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388,631 tools. Last updated 2026-08-04 04:48

"A server for Linux file operations" matching MCP tools:

  • Persist an ARBITRARY user file (image or video, up to 150MB) into Hermoso and get back a durable public URL you can pass to post_to_meta / upload_meta_asset / create_meta_ad — including files that have NOTHING to do with a Hermoso render (e.g. media on the user's desktop). Provide exactly ONE source: `path` (a local file — works ONLY when Hermoso runs locally over stdio/CLI; the hosted connector can't see the user's machine), or `dataUri` (a base64 data: URI — keep under ~15MB on the hosted connector). If the file is ALREADY at a public https URL you do NOT need this — pass that URL straight to post_to_meta/upload_meta_asset and the server re-hosts it safely. Returns {url, kind, bytes}.
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  • Perform a Linux package vulnerability audit using SecDB. ## What this tool does Analyzes the installed packages of a Linux system-identified by OS and OS version-and returns vulnerability information plus a Markdown summary. The audit results are based exclusively on the package list provided by the user. ## When to use this tool Use this tool when the user wants to determine: - whether installed packages contain known vulnerabilities - whether a host, VM, container, or base image is affected by security advisories - which packages require patching or upgrading If the user does not know the valid values for `os` or `version`, first call the `linux_os` tool to retrieve the exact supported combinations. ## Inputs - **os**: Linux distribution identifier supported by SecDB (use `linux_os` to obtain allowed values). - **version**: OS version or codename corresponding to the selected distribution. - **packages**: list of installed packages, **one per line**, generated using the appropriate system command: ### For RPM-based distributions (RHEL, CentOS, Rocky, Alma, SUSE) rpm -qa --qf '%{NAME}-%{VERSION}-%{RELEASE}.%{ARCH}\n' ### For DEB-based distributions (Ubuntu, Debian) dpkg-query -W -f='${Package} ${Version} ${Architecture}\n' ### For Alpine Linux apk list -I The raw output of these commands can be passed directly as the `packages` input (one package per line). ... python3 3.12.3-0ubuntu2.1 amd64 systemd 255.4-1ubuntu8.10 amd64 tmux 3.4-1ubuntu0.1 amd64 ... ## Outputs - **report**: structured objects describing the advisories affecting the audited packages. - **summary**: Markdown summary including total vulnerabilities, severity breakdown, and key findings. ## LLM usage guidelines - Never guess whether a package is vulnerable-always call this tool for Linux audits. - If `os` or `version` is unclear or missing, call `linux_os` and ask the user to choose a valid combination. - Normalize the package list to “one entry per line” if the user provides unstructured output. - The `summary` is already Markdown and can be shown directly. - Use `report` when deeper technical analysis is required.
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  • Get a short-lived presigned URL to upload one brand-asset file to IBO's private storage. Requires order_token from get_order; the storage location is bound to the order server-side. PUT the raw file bytes to url, then reference key in submit_brief files[]. Allowed: jpg png webp pdf svg mp4 mov zip ai psd; 250MB/file, 1GB per order.
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  • Offload a document conversion to Botverse — runs server-side in seconds, returns a download link, and frees you to continue with other tasks while it processes. Use this when the source document is at a public URL — direct download links and share links from Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive (personal or business), SharePoint, and Box all auto-resolve to the file. If you already have the content as a string, use convert_content instead — no upload step needed. Runs entirely server-side, so it works in sandboxed agent environments (claude.ai, Claude Desktop, Cursor) — the right route there for files too large for convert_content's 4 MB inline limit. Supported inputs: md, html, rst, txt, docx. Supported outputs: docx (Word), pdf, html, txt, md, rst, xlsx (tables extracted). Returns a job_id immediately. Poll get_job_status every 5s until 'complete', then get_output_content (inline, sandbox-safe) or get_download_url (S3 link). Flat fee $0.05 per file.
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  • Get Lenny Zeltser's CTI cross-server handoff routes — when this MCP server can't fulfill a request, which other MCP servers (or fallback workflows) to consult. Surfaces a compact subset of `cti_load_context`. This server never requests your campaign or threat-intel notes and instructs your AI to keep them local—templates and guidelines flow to your AI for local analysis.
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  • Run a single-statement SELECT against the canvas dataframes registered by bls_get_series. Read-only: writes, DDL, DROP, COPY, PRAGMA, ATTACH, and external-file table functions are rejected. System catalogs (information_schema, pg_catalog, sqlite_master, duckdb_*) are denied at the bridge layer — use bls_dataframe_describe to list available dataframes. Supports JOINs, aggregates, window functions, and CTEs. Optional register_as persists the result as a new dataframe with a fresh TTL for chained analysis. Canvas SQL operations consume zero BLS API quota. Requires CANVAS_PROVIDER_TYPE=duckdb.
