GitFlic MCP Server

gitflic_auth_login

Destructive

Validates a GitFlic API token against /user/me and stores it securely in the OS keychain or a chmod-0600 file, refusing invalid tokens. Supports named accounts and stdin input.

Instructions

Validate a GitFlic API token against /user/me, then store it in the OS keychain (macOS Keychain / Linux libsecret) or chmod-0600 file. Refuses to store an invalid token. Use --as to store under a named account; --stdin to read the token from stdin.

Tool call template

This tool declares no required parameters. Add optional parameters from the input schema as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {},
    "name": "gitflic_auth_login"
  }
}

Input Schema

Name	Required	Description
`as`	No	Named account (e.g. 'work', 'personal')
`raw`	No	Return the full, un-slimmed GitFlic response for THIS call (no token compression). Use when the default slim view dropped a field you need.
`stdin`	No	Read token from stdin
`token`	No	API token (else read from stdin if stdin=true)
`apiBase`	No	Override API base (for self-hosted)

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

First observedv0.5.1Nov 13, 2026

TDQS

A3.8/5.0

Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Even though the annotations already flag destructiveHint=true, the description earns credit for real behavioral detail: it discloses the storage backends (macOS Keychain / libsecret / chmod-0600 file) and that invalid tokens are rejected before storage. It stops short of saying what happens when a token is stored under a name that already exists, which is the key destructive behavior an agent would want confirmed.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Three tight sentences with the action front-loaded and the safety constraint second. The --as and --stdin notes at the end are the only extra information, and they earn their place.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a credential-writing tool with no output schema, the description covers validation, storage location, and failure behavior, which is most of what an agent needs. It's missing only the overwrite semantics for an existing account name and any indication of what the call returns on success.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both --as and --stdin are already documented in the schema; the description restates them with slight context but adds no semantics the schema lacks. apiBase goes entirely unmentioned. Baseline 3 applies when the schema already does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb and resource: validate a GitFlic API token against /user/me, then store it in the keychain or a 0600 file. It's far more concrete than a tautology, but it doesn't explicitly contrast itself with sibling auth tools like gitflic_auth_bind or gitflic_auth_switch, so the agent must infer the boundary.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The description implies when to use it (to establish a stored credential) and notes --as for named accounts, which hints at the multi-account story. It never states when a different auth tool should be used instead, and there are no explicit exclusions or prerequisites.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Deploy Server