for bulk manifest auditing, and the description explains how to provide input via manifest or dependencies. However, it never states when to prefer this tool over cve_lookup or package_vulnerabilities, nor does it mention any exclusions.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
cve_lookupAInspect
Look up a CVE by ID and get a compact summary: description, CVSS score & severity, vector, CWE weakness, publish date, and references. Source: NVD (NIST).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | e.g. CVE-2021-44228 |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the disclosure burden. It usefully states the return payload and the data source (NVD/NIST), but it does not mention error behavior, rate limits, network dependence, or other operational traits. This is adequate for a simple lookup but not deeply transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, tightly packed sentence that leads with the action and then lists the result components in a scannable sequence. There is no filler, redundancy, or irrelevant context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the input, the output fields, and the source. It does not explain what happens for invalid or nonexistent CVE IDs, but that is a minor gap given the simplicity of the operation and the availability of sibling tool context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already fully documents the single parameter cve_id with an example, so the baseline is 3. The description only confirms that the ID is a CVE identifier, adding no extra format, validation, or relationship details beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Look up a CVE by ID') and enumerates the exact contents of the result: description, CVSS score & severity, vector, CWE weakness, publish date, and references. This clearly distinguishes the tool from the sibling tools audit_dependencies and package_vulnerabilities, which focus on broader scanning rather than single-CVE lookup.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage context is implied: use this tool when you already have a CVE ID and want a compact summary. However, there is no explicit guidance about when to prefer this over the sibling tools, nor any mention of situations where it should not be used.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
package_vulnerabilitiesAInspect
List known vulnerabilities for a software package (optionally a specific version) via OSV. Ecosystems: npm, pypi, cargo, go, maven, rubygems, nuget, composer, pub, hex.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| name | Yes | Exact package name as published in that registry, e.g. lodash for npm, requests for pypi. | |
| version | No | Optional; if given, only vulns affecting that version are returned | |
| ecosystem | Yes | Package registry to look in. One of: npm, pypi, cargo, go, maven, rubygems, nuget, composer, pub, hex. |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
The description discloses useful behavioral context: the data source is OSV, version filtering is optional, and only the listed ecosystems are supported. Since there are no annotations, the description carries the transparency burden, but it omits details such as the shape of the returned vulnerability list, empty-result behavior, and any access or rate-limit considerations.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is two tight sentences with the core action front-loaded and the ecosystem list appended compactly. There is no filler, repetition, or unnecessary detail, making it easy for an agent to parse quickly.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple three-parameter read tool, the description is mostly sufficient to invoke the tool correctly. However, there is no output schema and the description does not explain what fields the vulnerability results contain, nor does it route the agent away from sibling tools when the context is a dependency audit or a CVE lookup.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents name, version, and ecosystem. The description adds a succinct restatement of the optional version and supported ecosystems, but it does not add significant meaning beyond what the input schema already provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb, 'List', and identifies a concrete resource: known vulnerabilities for a software package, optionally filtered by version, via OSV. It is distinct from the sibling tools because it is scoped to a package/ecosystem lookup, but it does not explicitly compare itself with audit_dependencies or cve_lookup.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description implies the tool's use case: call it when you need OSV vulnerability data for a named package in a supported ecosystem. However, it gives no explicit guidance about when to prefer the sibling tools instead, such as using cve_lookup for CVE IDs or audit_dependencies for dependency-tree auditing.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
3 tool updates
- First observed
audit_dependencies - First observed
cve_lookup - First observed
package_vulnerabilities
Frequently Asked Questions
Claiming proves that you control a remote MCP connector. It does not move, proxy, or interrupt the server.
Open the connector listing, choose Claim ownership, and sign in to Glama.
Complete one verification method:
GitHub identity — fastest for official registry listings. For a namespace such as
io.github.alice/server, link the matching GitHub user, then choose Claim with GitHub. An organization namespace such asio.github.acme/serveralso needs that organization to have installed the Glama AI GitHub App and approved its permissions, because GitHub discloses organization membership only to apps it has installed. Use HTTP or DNS when it has not.HTTP challenge — works when you can deploy a public file. Generate a token, publish the exact JSON Glama shows at
/.well-known/glama.jsonon the same origin as the connector, then choose Check HTTP challenge.DNS challenge — works when you control DNS but cannot change the server. Generate a token, create the exact TXT record Glama shows, wait for it to propagate, then choose Check DNS challenge.
After verification, Glama sends a confirmation email and gives you access to listing details, thumbnails, health checks, and analytics. Keep the HTTP file or DNS record in place: Glama periodically checks it and ownership remains verified while the token is discoverable.
