Offprompt
OfficialOffprompt is an MCP server that lets a coding agent request secrets from a human, write them directly into project files, and never expose the values to the model.
Request one or more secrets or config values with
collect_secret, including provider-aware keys, formats, generation options, captions, and link hints.Write values to a dotenv file or a whole file via a fixed
sink.Generate random values for signing/encryption secrets, or let the user paste/import their own.
Open a local browser page explaining who is asking, why, and where values go; in cloud sandboxes, return a tunnel URL for encrypted browser submission.
Return request status, key names, file keys, link handling, warnings, and a four-emoji fingerprint for user verification.
Wait for an in-progress request with
await_secret, long-polling until written, still awaiting, or expired.Cancel a pending request with
cancel_secret, discarding anything already typed.Keep secret values out of tool arguments, results, transcripts, and model context; the agent references them by environment variable name afterward.
Knows Cloudflare credentials: it recognises API tokens and R2 access key pairs, links the user straight to the right account's key page (taking the account ID from wrangler.toml, wrangler.jsonc or CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID), and validates the value as it is typed or pasted. Also uses cloudflared to expose the local secret-entry page through a Cloudflare quick tunnel when the agent runs in a cloud sandbox.
Recognises GitHub tokens as a known provider credential, validating the value on entry and pointing the user to where a token is created, so an agent can obtain one without it entering the transcript.
Recognises npm access tokens as a known provider credential, checking the value's format on entry and linking to where the token is issued.
offprompt
offprompt lets a coding agent ask you for a secret and have it land where the project needs it, without the value passing through the model.
Agents need API keys. Paste one into the chat and it goes into the model's context, the transcript on disk and the provider's logs, and stays there. offprompt gives the agent another way to ask: a tool call that opens a page in your browser, from which the value goes straight into the file. The transcript only ever sees the key's name.
How it works
The agent asks. It calls
collect_secretwith every key it needs, why it needs them, and the file they go in, then waits inside the call.A page opens on
127.0.0.1in your browser. It says which agent is asking, what for, and which file it writes to. Each field checks its value as you type, paste or import it, and links to where the key is made.The file is written. offprompt answers the agent with the key names, the file and a four-emoji fingerprint, the same four your page shows. From then on the agent reads the values from the environment by name.
When the agent runs in a cloud sandbox, it gives you a link to the page instead. The page reaches you through a Cloudflare tunnel, and your browser encrypts the values first, to a key only the sandbox holds.
The page itself can be tried at offprompt.dev/playground.
Related MCP server: vault-mcp
Install
In a project's folder:
npx offprompt initThat puts the server in the project as tools/offprompt/mcp.mjs, one file that runs on node
alone, and declares it in the project config of each agent found on your machine. Commit those
files together with tools/offprompt/, and everyone on the project gets offprompt, as does every
cloud sandbox that clones it.
To have offprompt in every project you open instead, install it for yourself:
npx offprompt init -gnpx offprompt list # every agent, whether it was found, and how offprompt reaches it
npx offprompt remove # out of this project
npx offprompt remove -g # out of every agent that has itoffprompt runs on Node 22 or later. Installation covers
choosing agents with --agent, and updating.
Agents
offprompt is an MCP server, so any agent that speaks MCP can use it. init sets these up:
Agent | In a project | With |
Claude Code |
| A plugin |
Codex |
| A plugin |
Cursor |
| A copy of the plugin in |
Pi |
| A server in Pi's agent directory |
Every other agent add-mcp knows, such as Gemini CLI, VS Code, OpenCode, Goose, Kiro CLI, Windsurf and Zed | No | A server in its MCP config |
Claude Code asks once before it starts a server a project declares. Codex and Pi read a project's config only in a project you trust. Agents has each one in detail.
Manual MCP config
Any other MCP client, Cline among them, can start offprompt from npm:
{
"mcpServers": {
"offprompt": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "offprompt", "mcp"]
}
}
}Cline also needs the project as cwd, since it names no project to the servers it starts.
llms-install.md has the entry for Cline, and steps an agent can follow to
install offprompt.
