hcl_apply_port_security

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare destructiveHint=true and readOnlyHint=false, so the description's real contribution is the refusal semantics: the tool rejects unproved protect/restrict mappings and unrequested auth or sticky/learned-state conversion. That is useful pre-call context an agent cannot derive from the annotations. It still omits what dry_run does and that operation_key enables safe retries on a non-idempotent mutation.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two short sentences with the capability stated first and the refusal constraint second — nothing is wasted. The phrasing is dense jargon ('bounded secure-MAC/shutdown intent', 'unproved IOS protect/restrict mappings') that takes a re-read.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

This is a destructive, non-idempotent mutation with a nested request object, 0% schema coverage, and no output schema, so the description should carry the load. Critical items are missing: dry_run's effect, operation_key's retry-safety role, timeout semantics, and what a successful apply returns or changes.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the nested PortSecurityRequest carries eight properties, so the description must compensate and largely does not. 'Secure-MAC' vaguely gestures at max_mac/sticky/static_macs and 'shutdown' at the violation enum, but dry_run, operation_key, and timeout_seconds are unexplained in both schema and description.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('apply') and a concrete resource ('bounded secure-MAC/shutdown intent on one existing access port'), including scope (one port, must already exist). A sibling set full of hcl_apply_* tools makes the naming pattern do some differentiation work, but the description itself never names an alternative, so it stops short of 5.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

'On one existing access port' implies a prerequisite, and the refusal clause tells the agent which requests will be rejected (unproved IOS protect/restrict mappings, auth or learned-state conversion). However, it never says when to prefer a sibling such as hcl_inspect_ports or hcl_audit_security first, and gives no guidance on when to use dry_run — usage is implied rather than stated.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.