The HTTP ownership file has this structure:
{
"$schema": "https://glama.ai/mcp/schemas/connector.json",
"claim": "glama_claim_..."
}Claim tokens are opaque, stable, and bound to the signed-in Glama account. They contain no email address or other personal information. If Glama can no longer discover a verified HTTP or DNS token, it starts a seven-day grace period before removing claim-based access. Restore the same token during that period to keep ownership verified. Never publish an email address, Glama session token, GitHub token, or connector credential as ownership proof.
If verification fails, confirm that you copied the current token exactly. The HTTP file must be public, return valid JSON with a successful HTTP response, and stay on the connector's origin. DNS changes may need more time to propagate. A claim cannot transfer to a different origin or hostname: if the connector target changes, Glama starts the grace period and the new target must be claimed separately after the previous claim is released.
For a connector linked to the official MCP Registry, registry updates continue to replace its name, description, and URL by default. After claiming, open Manage connector and enable Use Glama listing details as the source of truth if edits made on Glama should be preserved. Categories and thumbnails are always managed on Glama; registry linkage and technical connection settings continue to sync.
Control your server's listing on Glama, including description and metadata
Access analytics and receive server usage reports
Get monitoring and health status updates for your server
Feature your server to boost visibility and reach more users
To improve your MCP server's ranking:
Claim ownership of the server listing
Complete the server profile with an accurate description and thumbnail
Provide a test profile so Glama can connect to and evaluate the server
Keep tool definitions clear and complete to earn a high Tool Definition Quality Score (TDQS)
Route real usage through the Glama Gateway; more recorded successful server uses also improve the ranking
For users:
Full audit trail – every tool call is logged with inputs and outputs for compliance and debugging
Granular tool control – enable or disable individual tools per connector to limit what your AI agents can do
Centralized credential management – store and rotate API keys and OAuth tokens in one place
Change alerts – get notified when a connector changes its schema, adds or removes tools, or updates tool definitions, so nothing breaks silently
For server owners:
Proven adoption – public usage metrics on your listing show real-world traction and build trust with prospective users
Tool-level analytics – see which tools are being used most, helping you prioritize development and documentation
Direct user feedback – users can report issues and suggest improvements through the listing, giving you a channel you would not have otherwise
The connector status is unhealthy when Glama is unable to successfully connect to the server. This can happen for several reasons:
The server is experiencing an outage
The URL of the server is wrong
Credentials required to access the server are missing or invalid
If you are the owner of this MCP connector and would like to make modifications to the listing, including providing test credentials for accessing the server, please contact support@glama.ai.
Discussions
No comments yet. Be the first to start the discussion!
Related MCP Connectors
CVE lookups (NVD) and dependency-manifest audits (OSV) for AI agents. No API keys.
Trust-check any dependency for agents: OpenSSF Scorecard, licenses, CVEs, deps. 7 ecosystems.
Pay-per-call cybersecurity for AI agents: vuln scans, threat intel, compliance, code security.
Defensive vulnerability intelligence search across public CVE/NVD and GitHub advisory APIs with CVSS
1
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseAqualityDmaintenanceDependency security & health auditing for AI agents with no account or API key required.22MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceProvides CVE lookup, search, and exploit intelligence from public vulnerability sources (NVD, CISA KEV, EPSS) for AI agents to produce remediation guidance without consuming LLM tokens for data fetching.1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceProvides security checks for AI agents, including secret scanning, CVE lookup, and dependency vulnerability scanning, all running locally except for CVE lookups.MIT

Fetter MCPofficial
FlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceProvides real-time Python package vulnerability data, enabling AI agents to check CVEs, CVSS scores, and safe versions for informed dependency decisions.1-
Glama MCP Gateway
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
TDQS
The three tools serve distinct purposes: bulk manifest scanning, per-package vulnerability listing, and specific CVE details. audit_dependencies and package_vulnerabilities overlap in domain but differ in input granularity (manifest vs. single package), so misselection is unlikely with clear descriptions.
Names use lowercase with underscores, but the pattern varies: 'audit_dependencies' is verb_noun, 'cve_lookup' is noun_verb, and 'package_vulnerabilities' is noun_noun. There is no consistent verb-first or object-first convention, though the names remain readable and conventional for security tools.
With three tools, the server is on the lean side but still covers core vulnerability intelligence workflows. The count feels slightly thin for a 'Security Intel' scope, yet each tool addresses a substantial use case without unnecessary bloat.
The set covers bulk dependency auditing, package-level vulnerability queries, and CVE lookup, which are essential functions for security intelligence. Minor gaps exist, such as no search-by-keyword tool or advisory feed, but the main workflows for checking known vulnerabilities are well covered.