FORUM
Server Details
Signed, Merkle-proofed, on-chain-anchored trust records for MCP servers. Verify, do not trust.
- Status
- Healthy
- Uptime
- 100.0% over the last 24 hours
- Last Tested
- Transport
- Streamable HTTP · MCP 2025-06-18
- URL
- Repository
- forumtrust/forum-verify
- GitHub Stars
- 0
- ChatGPT
- –
- Claude
- –
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
Each tool targets a distinct object: method metadata, a Merkle proof, and a full trust record. The only soft overlap is that trust_lookup already embeds a Merkle proof, so an agent wanting a proof could plausibly pick either tool, but the descriptions make the standalone-vs-composite distinction reasonably clear.
Two of three tools follow a clean get_noun pattern (get_method, get_proof), while trust_lookup breaks it with a noun_lookup form. The deviation is minor and the names remain readable and self-explanatory.
Three tools is a tight, well-scoped surface for a read-only verification service. get_proof is arguably redundant given the proof embedded in trust_lookup, but keeping it separate is defensible for lightweight proof-only verification.
The core verification lifecycle (method metadata, record retrieval, proof, root anchoring) is covered with no dead ends for a known registry name. However, there is no discovery/enumeration or search tool, so an agent must obtain a valid registry_name externally, and there is no access to prior daily releases or historical records despite the daily-rebuild model.
Available Tools
3 toolsget_methodFORUM scoring method metadataARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return the metadata of the scoring method behind the current FORUM release: method_version, as_of_input_date, record_count, merkle_root, the record hash_recipe and freshness thresholds (the same object as GET /v1/method on the FORUM HTTP API), plus pointers with SHA-256 to the full method document (/v1/method/doc; section 10 holds the verification recipes), the weights file and the release manifest, and the path of the signing keys. The method is public and versioned; weights live in a published config file. What a score is NOT: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. It is a longitudinal behavioral-reputation summary with full evidence disclosure: scanners answer "is this safe to install today"; FORUM answers "what has this thing done since everyone installed it". Scores are flags, not verdicts: the band is derived only from the documented sub-scores, and a sub-score FORUM could not observe is reported as null with a reason, not estimated. Takes no arguments. Read-only.
Inputs: no named parameters.
get_proofFORUM Merkle proofARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Return the Merkle audit path that ties one FORUM trust record to the daily release root: leaf, index (0-based leaf position), path (sibling hashes, leaf level first) and root. Same object as GET /v1/trust/{registry_name}/proof on the FORUM HTTP API. Verification recipe: (1) h = the 32 bytes of leaf (hex-decoded; leaf is the record's content_sha256), i = index. (2) For each hex sibling s in path, in order: if i is even, h = sha256(h + s_bytes); if i is odd, h = sha256(s_bytes + h); then i = i // 2. (3) hex(h) must equal root. Then compare root with merkle_root from get_method and with the on-chain anchor (method doc section 10.2); a root taken only from this response shows internal consistency, not publication. A valid proof shows that the record is part of the published release; it says nothing about whether the scored server is safe. A score is: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. An unknown name returns isError with error=not_in_registry. Read-only.
Inputs: registry_name (required).
trust_lookupFORUM trust record lookupARead-onlyIdempotentInspect
Look up the FORUM trust record for one MCP server listed in the official MCP Registry. Returns, in one response: the ed25519-signed record (sub-scores for provenance, static scan, drift and incidents; a derived band; evidence pointers; a null score with a stated reason wherever coverage is missing), the record's Merkle proof, and a paragraph of verify instructions. record_json is byte-identical to the body of GET /v1/trust/{registry_name} on the FORUM HTTP API; record_content_sha256 is the record hash and Merkle leaf. Records are rebuilt daily; as_of_input_date is the input date of this one. An unknown name returns isError with error=not_in_registry: the name is not in the current registry snapshot, which is absence of a record, not a negative finding. What a score is NOT: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. It is a longitudinal behavioral-reputation summary with full evidence disclosure: scanners answer "is this safe to install today"; FORUM answers "what has this thing done since everyone installed it". Verify, do not trust: recompute the hash, check the signature, and check the proof against a root obtained independently. Read-only.
Inputs: registry_name (required).
Tool Schema Changelog
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