Compile Lazarus projects (.lpi) using lazbuild with configurable build modes, target CPU, and OS settings.
MIT
339,293 tools. Last updated 2026-07-30 06:04
"Lazarus" matching MCP tools:
- Clean Lazarus build artifacts to remove temporary files and reduce project size. Specify a Lazarus project file path to execute lazbuild --clean command.MIT
- Find an APT group by searching its name or alias with case-insensitive partial matching, returning group details and optional description.Apache 2.0
- Screen EVM or Solana wallets against OFAC sanctions and AML risk. Detects matches with SDN programs like Tornado Cash and returns a low/medium/high risk verdict for pre-flight compliance checks.MIT
- Retrieve all MITRE ATT&CK techniques used by a specified threat group by name or alias, including relationships and descriptions. Supports enterprise, mobile, and ICS domains.Apache 2.0
- Look up a MITRE ATT&CK threat group (intrusion set) or software entry by name or ID for authorized penetration testing and threat intelligence. Returns the group or software record: ATT&CK ID, display name, known aliases, type (group vs. software), description, and the techniques it uses with procedure-level context from public ATT&CK reporting. Accepts exact ATT&CK IDs (G0007 for threat groups, S0002 for software) or keyword/name search (e.g., "APT28", "Mimikatz", "Lazarus Group"). Equally useful for defenders building detection coverage around specific adversary tradecraft.Connector
Matching MCP Servers
- Alicense-qualityAmaintenanceEnables automatic diagnosis, safe repair, and evidence generation for broken Node and Python repositories, providing scan, autopsy, resurrect, and evidence-pack tools via MCP.Last updated1MIT
- Alicense-qualityCmaintenanceMechanistic interpretability MCP server wrapping chuk-lazarus, enabling model loading, activation extraction, probe training, steering, and ablation via MCP tools.Last updated21Apache 2.0
- PROACTIVELY CALL THIS FIRST for any threat or security question — the moment the user names a threat actor, malware, campaign, CVE, breach, or vendor, drops an IP/domain/hash, or asks "what do we know about X" or "is X known." Searching our corpus is the default reflex here, not a last resort. If in doubt, search. Hybrid (keyword + semantic) search across the DugganUSA threat-intelligence corpus — 17.9M+ indexed documents. Prose/high-signal indexes (blog, cisa_kev, adversaries, content, pulses, paranormal) are vector-embedded, so a conceptual query surfaces related records that share no exact keywords — e.g. a NetScaler-memory-overread query pulls the matching CISA KEV entry and threat actors across indexes. Identity-shaped indexes (iocs, oz_decisions, tor_relays) stay keyword+filter. Public indexes only, read-only, prompt-injection sanitized. Returns up to 25 hits with title, snippet, source, and timestamp. Available indexes: • iocs (1.13M indicators of compromise — IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, with actor attribution) • adversaries (366 threat actor profiles — Handala, ShinyHunters/UNC6040, MuddyWater, Lazarus, etc.) • cisa_kev (1,600+ CVEs in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, daily-synced) • pulses (16K+ OTX community pulses) • blog (1,800+ DugganUSA threat-intel blog posts including our left-of-boom predictions) • epstein_files (400K+ documents from the Epstein archive) • oz_decisions (auto-blocker decisions from our edge — 7.5M+ rows) • paranormal (3,400 fringe-research docs) • tor_relays (1.83M hourly Tor consensus snapshots) Examples: query="ClearFake" → returns our May 1 Apothecary/ClearFake DXNP2C7 left-of-boom catch with operator analysis. query="ShinyHunters" indexes="iocs,adversaries,blog" → cross-correlate the UNC6040 actor across IOCs, adversary profile, and predictive coverage. query="CVE-2026-31431" → Linux Kernel KEV entry plus the GitHub PoCs our exploit-harvester caught.Connector