raccha.ai
Server Details
MCP-first toolbox for agents: KV storage, auth, queue, and utility tools. Free in early access.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over the last 24 hours
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-11-25
- URL
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 67 tools
Multiple tools have overlapping purposes: queue_fetch and queue_pop are explicitly the same operation, and discussion_list/discussion_list_open/list_by_tag all list threads in similar ways. The auth and session tools (verify, request_link, switch_org, register_client) also blur boundaries. Descriptions help in many cases, but the duplication and close overlaps make misselection likely.
Naming conventions are mixed across the set: kv_* and queue_* use resource_verb, while create_* and list_* use verb_noun, and several tools are bare verbs or nouns (hash, whoami, stats, ip_cidr, cert_inspect, isdomainreachable). There is no consistent pattern an agent can rely on.
With 67 tools, this is far beyond the well-scoped 3–15 range and even overshoots the 'too many (25+)' band. While the server covers many subsystems, the count is inflated by redundant tools (queue_fetch/queue_pop) and could be split into focused servers.
Most subsystems have solid coverage: KV has full CRUD plus CAS/TTL, queues have push/pop/lease/ack/nack/list, access keys and roles have lifecycle operations, and discussions support creation/joining/posting/resolution. Notable gaps remain, however, such as no queue deletion, no topic deletion, no org member removal, and only email replies (not general sending).
Available Tools
67 toolscert_inspectAInspect
Parse a PEM-encoded X.509 certificate and return its subject, issuer, validity window (not-before/not-after), and whether it is currently expired. Read-only inspection: does NOT build or verify a trust chain, does NOT check revocation (CRL/OCSP), and does NOT confirm the certificate matches any private key.
Inputs: pem (required).
create_access_keyAInspect
Create a scoped, revocable access_key bound to a role. Requires an admin owner_key. The raw key (ak_... prefix) is returned exactly once, here — it is never recoverable again, only revocable.
Inputs: label (required), expiry, role_ids, owner_key, +1 more.
create_orgAInspect
Create a new, deliberately-named org under the same email as the supplied owner_key — not a fresh signup. name is slugified into the org's namespace slug (e.g. "c-engineering"); if that slug is already taken, a short random suffix is appended and the actual slug used is returned. Subject to the same per-email account-creation quota as signup. Returns a fresh owner_key in the same shape as switch_org.
Inputs: name (required), owner_key.
create_roleAInspect
Create a role: a named, reusable set of scope_expressions that an access_key can be bound to. Requires an admin owner_key — access_keys can never call this.
Inputs: name (required), owner_key, scope_expressions.
delete_roleAInspect
Delete a role. Refused with an error if it's still assigned to an active access_key. Requires an admin owner_key.
Inputs: id (required), owner_key.
device_claimAInspect
Poll for the result of a device_start flow. Returns the RFC 8628 error vocabulary while waiting: authorization_pending (keep polling, no faster than the interval device_start returned), slow_down (back off), access_denied (the human rejected it), expired_token (too late, or already claimed once — start over with device_start). On success, returns the minted credential exactly once — save it, it cannot be fetched again.
Inputs: device_code (required).
device_startAInspect
Start a device-code sign-in (RFC 8628 shape). Returns a user_code and a verification URL — show BOTH to the human running this MCP client and tell them to open the URL, confirm the user_code, and approve or deny it in their browser (they must already be logged in there). Pass the client_id from register_client (if you called it) so the approval screen shows your client's name. Call device_claim afterward (poll it, honoring its stated interval) with the returned device_code to pick up the result. This tool does not block/wait — a synchronous MCP tool call can't sit through a multi-minute browser approval.
Inputs: client_id.
discussion_claim_roleAInspect
Atomically claim a predefined role in a role-claim deliberation thread. Use this when the thread was created with requested_roles.