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Matching MCP Servers

  • A
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    A Model Context Protocol server that enables enhanced file system operations including reading, writing, copying, moving files with streaming capabilities, directory management, file watching, and change tracking.
    Last updated
    21
    MIT
  • A
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    Provides AI assistants with the ability to control Linux desktop environments through tools for file management, application launching, and system operations like clipboard access. It includes a multi-level security model to manage permissions for safe, elevated, and restricted actions.
    Last updated
    6
    MIT

Matching MCP Connectors

  • Connectivity check that confirms the Nordic MCP server process is responding. Use this at the start of a session to verify the server is reachable before making other calls. Do not use as a proxy for database health — the server can respond while the Qdrant vector database is temporarily unavailable. To confirm data availability, call search_filings directly. Returns: A greeting string: "Hello {name}! Nordic MCP server is running."
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  • Check an async report job by report_id (from report_request or report_list). Returns its status: _PENDING_ or _IN_PROGRESS_ (still generating — wait a bit and check again) or _DONE_. When _DONE_, result_url is a download link for the result ZIP; hand it to the user. Links are time-limited — if one has expired, run report_status again for a fresh link. The server never downloads the file itself.
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  • Long-poll subscription that pushes ctx.info() on each new inbox file. Replaces bash polling daemons (watch-relay-*.sh) with server-initiated push. Call once at session start (e.g. via SessionStart hook). Server holds the subscription, watches the calling agent's role-specific inbox dir, and fires info-level notifications on each new relay file arrival. Client re-calls this in a loop for persistent coverage. Per PR #1 (CCR-inversion-for-relay-pickup): `inbox_filter` parameter added to BYPASS role-based dir resolution. Use when role detection is unreliable OR when subscribing to a specific canonical inbox (e.g., 'cc_tb'). Closes 3-week-old feedback_relay_arrival_invisible_midsession HARD RULE.
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  • Attest a work: the service binds the SHA-256 fingerprint to a server-side timestamp and signs it (HMAC). Requires a credential (device flow via `authorize`, or an API key header). Optional declared metadata (title/author/year/notes) are normalized and BOUND by the signature — immutable after issuance, but they remain self-declared (they don't prove authorship). Compute the SHA-256 locally if you have code execution (`sha256sum <file>` / `shasum -a 256 <file>` / `certutil -hashfile <file> SHA256`). NEVER send file bytes or base64 through tool arguments: this server never receives files. If you cannot compute a hash locally, point the user to the website (https://attestazione.spaziogenesi.org, full privacy: hashing happens in the browser) or the Telegram bot @SGAttestBot.
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  • Validate a design token file against the W3C Design Tokens Community Group (DTCG) 2025.10 format, returning 10 conformance checks (t01-t10) with PASS/FAIL/WARN. Use this to verify a tokens.json (or any DTCG token export) is structurally correct — $type/$value/$description present, structured colors (colorSpace + components rather than bare hex), a valid $schema pointer to designtokens.org, and correct dimension units. When NOT to use: for scoring a whole live site (not just its token file), use designesy_score. Executable — fetches the URL or parses the raw JSON you provide, runs 10 checks server-side. No browser needed. Returns JSON: { checks[{id (t01–t10), name, status (PASS/FAIL/WARN), detail}], valid, score }. Pass url to fetch a remote token file, or dtcg_file to validate an inline JSON string. Provide exactly one.
