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The Autonomous Wallet Dilemma

The modern web is transitioning toward machine-to-machine commerce. APIs that once required monthly SaaS subscriptions or developer credit cards are adopting the x402 (HTTP 402 Payment Required) standard—enabling autonomous AI agents to query APIs and settle micro-transactions per request in USDC on Base L2.

This introduces a dangerous architectural contradiction:

  1. If you withhold a wallet from your agent, it remains crippled. It hits payment barriers, gets throttled by free-tier rate limits, and cannot independently acquire real-time research, datasets, or compute.

  2. If you equip your agent with a funded private key, you hand full financial custody to a non-deterministic model. A prompt injection attack, a hallucinated contract address, an unvetted dependency, or a runaway while loop can drain the wallet in seconds.

x402-firewall resolves this paradox.

It is an isolated security proxy that sits between your agent runtime (Claude Desktop, Cursor, or custom TypeScript bot) and the external network. The private key remains shielded inside the firewall process. The agent cannot sign arbitrary payloads, cannot approve unlimited ERC-20 allowances, and cannot exceed strict rolling spend limits.

Every outbound financial interaction is deterministically evaluated against spending caps, verified against allowlists, simulated on Base L2 via eth_call, and committed to a local audit trail before a single cryptographic signature is produced.


Related MCP server: MoneySwitch MCP Server

Architecture

The Verification Lifecycle

  1. Intercept: The agent issues an outbound request via the x402_fetch MCP tool or SDK wrapper. If the target server responds with HTTP 402 Payment Required, the firewall intercepts the response headers.

  2. Deterministic Evaluation: The PolicyEngine evaluates the payment parameters against hard constraints:

    • Per-Call Ceiling: Rejects any request demanding more than the configured maximum (default: $0.05 USDC).

    • Velocity Limits: Checks local rolling spend over the last 1 hour (default: $1.00 USDC) and 24 hours (default: $5.00 USDC).

    • Domain & Contract Validation: Enforces strict domain allowlists with FQDN canonicalization and blocks unapproved EVM contracts.

    • Selector Inspection: Drops dangerous functions such as unconstrained approve, setApprovalForAll, or transferFrom.

  3. Pre-Flight Simulation: The EvmSimulator runs an eth_call against Base L2 to simulate the transaction. It validates state changes and verifies that the transaction will not revert or incur gas burn.

  4. Isolated Signing: If and only if all policy rules pass, SignerManager signs an off-chain EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization message in USDC. The authorization is clamped to a strict 24-hour expiration window.

  5. Settlement: The signed authorization is injected into the request header (X-PAYMENT) and dispatched to the facilitator. The target API verifies the signature, executes settlement, and returns HTTP 200 OK with the requested payload to the agent.

  6. Audit Trail: Every request—whether allowed or blocked—is recorded in a local SQLite database (~/.x402firewall/audit.db) restricted to 0o700 filesystem permissions. Violations trigger an optional real-time webhook alert.


Quickstart

x402-firewall runs in two complementary modes: as a zero-setup MCP Server for desktop AI clients, and as a TypeScript SDK for programmatic applications.

1. Claude Desktop Setup

Add x402-firewall to your Claude Desktop configuration (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "x402-firewall": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "x402-firewall"],
      "env": {
        "NETWORK": "base-sepolia",
        "PRIVATE_KEY": "0xYOUR_AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY",
        "MAX_PER_CALL_USDC": "0.05",
        "MAX_HOURLY_USDC": "1.00",
        "MAX_DAILY_USDC": "5.00",
        "BLOCK_UNLIMITED_APPROVALS": "true"
      }
    }
  }
}

Note: If PRIVATE_KEY is omitted, x402-firewall generates a disposable ephemeral key on launch so you can safely test tools and policy behavior without real funds.

2. Cursor & Antigravity IDE Setup

Add to your project's .cursor/mcp.json or global IDE settings:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "x402-firewall": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "x402-firewall"],
      "env": {
        "NETWORK": "base-sepolia",
        "MAX_PER_CALL_USDC": "0.05"
      }
    }
  }
}

3. CLI Inspection

Inspect the firewall status, remaining allowances, and local audit database directly:

