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get_cve_details

Read-only

Fetch complete details for a single CVE, including NVD data, affected vendor versions, EPSS score, CISA KEV status, and GitHub advisories; falls back to CVE List when NVD lacks the entry.

Instructions

Fetch full, current details of one CVE from the NVD, with the vendor's affected versions from the CVE List, EPSS, CISA KEV status and any GitHub advisories (affected packages and patched versions). Falls back to the CVE List when NVD is unavailable or does not have the CVE yet.

Args: cve_id: CVE identifier, e.g. "CVE-2026-12345".

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
cve_idYes

Output Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
resultYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.1

TDQS

A4.1/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint=true and openWorldHint=true, so the safety profile is covered. The description goes beyond them by disclosing the source-fallback behavior when NVD is down or missing the CVE, which is genuinely useful operational context an agent couldn't infer from annotations. It stops short of stating latency, rate limits, or partial-failure semantics, keeping it at a 4.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core capability is front-loaded in one dense but readable sentence, followed by a minimal Args block. It is appropriately sized for the tool's scope, though the Args section largely repeats the parameter name and could be trimmed.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return-value structure needn't be explained. Combined with annotations covering read-only/open-world behavior, the description supplies the missing pieces: what data categories come back and what happens on NVD failure. Only the undefined behavior on a nonexistent or malformed CVE ID is left unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description carries the burden for the single parameter. It compensates well by giving the exact accepted format with a concrete example ('CVE-2026-12345'), which the schema's bare 'Cve Id' title does not. The only remaining gap is whether the ID is case-sensitive or accepts variants.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description opens with a specific verb and resource ('Fetch full, current details of one CVE') and enumerates the exact data sources aggregated: NVD, CVE List vendor versions, EPSS, CISA KEV, and GitHub advisories. That level of detail clearly distinguishes it from siblings like search_recent_cves and search_github_advisories, which are lookup/list tools rather than single-CVE aggregators.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives one useful conditional: falls back to the CVE List when NVD is unavailable or lacks the CVE. But it never explicitly says when to use this versus search_recent_cves or search_github_advisories, nor does it state prerequisites (e.g., that a CVE ID must be known first). Usage context is implied by the aggregation framing rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.