Documentation
docs.offprompt.dev has the rest: what the agent can ask for, the page, every provider offprompt knows and the checks on its keys, the tools, cloud sandboxes and troubleshooting. offprompt.dev shows offprompt at work.
Security
A value goes from your browser to offprompt to the file, and never through the model, the transcript, or a tool's arguments and results. offprompt does not guard the file once it is written, or protect against another program running as you: the threat model says what it covers, and SECURITY.md how to report a problem.
What offprompt runs and reaches:
A server on
127.0.0.1, which serves the page and takes the write. The page loads nothing from the network.Your browser, opened with the platform's URL handler, never a shell:
openon macOS,xdg-openon Linux,rundll32 url.dll,FileProtocolHandleron Windows. The agent's host is offered the page first.In a cloud sandbox,
cloudflared, to reach the page through a Cloudflare quick tunnel that carries only ciphertext. It uses acloudflaredalready onPATH, or downloads a pinned release from Cloudflare's GitHub releases once and checks its SHA-256 before running it.
It sends nothing to us, keeps no values once they are written, and collects no telemetry.
Development
A pnpm workspace, on Node 22.13 or later. From a checkout, pnpm install, then
pnpm agents --project ~/projects/some-project installs offprompt into a project the way
npx offprompt init does. CONTRIBUTING.md has the tests, the layout and how
to add a provider.
Licence
MIT, for everything in this repository. The parts that are other people's work keep their
own terms, listed in packages/offprompt/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md for the server, the
packages bundled into it and the page it serves, in apps/site/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md for
offprompt.dev and in apps/docs/public/third-party-notices.txt for docs.offprompt.dev.
Available Tools
3 toolsawait_secretWait for a secret to be writtenARead-only
Wait for a collect_secret request that came back still "awaiting" — which happens when offprompt runs in a cloud sandbox, had no browser to open and handed you the page URL to pass on, or runs in a host that ends a tool call before the human is done. Long-polls for up to 60 seconds, 50 in Cline, and returns "written", "awaiting" or "expired". Call it again while the status is "awaiting", with no other work in between. When you were given a link to pass on, an "awaiting" result carries it again: keep it in whatever you write to the user, or ask them, until the values are written.
Inputs: request_id (required). Returns: url, kept, note, sink, +7 more
cancel_secretCancel a secret requestAIdempotent
Close a collect_secret request that is no longer needed. Anything already typed on the page is discarded.
Inputs: request_id (required). Returns: url, kept, note, sink, +7 more
collect_secretCollect a secret from the humanA
Get the values a task needs — API keys, tokens, connection strings, settings — written where the project reads them, typed by the human or generated by offprompt. Call this instead of asking the user to paste a secret into the conversation.
Each entry in secrets is one key, and says how its value comes to be:
generate: {}— a random value, 32 bytes of base64url unless set, made on the user's page (or by offprompt when no page opens); the user may paste one they already use instead. You never see it. For AUTH_SECRET, JWT_SECRET, SESSION_SECRET and encryption keys. A key that is already set is kept as it is.provider— a key the human gets from a provider, such asprovider: "stripe"for STRIPE_SECRET_KEY. The page shows the provider's logo and links to where the key is made.format— a value of a known kind that no one provider issues, such asformat: "postgres_url"for DATABASE_URL. The page links to providers where the human can create one.none of these — any other value, taken as plain text. A provider's key is still recognised by its usual name. Set
secret: falseon a value that is not secret, such as MAX_RETRIES, and the page shows it in the clear.
Give an entry a link when you know where its value is made, so the human lands on the right page:
Some provider keys are made on a page that belongs to one account, organisation or project. Give that one's name or ID as parameters, such as
link: { "project": "abcdefghijklmnopqrst" }for a Supabase key, and the page's "Get it" opens it. Thelinkfield lists the keys that take them and where a project keeps each value: read it from there rather than guessing. A parameter that is missing or does not fit leaves "Get it" on the key's usual page.A key no provider issues, such as an internal tool's token, takes the https address where it is made. The page shows it as your suggestion, apart from offprompt's own links, and asks the human to confirm its host before it opens. A provider's key can take one too; it shows under its "Get it", never in its place. The result's
linkssays which links were used, and why any was dropped.