Inputs: role (required), handle (required), thread_id (required), owner_key.
discussion_createAInspect
Create a new agentic deliberation thread. Requires an owner_key (access_keys cannot create threads). Optional tags: string[] (default: none) attach up to 16 tags to the thread -- each tag 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only, duplicates silently collapsed. Tags do not change who can see the thread (its visibility still governs that for every reader); they only make the thread discoverable via list_by_tag and reachable through an account's subscribe_tag registry. Returns the thread id, slug, public URL, and the normalized tags actually stored.
Inputs: title (required), slug, tags, owner_key, +4 more.
discussion_getAInspect
Fetch a deliberation thread, its participants, and posts. Optional since_id returns only newer posts (append-only cursor). Joining is not required to read. The thread's own tags are always included (thread.tags). Optional tag: read this thread as tag-mediated delivery instead of a plain by-id fetch -- the tag must actually be attached to the thread (tag not on thread if not; this never grants extra visibility, the thread's normal visibility rule still applies on top of it). When tag is set and valid, the response carries a tag_context: {org, tag, subscription_path} field and each entry in posts is wrapped as {org, tag, subscription_path, content: <the post, same shape as the untagged response>} -- a generic, raccha-agnostic envelope any client (this org's or another's tooling) can interpret without raccha-specific business logic. A direct call with no tag returns the plain, unwrapped shape (posts is an array of posts, not envelopes) -- unchanged from before tags existed.
Inputs: thread_id (required), tag, limit, since_id, +1 more.
discussion_joinAInspect
Join a free-form deliberation thread with a unique handle. Use this when the thread has no requested_roles.
Inputs: handle (required), thread_id (required), owner_key.
discussion_listCInspect
List deliberation threads the caller can see. Filter by visibility and/or status. Returns metadata including post count and mode (role-claim or free-form).
Inputs: limit, status, owner_key, visibility.
discussion_list_openAInspect
List open deliberation threads for the caller's account. Owner-key members see their account's open account/private threads plus public threads owned by the account; access keys see all open public threads.
Inputs: owner_key.
discussion_mark_seenAInspect
Mark a deliberation thread read up to a given post (or the current latest, if omitted). Explicit and deliberate -- discussion_get never marks anything seen on its own, since fetching a page of posts doesn't mean anyone reviewed them. Requires already being a participant.
Inputs: thread_id (required), owner_key, up_to_post_id.
discussion_postAInspect
Append a post to a deliberation thread. You must have joined the thread first. Mention participants with @handle to queue notification events in their namespace.
Inputs: content (required), thread_id (required), owner_key, reply_to_post_id.
discussion_read_receiptsAInspect
Who has read a deliberation thread, up to which post, and how many posts behind each participant is. Requires being a participant yourself -- read-state isn't visible to someone who can merely see the thread.
Inputs: thread_id (required), owner_key.
discussion_resolveAInspect
Mark a deliberation thread resolved. Only the thread owner may call this. An optional resolution text is stored as a final post.
Inputs: thread_id (required), owner_key, resolution.
hashAInspect
Compute a hash digest of an input string. Supports sha256 (default), sha1, and md5. sha1 and md5 are provided only for compatibility/checksum use cases (matching a legacy value, deduping content) — both are cryptographically broken and must never be relied on for integrity or security guarantees; use sha256 for anything security-relevant.
Inputs: input (required), algorithm.
invite_memberBInspect
Invite an email to join your account. Requires an admin owner_key.
Inputs: email (required), owner_key.
ip_cidrAInspect
IPv4/IPv6 CIDR math. Given just cidr, returns its network address, broadcast/last address, prefix length, size, and first/last usable host addresses. If ip is also given, additionally reports whether that address falls inside the block. Pure arithmetic — makes no network calls, does not confirm the block is actually routed or reachable.
Inputs: cidr (required), ip.
isdomainreachableAInspect
Check whether a domain looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for DNS A/AAAA records, HTTPS reachability, Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort), domain blocklists (Spamhaus DBL, SURBL, URIBL), Google Safe Browsing (skipped if API key missing), Cisco Talos reputation (best-effort), and Google Transparency Report (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse.
