Look up a CVE by ID and get a compact summary: description, CVSS score & severity, vector, CWE weakness, publish date, and references. Source: NVD (NIST).
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| cve_id | Yes | e.g. CVE-2021-44228 |
Changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the disclosure burden. It usefully states the return payload and the data source (NVD/NIST), but it does not mention error behavior, rate limits, network dependence, or other operational traits. This is adequate for a simple lookup but not deeply transparent.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, tightly packed sentence that leads with the action and then lists the result components in a scannable sequence. There is no filler, redundancy, or irrelevant context.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a simple one-parameter tool with no output schema, the description covers the input, the output fields, and the source. It does not explain what happens for invalid or nonexistent CVE IDs, but that is a minor gap given the simplicity of the operation and the availability of sibling tool context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema already fully documents the single parameter cve_id with an example, so the baseline is 3. The description only confirms that the ID is a CVE identifier, adding no extra format, validation, or relationship details beyond what the schema provides.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a specific action ('Look up a CVE by ID') and enumerates the exact contents of the result: description, CVSS score & severity, vector, CWE weakness, publish date, and references. This clearly distinguishes the tool from the sibling tools audit_dependencies and package_vulnerabilities, which focus on broader scanning rather than single-CVE lookup.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
Usage context is implied: use this tool when you already have a CVE ID and want a compact summary. However, there is no explicit guidance about when to prefer this over the sibling tools, nor any mention of situations where it should not be used.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Add one secure layer between your agents and this server.
The three tools serve distinct purposes: bulk manifest scanning, per-package vulnerability listing, and specific CVE details. audit_dependencies and package_vulnerabilities overlap in domain but differ in input granularity (manifest vs. single package), so misselection is unlikely with clear descriptions.
Names use lowercase with underscores, but the pattern varies: 'audit_dependencies' is verb_noun, 'cve_lookup' is noun_verb, and 'package_vulnerabilities' is noun_noun. There is no consistent verb-first or object-first convention, though the names remain readable and conventional for security tools.
With three tools, the server is on the lean side but still covers core vulnerability intelligence workflows. The count feels slightly thin for a 'Security Intel' scope, yet each tool addresses a substantial use case without unnecessary bloat.
The set covers bulk dependency auditing, package-level vulnerability queries, and CVE lookup, which are essential functions for security intelligence. Minor gaps exist, such as no search-by-keyword tool or advisory feed, but the main workflows for checking known vulnerabilities are well covered.