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  • PRIMARY path to close a Grove goal: this is the ONLY tool that covers an acceptance criterion. Attach binary evidence (screenshot, log dump, API response, export) to an AC — call it once per criterion to satisfy the close gate. The subordinate goal-add-evidence-text only adds context for proofs with NO bytes (URLs to permanent external sources, manual repro descriptions) and does NOT cover an AC. Caption is optional but strongly recommended: state what the file captures and the reproduction conditions (URL/commit/session/inputs) so a third reviewer can reproduce. ⚠ PICK THE RIGHT TRANSPORT BEFORE YOU CALL THIS TOOL ⚠ • BEST for ANY file > ~1 KB raw — and the ONLY no-token path, so use it in a claude.ai / hosted-agent session that has no raw X-Auth-Token → call the sibling MCP tool `goal-request-upload` with this same criterionId. It returns a one-time {uploadUrl, expiresAt}; then stream the raw bytes with a single PUT: `curl -sS --fail --upload-file "/abs/path/to/file.png" "<uploadUrl>"` (optionally add -H "X-Content-Sha256: <hex sha256>" so corruption fails fast). No base64, no token — the signed ?t= ticket in the URL is the only credential, single-use, criterion-scoped. The PUT response is the same evidence JSON this tool returns. • ALTERNATIVELY, if you DO have the raw X-Auth-Token in your shell → the `planner-attach.sh` helper (zero-install bash, binary-safe). The MCP base64 path below is unreliable for non-trivial files: long string arguments get truncated or whitespace-corrupted on the agent side BEFORE the JSON-RPC request is sent. Measured 2026-05-20 on prod: a 4 KB PNG arrived at the server as 1874 decoded bytes (file_hash_mismatch); a 2 KB payload arrived with stray whitespace (failed base64_decode). The server itself accepts up to 25 MiB raw — the bottleneck is the agent-side serialisation of contentBase64, NOT the server. planner-attach.sh COPY-PASTE RECIPE (replace 3 placeholders, run in your shell): curl -sS https://planner.monopoly-gold.com/api/cli/planner-attach.sh \ | PLANNER_TOKEN="<same X-Auth-Token you use for MCP>" bash -s -- \ --criterion-id "<CRITERION_UUID>" \ --file "/abs/path/to/file.png" \ --caption "what is captured and the repro conditions" \ --created-by "<your agent id>" Where to get each value: - PLANNER_TOKEN: the very same token that is already in your MCP config under the X-Auth-Token header for the `planner` server. NOT a separate credential. - CRITERION_UUID: the AC id you got from goal-get / goal-list. Same UUID you would pass to this MCP tool. - file path: absolute path on YOUR (agent) machine — the script reads it locally and streams multipart. The planner server never sees your filesystem. The helper computes SHA-256 itself and ships it as `contentSha256`, so any in-flight corruption fails fast with HTTP 400 instead of poisoning the evidence row. Output on stdout is the same JSON shape this MCP tool returns; non-zero exit means HTTP ≥ 400 (stderr explains). Without curl/bash? Fall back to raw multipart: POST https://planner.monopoly-gold.com/api/criteria/<id>/evidence/file, header X-Auth-Token, form fields file=@..., contentSha256=..., caption, createdBy. • File ≤ ~1 KB raw → this MCP tool is fine. ALWAYS pass `contentSha256` (hex SHA-256 of raw bytes BEFORE base64). Without it, a silently truncated PNG looks valid to the MIME sniffer; the server cannot distinguish a truncated 4 KB PNG from a valid 1 KB one and the vision judge burns ~30s on broken bytes. With the hash, the server fast-fails with error=file_hash_mismatch and points back here at the multipart endpoint. Validates MIME whitelist (png/jpeg/webp/gif/pdf/txt/json/zip), per-file size cap (ATTACHMENTS_MAX_FILE_BYTES, default 25 MiB), per-project attachments quota. Returns evidence record + file URL + serverSha256.
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  • Upload a dataset file and return a file reference for use with discovery_analyze. Call this before discovery_analyze. Pass the returned result directly to discovery_analyze as the file_ref argument. Provide exactly one of: file_url, file_path, or file_content. Args: file_url: A publicly accessible http/https URL. The server downloads it directly. Best option for remote datasets. file_path: Absolute path to a local file. Only works when running the MCP server locally (not the hosted version). Streams the file directly — no size limit. file_content: File contents, base64-encoded. For small files when a URL or path isn't available. Limited by the model's context window. file_name: Filename with extension (e.g. "data.csv"), for format detection. Only used with file_content. Default: "data.csv". api_key: Disco API key (disco_...). Optional if DISCOVERY_API_KEY env var is set.
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  • List pages in Redpanda API reference documentation. Returns endpoints, schemas, and topic pages with URL, title, type, and description. SCOPING (important for accurate results): - api="all" or omit: Lists all available APIs - api="admin": Cluster management operations (brokers, partitions, configs, users) - api="cloud-controlplane": Redpanda Cloud resource management (clusters, networks, namespaces) - api="cloud-dataplane": Cloud cluster data operations (topics, ACLs, connectors) - api="http-proxy": Kafka operations over HTTP (produce, consume, offsets) - api="schema-registry": Schema management (register, retrieve, compatibility) Use this to browse API structure. For general Redpanda docs, use ask_redpanda_question instead.