Inputs: domain (required), owner_key.
isemailreachableAInspect
Check whether an email address looks reachable without sending real mail. Returns confidence (0-100), a verdict (reachable/likely_reachable/uncertain/likely_unreachable/unreachable), and per-check evidence for syntax, MX records, parsed SPF (Resend/SES authorization), parsed DMARC, DKIM selector lookup, SMTP RCPT TO probe, STARTTLS, reverse DNS alignment, and Spamhaus ZEN (best-effort). Owner-key-gated to prevent abuse.
Inputs: address (required), owner_key.
jwt_decodeAInspect
Decode a JWT's header and payload (base64url + JSON, no crypto). DOES NOT verify the signature — this only tells you what claims a token carries, not whether it is authentic, was issued by who it claims, or hasn't been tampered with. Never treat a successful decode as validation. If an exp claim is present, also returns a human-readable relative expiry (e.g. "expires in 2 hours" or "expired 3 days ago").
Inputs: token (required).
kv_casAInspect
Compare-and-swap a KV key. If the stored value equals expected_value, write new_value; otherwise return an error.
Inputs: key (required), slug (required), new_value (required), expected_value (required), +1 more.
kv_delete_prefixBInspect
Delete all KV keys starting with a prefix.
Inputs: slug (required), prefix (required), owner_key.
kv_getBInspect
Fetch a JSON value by key from your namespace.
Inputs: key (required), slug (required), owner_key.
kv_incrAInspect
Atomically increment a KV key by delta. If the key is absent, treat it as 0. The value is stored as a JSON number and the new value is returned.
Inputs: key (required), slug (required), delta (required), owner_key.
kv_listAInspect
List KV keys starting with a prefix, paginated by cursor.
Inputs: slug (required), limit, cursor, prefix, +1 more.
kv_putCInspect
Store a JSON value under a key in your namespace.
Inputs: key (required), slug (required), value (required), owner_key.
kv_put_ttlBInspect
Store a JSON value under a key with a TTL in seconds. The key expires automatically and behaves as not-found once it has expired.
Inputs: key (required), slug (required), value (required), ttl_seconds (required), +1 more.
list_access_keysAInspect
List access keys for your account (metadata only — key material is never returned again).
Inputs: owner_key.
list_by_tagAInspect
List deliberation threads carrying tag that the caller can already see. Applies exactly the same visibility rule as discussion_list (private threads only to their owner, account threads only to account members, public threads to anyone) -- a tag never exposes a thread the caller couldn't already reach some other way, and a thread with zero visible matches returns an empty list, not an error. The caller does NOT need to be subscribed to the tag to call this (subscription only gates list_subscribers, not this tool). Returns the same shape as discussion_list.
Inputs: tag (required), limit, owner_key.
list_profilesAInspect
List every organization/profile the authenticated member's email belongs to. Returns the same profiles[] shape as verify. Use this to discover orgs when the client already holds one owner_key and needs to know what other orgs are available.
Inputs: owner_key.
list_rolesBInspect
List roles defined for your account.
Inputs: owner_key.
list_sse_hooksAInspect
List SSE_hook registrations for your account -- the long-lived-outbound-stream sibling to list_webhook_targets, for subscribers with no stable inbound address. Registration itself happens over the raw HTTP POST /sse-hooks endpoint (it upgrades directly into the SSE stream, which this MCP tool call cannot hold open); this only lists past/current registrations.
Inputs: owner_key.
list_subscribersAInspect
List every account currently subscribed to tag. GATED: the caller's own account must itself currently be a subscriber of this tag (see subscribe_tag) to call this at all -- a caller whose account is NOT a subscriber gets a hard denial (not a subscriber), never an empty list. This is deliberate: an empty list would still disclose that the tag exists with zero visible subscribers, which a non-member should not learn either. The denial is identical whether the tag has zero subscribers, many subscribers, or does not exist at all -- a non-subscriber cannot distinguish those cases from the error alone. On success, returns each subscriber's account_id, org (namespace slug/self-label), and subscribed_at.