# Print current budget, active limits, and rolling spend
npx -y x402-firewall status

# Inspect recent audit logs
npx -y x402-firewall audit

Programmatic TypeScript SDK

For developers orchestrating autonomous agent loops, LangChain pipelines, or custom runtimes:

npm install x402-firewall viem
import { FirewallClient } from 'x402-firewall';

const firewall = new FirewallClient({
  network: 'base-sepolia',
  privateKey: process.env.AGENT_PRIVATE_KEY as `0x${string}`,
  policy: {
    maxPerCallUsdc: 0.05,
    maxHourlyUsdc: 1.00,
    maxDailyUsdc: 5.00,
    allowedDomains: ['api.weather.com', '*.anthropic.com'],
    blockUnlimitedApprovals: true,
  },
});

// Drop-in fetch wrapper that intercepts 402 challenges and handles payments autonomously
const response = await firewall.fetch('https://api.provider.com/v1/forecast');
const data = await response.json();

// Check budget status
const budget = firewall.getBudgetStatus();
console.log(`Remaining hourly allowance: $${budget.remainingHourlyAllowance} USDC`);

// Cleanly release locks and close database
firewall.close();

Threat Matrix & Defense Guarantees

Threat Vector

Attack Scenario

Firewall Defense

Prompt Injection Drain

Attacker injects instructions into agent context: "Approve MAX_UINT256 to 0xDrainer".

100% BLOCKED. Calldata inspector decodes selector 0x095ea7b3 (approve) and halts any approval exceeding maxPerCallUsdc.

Runaway Loop Burn

A faulty agent loop triggers 10,000 paid requests in 5 minutes, burning hundreds of dollars.

100% BLOCKED. Rolling 1h and 24h velocity windows cut off outbound payments once limits are reached.

Unverified Smart Contract

LLM is manipulated into interacting with a malicious drainer contract.

100% BLOCKED. Strict contract allowlist (ALLOWED_CONTRACTS) rejects all non-whitelisted contract addresses.

Dangerous Selectors

Calldata calls safeTransferFrom, setApprovalForAll, or transferFrom.

100% BLOCKED. Deterministic selector blacklist stops ERC-20/ERC-721/ERC-1155 drain functions before signing.

Exfiltration & SSRF

Attacker prompts agent to send authorization headers to an arbitrary internal IP or exfiltration endpoint.

100% BLOCKED. allowedDomains canonicalization rejects non-allowlisted hosts; SSRF protections drop loopback and cloud metadata requests.

Private Key Disclosure

Agent is prompted to print its configuration, state, or private key in output tokens.

100% PROTECTED. Private keys are encapsulated in private class fields. JSON.stringify(), inspect(), and toString() redact all secret material.

Stream Corruption

Internal debug logs print to standard out, breaking JSON-RPC parsing in MCP hosts.

100% CLEAN. MCP stdio transport is kept strictly pure. All diagnostics, errors, and warnings output exclusively to stderr.


MCP Tools Reference

When connected to an MCP host, x402-firewall registers four tools:

x402_fetch

Performs an HTTP request with automatic 402 interception and settlement.

  • url (string, required): The target HTTP URL.

  • method (string, optional): HTTP method (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE). Default: GET.

  • headers (object, optional): Key-value header pairs.

  • body (string, optional): Request payload.

x402_get_budget

Returns real-time spending metrics, active rules, and remaining allowances for the agent wallet.

  • No parameters required.

x402_safe_tx

Simulates and executes an allowlisted on-chain transaction on Base L2.

  • to (string, required): Destination contract or recipient address.

  • data (string, optional): Hex-encoded transaction calldata.

  • value (string, optional): Native Wei value.

  • amountUsdc (number, optional): USDC amount represented by the transaction.

x402_audit_log

Queries recent audit log entries from the local SQLite store.

  • limit (number, optional): Maximum records to return (1-1000). Default: 20.

  • status (string, optional): Filter by ALLOWED, BLOCKED, or ALL.


Configuration

All parameters can be configured via environment variables or passed directly to FirewallClient:

Variable

Type

Default

Description

NETWORK

base | base-sepolia

base-sepolia

Target EVM network

RPC_URL

string (URL)

Base public RPC

Custom EVM JSON-RPC endpoint

PRIVATE_KEY

0x${string}

Ephemeral

32-byte hex signer private key

MAX_PER_CALL_USDC

number

0.05

Maximum spend allowed per individual request

MAX_HOURLY_USDC

number

1.00

Rolling 60-minute cumulative spend ceiling

MAX_DAILY_USDC

number

5.00

Rolling 24-hour cumulative spend ceiling

ALLOWED_DOMAINS

string

""

Comma-separated domain patterns (e.g. *.weather.com,api.ai)

