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FORUM trust record lookup

trust_lookup
Read-onlyIdempotent

Look up the FORUM trust record for one MCP server listed in the official MCP Registry. Returns, in one response: the ed25519-signed record (sub-scores for provenance, static scan, drift and incidents; a derived band; evidence pointers; a null score with a stated reason wherever coverage is missing), the record's Merkle proof, and a paragraph of verify instructions. record_json is byte-identical to the body of GET /v1/trust/{registry_name} on the FORUM HTTP API; record_content_sha256 is the record hash and Merkle leaf. Records are rebuilt daily; as_of_input_date is the input date of this one. An unknown name returns isError with error=not_in_registry: the name is not in the current registry snapshot, which is absence of a record, not a negative finding. What a score is NOT: Not a security guarantee, not a penetration test, not certification of code correctness. It is a longitudinal behavioral-reputation summary with full evidence disclosure: scanners answer "is this safe to install today"; FORUM answers "what has this thing done since everyone installed it". Verify, do not trust: recompute the hash, check the signature, and check the proof against a root obtained independently. Read-only.

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "registry_name": "<registry_name>"
    },
    "name": "trust_lookup"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
registry_nameYesMCP Registry server name, exactly as the registry spells it: owner/name, e.g. io.github.pipeworx-io/19hz. Contains a slash; pass it raw (no URL-encoding). Case-sensitive.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observed

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already cover the read-only, idempotent, non-destructive profile, and the description adds substantial behavior beyond them: daily rebuilds and as_of_input_date, byte-identity with GET /v1/trust/{registry_name}, unknown names returning isError=not_in_registry meaning absence rather than a negative finding, and an explicit disclaimer of what a score is not. The absence-vs-negative distinction is exactly the kind of nuance that prevents misinterpretation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Purpose is front-loaded in the first clause, followed by return contents, then error semantics, then scope disclaimers — a sensible order. It is dense for its length; the 'what a score is NOT' passage is longer than strictly needed but earns most of its space by preventing over-reading of scores.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a single-parameter read tool with no output schema, the description fully compensates: it describes the return payload, the hash/Merkle semantics, freshness, and the error case. Nothing an agent needs in order to call this correctly or interpret the result is missing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

With one parameter and 100% schema description coverage, the schema already documents the owner/name format, case sensitivity, and raw (non-URL-encoded) passing. The description adds no syntax or format detail beyond that, so the schema does the heavy lifting and a baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The opening states a specific verb and resource — look up the FORUM trust record for one MCP server in the official MCP Registry — and the description enumerates exactly what comes back (signed record, Merkle proof, verify instructions). It does not explicitly differentiate from the siblings get_method and get_proof, even though the tool returns both a proof and verify steps, so the agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives clear when-to-use framing by contrasting FORUM against security scanners ("scanners answer 'is this safe to install today'; FORUM answers 'what has this thing done since everyone installed it'") and closes with a verify workflow. It stops short of naming the sibling tools to call for proof checks, leaving that inference to the agent.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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