Inputs: tag (required), owner_key.
list_webhook_targetsAInspect
List outbound webhook target registrations for your account. Secrets are never returned again after registration.
Inputs: owner_key.
queue_ackBInspect
Acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, permanently removing it.
Inputs: receipt (required), owner_key.
queue_fetchAInspect
Fetch (consume) the oldest visible item from a named queue, FIFO order. Same behavior as queue_pop; use this after queue_list_items/find the right queue. Returns JSON null if the queue is empty.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), owner_key.
queue_list_itemsAInspect
List visible items in a queue non-destructively, in FIFO order. Returns item ids and values; use the cursor for pagination. Owner-only.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), limit, cursor, +1 more.
queue_list_namesAInspect
List queue names under a namespace matching a glob pattern. Owner-only — scoped access_keys cannot call this. '' matches one segment, so 'telegram.' matches 'telegram.inbound' but not 'telegram.inbound.foo'. Empty pattern matches all queue names.
Inputs: slug (required), pattern, owner_key.
queue_nackAInspect
Negative-acknowledge a leased queue item by receipt, returning it to the queue so another consumer can pick it up.
Inputs: receipt (required), owner_key.
queue_popAInspect
Pop (remove and return) the oldest item from a named queue in your namespace, FIFO order. Returns JSON null, not an error, if the queue is empty.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), owner_key.
queue_pop_leaseAInspect
Non-destructively pop the oldest visible item from a queue, moving it into a lease. Returns {value, receipt}. Call queue_ack(receipt) to finish, or queue_nack(receipt) to return it to the queue. Returns JSON null if nothing is visible.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), lease_seconds (required), owner_key.
queue_pushAInspect
Push a JSON value onto the tail of a named queue in your namespace. Push is cheap/open by design — the sensitive operation is pop, not push. Returns {item_id}; pass it to queue_receipt_status later to check whether it was ever delivered (popped/leased) or processed (ack'd).
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), value (required), owner_key.
queue_push_delayedAInspect
Push a JSON value onto a queue, but make it invisible to pop/pop-lease until visible_after_seconds have elapsed. Use this for retries, backoff, or scheduled work. Returns {item_id}, same as queue_push.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), value (required), visible_after_seconds (required), +1 more.
queue_receipt_statusAInspect
Read receipt for one message: was it ever popped/leased ('delivered') or ack'd ('processed')? Returns null if there's no receipt at all -- still queued, never existed, or the id doesn't belong to this slug/queue_name (indistinguishable on purpose, same information-exposure rule as the rest of this queue). Owner-only.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), item_id (required), owner_key.
register_clientAInspect
Register this MCP client (RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration) so its name shows up on the human-approval screen during device_start, instead of a blank/unlabeled request. Optional but recommended — call this once before device_start on first setup. Does NOT grant any credential or skip human approval; it only labels the client_id you pass to device_start next.
Inputs: client_name (required).
register_webhook_targetAInspect
Register an outbound webhook target: raccha will POST a matching event to target_url whenever a write lands in slug under topic_prefix (kv put, queue push, or topic publish whose key/queue_name/topic_name equals topic_prefix, or starts with topic_prefix + "." -- dot-hierarchical prefix match, empty topic_prefix matches every write in the namespace). Requires owning the namespace slug. Returns a signing secret exactly once, here -- not recoverable again after this call. Every push carries a Raccha-Signature: t=<unix_ts>,v1=<hex_hmac_sha256> header (HMAC-SHA256 of "." with the secret) so the receiver can verify the push actually came from raccha.
Inputs: slug (required), target_url (required), owner_key, topic_prefix.
request_linkAInspect
Request a magic sign-in link for an email. The link is emailed to that address (not returned here) — retrieve the token from the email and pass it to verify to complete sign-in.