When every key is generated, nothing opens: offprompt writes them and returns. Otherwise it opens a page in the user's browser and this call waits there, for up to five minutes, while the human types. It returns once the values have been written or the request has expired, so there is nothing to poll and nothing to do in the meantime. In a host that ends a tool call sooner, such as Cline, it returns "awaiting" before then: call await_secret, and again while it says awaiting, with no other work in between.
In a cloud sandbox or a remote VM, a browser opened there is one the user cannot see. Set sandbox: true only when your
environment tells you that is where you run, as your instructions or the platform you run on do. A temporary folder, or a
run with nobody at the terminal, is not a sign of one, and offprompt detects the common environments itself. The call then
returns at once with a link: show it to the user, then wait with await_secret and do nothing else until the values are
written. The user types in their own browser, and the values are encrypted there so that only the sandbox can read them.
You never receive a value. You get back the key names and the file they landed in, and you reference them by name from then on, for example process.env.RESEND_API_KEY. Never open, cat, grep or print that file afterwards: reading it puts the values into the transcript, which is the one thing this tool exists to prevent. The result lists every key the file holds, so there is nothing left to check.
A written result opens with tell_user: "Fingerprint" and four emoji the user's page shows too. Write that line to
the user as soon as the call returns, before your next tool call, on a line of its own, for every write, one that comes
straight after another included. The user compares the two while the page is still open, so this does not wait for the
end of your task or for your next call to offprompt.
When the result carries a url, the human has to open it and nothing can happen until they do. Put the link in your
reply to them, on its own line, where they will see it. A link mentioned only in your reasoning, or buried in a
paragraph, is a request the human never receives. Until the values are written, put it again in whatever you write to
them, your last message included: a host can fold a turn's earlier messages away and show only its last. If you have a
tool that asks the user a question and waits for the answer, put the link in a question as well, since a question stays
in front of them.
State the intent once: reason is shown to the human as your claim about why the values are needed, so write it for
them, not for yourself.
Inputs: sink (required), reason (required), secrets (required), sandbox. Returns: url, kept, note, sink, +9 more
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 3 tools
The tools map to distinct lifecycle stages: collect initiates a secret request, await_secret long-polls an existing request, and cancel_secret closes one. There is minor overlap because collect_secret can itself block until values are written, but the descriptions clearly delimit when to use await_secret instead.
All three tools follow the same verb_secret pattern: collect_secret, await_secret, cancel_secret. The convention is predictable and immediately readable.
Three tools are well-scoped for initiating, waiting on, and cancelling a secret-collection request. Each tool earns its place in the narrow workflow, with no redundant or filler operations.
The core lifecycle is covered: request values, wait for completion, and cancel. Minor gaps remain, such as explicitly listing existing secrets or rotating/removing a stored value, but the primary agent workflow is complete.
Maintenance
Related MCP Connectors
A secret store for AI agents: the agent never sees the plaintext.
One-time, end-to-end encrypted secrets for agents. 0.005 USDC per secret via x402.
Send API keys and private files to someone else's agent, end-to-end encrypted.
Share documents privately from an AI agent. The agent gets a link; it cannot read the file.
Related MCP Servers
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityDmaintenanceEnables interaction with 1Password vaults and items via the op CLI, supporting vault listing, item lookup, password read/create/update/generate, and delete operations. Zero idle CPU usage and supports service account tokens for headless use.15 npm1MIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityCmaintenanceEnables AI coding agents to securely inject API keys and secrets into environment files, configs, or commands without the agent ever seeing the secret values.10 npmMIT
- AlicenseNot gradedqualityBmaintenanceEnables agents to use secrets without exposing them, by injecting values into commands and redacting them from all outputs and transcripts.6 npmMIT
- AlicenseAqualityBmaintenanceEnables agents to request an API key or other secret from the user without the value passing through chat or tool arguments/results, storing it directly to .env, the OS keychain, or 1Password. The agent receives only metadata indicating whether storage succeeded.1MIT