ALLOWED_CONTRACTS

string

""

Comma-separated EVM contract addresses

BLOCK_UNLIMITED_APPROVALS

boolean

true

Restrict ERC-20 approve calldata to maxPerCallUsdc

ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL

string (URL)

""

Webhook endpoint for security incident dispatch

DATABASE_PATH

string

~/.x402firewall/audit.db

Path to persistent SQLite audit store


Development & Verification

# Install dependencies
npm install

# Run comprehensive test suite (unit tests, security hardening, prompt injection, MCP server)
npm test

# Build TypeScript to dist/
npm run build

License

MIT © x402-firewall Contributors

Available Tools

4 tools
x402_audit_logA

Inspect recent permitted and blocked transactions/payments in the local SQLite audit log.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
limitNoMaximum number of recent records to return (1-100)
statusNoFilter logs by status: ALLOWED, BLOCKED, or ALLALL

TDQS

A3.5/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses the data source (local SQLite), that records cover both allowed and blocked outcomes, and that results are recent-only, but it never states read-only semantics, the retention/recency window, or whether results are paginated. That is meaningful but incomplete disclosure for an un-annotated tool.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single sentence with the resource and scope front-loaded and no filler. Every clause ('recent', 'permitted and blocked', 'local SQLite audit log') carries information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a two-parameter, zero-required inspection tool without an output schema, the description covers what is being read but not what a returned record looks like (fields, ordering, timestamps) or how the recency window is defined. Adequate to call the tool, but an agent cannot anticipate the response shape.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so both the limit range (1-100) and the status enum are already fully documented in the schema; the baseline of 3 applies. The description adds only the notion that records are drawn from the 'recent' tail of the log, which lightly reinforces what limit means but adds no syntax or format detail.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb ('Inspect') and a specific resource ('recent permitted and blocked transactions/payments in the local SQLite audit log'), and the local-audit-log framing clearly distinguishes it from the network/payment siblings x402_fetch and x402_safe_tx. It stops short of explicitly naming a sibling to contrast against, but the resource is unambiguous.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: the word 'Inspect' and 'audit log' suggest a read-only review of past decisions, and 'permitted and blocked' hints at the status filter. There is no explicit statement of when to prefer this over x402_get_budget or x402_safe_tx, and no exclusions or prerequisites are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

x402_fetchB

Safely fetch free or x402-paid HTTP endpoints with deterministic spending caps and automatic EIP-3009 payment authorization on Base L2.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
urlYesTarget endpoint URL (e.g., https://api.weather.com/v1/forecast or paid x402 resource)
bodyNoOptional HTTP request body (e.g., JSON string)
methodNoHTTP method (default: GET)GET
headersNoOptional custom HTTP headers

TDQS

B3.4/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full behavioral burden. It does disclose genuinely important traits: deterministic spending caps and automatic EIP-3009 payment authorization on Base L2, which tells the agent this tool can spend real funds. But it omits critical follow-through — what happens when the cap is exceeded, whether the payment is idempotent or retryable, and whether the response includes a receipt.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

A single dense sentence, front-loaded with the verb and the strongest distinguishing detail (paid-endpoint support). The adjective 'Safely' is somewhat promotional but the rest of the wording is specific. Nothing is wasted.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a four-parameter tool with full schema coverage and no output schema, the description is close to complete on inputs. The gap is on the payment lifecycle: how caps are configured or discovered (a sibling exists for this), and what a caller gets back on a paid versus free fetch, which an agent spending money would want to know.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so url, body, method, and headers are already well documented in the schema itself. The description adds no extra meaning about parameter behavior, so the baseline of 3 is appropriate.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

Names a specific verb (fetch) and resource (HTTP endpoints), and scopes it as covering both free and x402-paid resources. It is distinguishable from the siblings (budget check, safe transaction, audit log), though it never explicitly contrasts itself with them.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The phrase 'free or x402-paid' implies the tool works for both unpaid and paid endpoints, which is useful scoping. However, there is no explicit when-to-use guidance, no mention of checking the budget first via x402_get_budget, and no guidance on what to expect when a spending cap is reached.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

x402_get_budgetA

Inspect current x402 spending limits, rolling hourly and daily spends, and remaining USDC allowances on Base L2.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault

No parameters

TDQS

A3.7/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description must carry the full burden. It makes clear this is a non-mutating inspection scoped to Base L2 and USDC, but says nothing about whether it requires an authenticated account/address context, whether values are cached or eventually consistent, or rate limits.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