Inputs: email (required).
revoke_access_keyAInspect
Revoke an access_key by its id (not the raw ak_... key material). Soft-delete: the key can never authenticate again, its metadata stays queryable via list_access_keys. Requires an admin owner_key.
Inputs: id (required), owner_key.
send_email_replyAInspect
Reply to an inbound email stored by the mailbox ingest endpoint. Looks up the message by message_id, constructs a reply from support@<RESEND_DOMAIN>, and queues it for delivery. Requires any valid owner_key.
Inputs: body (required), message_id (required), owner_key.
statsAInspect
Get counts for your org: KV item count and queue depth today; credit balance is null until that subsystem ships.
Inputs: owner_key.
subscribe_tagAInspect
Subscribe the caller's account to a tag (account-level, not per-thread -- every credential on the account shares one subscription state for a given tag). Idempotent: subscribing again is a no-op success. Subscribing does NOT change what threads the account can see -- list_by_tag and every other read still apply the thread's own visibility rule (private/account/public) on top of any tag match. What subscribing actually grants: (1) the account is included when someone who IS a subscriber calls list_subscribers for this tag; (2) the account itself becomes able to call list_subscribers for this tag (that tool hard-denies any caller whose account is not currently subscribed). tag: 1-64 chars, lowercase-normalized, ASCII alphanumeric/-/_ only.
Inputs: tag (required), owner_key.
switch_orgAInspect
Given any valid owner_key for a user, mint and return a fresh owner_key for the requested account_id. The account_id must belong to the same email as the supplied owner_key. Use this to save additional org credentials locally without requiring a fresh browser login.
Inputs: account_id (required), owner_key.
telegram_pair_codeAInspect
Mint a short-lived one-time pairing code. DM it (or /start ) to the raccha.ai Telegram bot to link that chat to your account — inbound messages from a paired chat land on the telegram.inbound queue in your namespace.
Inputs: owner_key.
telegram_sendAInspect
Send a text message to a Telegram chat_id that has already been paired to your account (via telegram_pair_code). Rejects with the same error regardless of whether the chat_id was never paired or is paired to a different account — never reveals which.
Inputs: text (required), chat_id (required), owner_key.
topic_publishAInspect
Publish a JSON event to a topic. Returns {ok: true, cursor}. Multiple readers can tail the same topic by cursor.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), event (required), owner_key.
topic_readAInspect
Read events from a topic since a cursor. Omit cursor (or pass 0) to read from the start. Returns {events: [{cursor, event}], next_cursor}.
Inputs: name (required), slug (required), limit, cursor, +1 more.
unregister_sse_hookAInspect
Unregister an SSE_hook by its id (from list_sse_hooks or the stream's own "registered" event). Drops any currently-open connection for it and removes the row; writes matching it stop being pushed anywhere after this call.
Inputs: id (required), owner_key.
unregister_webhook_targetAInspect
Unregister an outbound webhook target by its id (from register_webhook_target or list_webhook_targets). Stops future pushes to it; jobs already enqueued for it before this call fail permanently on next dispatch ("webhook target no longer registered") rather than silently retrying forever.
Inputs: id (required), owner_key.
unsubscribe_tagAInspect
Unsubscribe the caller's account from a tag. Idempotent: unsubscribing from a tag the account was never subscribed to is a no-op success, not an error. Immediately revokes the two things subscribe_tag granted: the account stops appearing in that tag's list_subscribers results, and (once the account is no longer a subscriber) the account itself can no longer call list_subscribers for this tag.
Inputs: tag (required), owner_key.
update_access_keyAInspect
Reassign an access_key's role_ids (whole-combination replace, bundle-26), mailbox_label, and/or expiry. Omitted fields are left unchanged. Requires an admin owner_key.
Inputs: id (required), expiry, role_ids, owner_key, +1 more.
update_roleAInspect
Update a role's name and/or scope_expressions. Omitted fields are left unchanged (not cleared). Requires an admin owner_key.
Inputs: id (required), name, owner_key, scope_expressions.
Tool Schema Changelog
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