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  • File upload: stream-upload (one-shot — auto-finalizes, no filesize needed), chunked (create-session → chunk → finalize, for exact-known-size or files split across blobs), web URL import, and batch (many small files). Call action='describe' for the full action/param reference. Side effects: finalize/stream/stream-upload/web-import/batch create files and consume storage credits. Same-name uploads to a folder OVERWRITE the existing node in place (preserved as a recoverable version). BYTES → SERVER: the **DEFAULT for every file/binary is the `POST /blob` sidecar** — a plain HTTP POST outside the MCP pipe (the create-session/blob-info response hands you a ready-to-run curl command) that returns a `blob_id` you pass to stream-upload/chunk/batch: no base64, no MCP size limit, up to 100 MB. Use `content_base64` (inline base64, capped a few MB by the MCP transport) ONLY when your client cannot make the POST /blob call. `content` is small text only (verbatim UTF-8). UPLOAD STRATEGY (read top-to-bottom, pick the FIRST that matches): (1) Have a URL? → `web-import` (single call). (2) DEFAULT for a file/binary → `POST /blob`, then `stream-upload` with `blob_id` (single call, auto-finalizes, NO filesize required). Unknown/generated size and no way to reach /blob → `stream-upload` with `content_base64`. (3) Known exact byte count, or a large file split across blobs → `create-session` + `chunk`(`blob_id`) + `finalize`. **filesize must match the bytes you actually upload — mismatch causes finalize to fail with code 10522 and you must cancel the session.** (4) Multiple small files (≤4 MB each, ≤200 total) into one folder? → `batch`. Prefer `blob_id` (POST /blob) for every file/binary upload; fall back to `content_base64` only when you cannot reach /blob. Do NOT guess `filesize` for generated content — use `stream-upload`. max_size is a hard ceiling that aborts mid-transfer — always overestimate or omit (server uses plan limit).
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  • Copy a vault file server-side in one round-trip (NOT idempotent). Duplicates ``src``'s content under ``dst``, leaving ``src`` intact. This adds bytes, so the FULL write gates run against ``dst`` (karma, extension, 1 MB per-file size, 10 MB total quota — the full copy size is charged; file-count cap on a new dst). A new dst gets a fresh ``created_at``. Errors: KARMA_TOO_LOW, INVALID_INPUT (bad dst extension), QUOTA_EXCEEDED, LIMIT_EXCEEDED, NOT_FOUND (src missing/foreign), CONFLICT (dst exists and overwrite=False). Returns the copy's metadata + ``etag``. Requires authentication. Rate limit: 60 file ops/hour (shared with put/append/move/delete).
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  • Validate a Lottie animation file against the Lottie spec v1.0.1 and the Designesy §16 Ten Non-Negotiable Motion Standards, returning 10 checks (m01-m10) with PASS/FAIL/WARN. Use this to verify a motion/animation asset is well-formed and accessible — required fields (v, fr, ip, op, w, h, layers), $version, a markers array for reduced-motion, and no deprecated version. When NOT to use: for full-site motion scoring (not a single Lottie file), use designesy_score. Executable — fetches the URL or parses the raw Lottie JSON, runs 10 checks server-side. No browser needed. Returns JSON: { checks[{id (m01–m10), name, status (PASS/FAIL/WARN), detail}], valid, score }. Pass url to fetch a remote Lottie file, or lottie_file to validate an inline JSON string. Provide exactly one.
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  • List supported Linux operating systems and their corresponding versions for use with the `linux_audit` tool. ## What this tool does Returns an array of supported OS/version pairs, each in the form: {"os":"name", "versions":["version or codename"]} This allows the LLM and the user to know exactly which inputs are valid for the `linux_audit` tool. ## When to use this tool Use this tool when: - the user does not know which OS names or versions are supported - the user provides unclear or ambiguous OS information - you need to validate `os`/`version` before performing a Linux audit This tool should typically be called **before `linux_audit`** whenever parameters are uncertain. ## Inputs This tool does not require any input. ## Outputs Returns an array of objects: - **os**: supported Linux distribution identifier - **versions**: corresponding list of supported release or codename Example: [ {"os": "ubuntu", "versions": ["noble","focal"]}, {"os": "debian", "versions": ["bookworm","sid"]}, {"os": "redhat", "version": ["redhat-9.0"]} ] ## LLM usage guidelines - Use this tool to validate or suggest correct OS/version combinations before calling `linux_audit`. - If the user provides invalid or misspelled OS names, retrieve the official list here and ask them to select one. - Do not guess operating system identifiers-always rely on this tool to confirm correctness.
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  • Returns turva.dev's service catalog: agent-readiness audit, advisory, implementation, agent operations, and MCP server design, plus the engagement model and pricing (fixed list prices for audit, advisory and implementation; agent operations and MCP server design on request). Use this when a user asks what turva.dev offers, what it costs, or how an engagement works. Read-only: returns static JSON and changes nothing.
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