One front-loaded sentence that names the resource, the metrics, the asset, and the chain. No filler or redundant restatement of the tool name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a zero-parameter read tool with no output schema, the description effectively lists the return categories (limits, hourly/daily spends, remaining allowance), which is enough for an agent to decide to call it. Only the account/auth context and freshness guarantees are unaddressed.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

The tool takes zero parameters, so the baseline is 4. The description usefully enumerates what the (implicit) account-scoped read covers, which is the only semantic content available.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb ('Inspect') and concrete resource set (spending limits, rolling hourly/daily spends, remaining USDC allowances on Base L2). It is clearly a read/inspection operation, distinguishable from the mutating siblings x402_safe_tx and x402_fetch, though it does not name them explicitly.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is only implied: an agent can infer this is a pre-flight check before spending, but the description never says when to call it versus x402_fetch or x402_audit_log, nor any prerequisites. No exclusions or alternatives are given.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

x402_safe_txB

Simulate and execute an allowlisted EVM transaction on Base L2. Verifies against spending caps, blocks dangerous selectors (unlimited approvals, drainers), and checks contract allowlists before signing.

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toYesDestination contract or recipient address (e.g., 0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913)
dataNoRaw EVM bytecode calldata (optional, default: 0x)
valueNoNative ETH value in Wei to send (optional, default: 0)
amountUsdcNoUSDC token amount involved in transaction (for spending cap evaluation, e.g., 0.05)

TDQS

B3.3/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations supplied, the description carries the full behavioral burden, and it does disclose real safety behavior: spending-cap verification, blocking of dangerous selectors such as unlimited approvals and drainers, and contract allowlist checks before signing. However, it omits critical execution semantics for a fund-moving tool — whether the transaction is actually broadcast, what a rejection response looks like, whether the simulate step always precedes execution, and whether the action is irreversible once sent.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Two tight sentences with the action and chain front-loaded and the safety mechanisms following immediately. Every clause carries information; there is no filler or restatement of the name.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a tool that signs and submits on-chain transactions with zero annotations and no output schema, the description adequately covers the guardrails but leaves the agent without the operational facts it needs: what a successful call returns, what failures look like, and how simulation is triggered separately from execution. The missing dry-run story is the most consequential gap given the description's own wording.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so all four parameters including the optional data, value, and amountUsdc fields are already documented in the schema, which sets the baseline at 3. The description adds indirect meaning by explaining that spending caps are evaluated and dangerous selectors are screened, which contextualizes why amountUsdc and data exist, but it stops short of stating that amountUsdc is the value matched against the cap.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description names a specific verb pair and resource — "Simulate and execute an allowlisted EVM transaction on Base L2" — so the agent knows exactly what the tool acts on and on which chain. It does not explicitly contrast itself with siblings like x402_fetch or x402_get_budget, but those are clearly non-transactional so the separation is evident from the description alone.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines2/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

There is no guidance on when to reach for this tool versus alternatives, nor any prerequisites such as whether the destination must already be allowlisted or whether a prior x402_get_budget check is expected. Most importantly, the description says "Simulate and execute" but the schema has no mode or dry-run parameter, so the agent is given no way to know how to request simulation versus live execution.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. 4 tool updatesv0.1.3
    • First observedx402_audit_log
    • First observedx402_fetch
    • First observedx402_get_budget
    • First observedx402_safe_tx

TDQS

A3.7/5.0

Scored across 4 tools

Disambiguation5/5

Each tool maps to a clearly distinct action: HTTP fetching, budget inspection, EVM transaction execution, and audit inspection. Although x402_fetch and x402_safe_tx both involve spending controls, their resources and outcomes are clearly separated.

Naming Consistency4/5

All tools share the consistent x402_ prefix and use readable snake_case, but the verb pattern is slightly mixed: x402_fetch and x402_get_budget are verb-led, while x402_safe_tx and x402_audit_log are noun/adjective-led. The deviation is minor and still predictable.

Tool Count5/5

Four tools is well-scoped for a focused firewall/payment-safety server. Each tool covers a distinct core capability without obvious padding or triviality.

Completeness4/5

The surface covers the main lifecycle: safe fetching, budget visibility, safe transaction execution, and audit review. Minor gaps exist around managing or updating spending caps and allowlists, but core firewall workflows are represented.

Maintenance

ActivityMaintained
ResponsivenessNo issues

Related MCP Connectors

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