mcp-security-toolkit
This server provides security auditing primitives and pentesting utilities for AI agents and developers, covering static analysis, network reconnaissance, and attack-preparation tools.
Security Auditing
mcp_server_audit— Statically audit MCP server Python source code (AST-based) for 13+ risk categories: shell execution, path traversal, SSRF, code injection, secret reads, tool shadowing, and moreagent_tool_risk_audit— Analyze agent tool JSON schemas for over-broad parameters, dangerous defaults, missing constraints, and exfiltration shapesprompt_injection_audit— Review system prompts/templates for injection surface, untrusted placeholders, missing delimiters, dangerous instructions, and precedence inversionsowasp_llm_classify— Map security findings to OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) categories with confidence scores and reasoning
HTTP & Auth Analysis
jwt_inspect— Decode and audit JWTs; flagsalg:none, weak algorithms, missing claims (exp,iss,aud), suspiciouskidvalues, and external key URLshttp_diff— Security-focused diff of two HTTP responses to assist with auth-bypass and IDOR triage; highlights status, headers, cookies, and body changes
Pentest Primitives
default_creds_lookup— Look up known default credentials for 50+ vendors/products (e.g., Cisco, Tomcat, MongoDB)sensitive_files_list— Get curated sensitive file path lists for various stacks (PHP, WordPress, .NET, Java, Node, Python, Kubernetes, Docker, CI)wordlist_gen— Generate targeted wordlists for passwords, usernames, or subdomainsgraphql_introspect— Run GraphQL introspection against an endpoint and summarize the schema with security observations (includes SSRF protection)phpggc_generate— Generate PHP deserialization gadget chain payloads via thephpggcCLI
OOB Callback Capture (Blind SSRF/XXE/RCE)
interactsh_register— Register a new out-of-band callback URL and get a session tokeninteractsh_poll— Poll for captured OOB interactions for a registered sessioninteractsh_stop— Terminate an interactsh session and clean up resources
Includes curated sensitive file paths for Docker in its sensitive_files_list tool.
Provides tools for introspection of GraphQL APIs, returning schema summaries and security observations.
Wraps the phpggc CLI to generate PHP deserialization gadget chains for security testing.
Includes curated sensitive file paths for WordPress in its sensitive_files_list tool.
mcp-security-toolkit
Built by Redmai. For continuous autonomous API / agent security scanning, use Redmai.
Source / schema / prompt audit primitives for agent builders.
Plug into Claude Code / Cursor / Claude Desktop. Audit MCP servers, agent tool schemas, system prompts, JWTs, and HTTP-response diffs — locally, in the coding agent you already use. Atomic, auditable, no orchestration.
Why this exists
Most security-flavored MCP servers wrap an existing CLI (Burp, Shodan, CyberChef) or audit MCP configurations and tool descriptions. The primitives a developer reaches for when their own code ships an LLM feature — source-level audit of an MCP server, schema-level audit of an agent tool, static review of a system prompt — are thinly covered.
mcp-security-toolkit ships those primitives, plus the everyday pentest
atoms an agent reaches for during AppSec work, so you can run one server
instead of five.
Related MCP server: depguard
Headline tools
mcp_server_audit
Heuristic AST audit of an MCP server's Python source. Enumerates
@tool-decorated and imperatively-registered tools, then runs 13 detectors:
Detector | Category | Sev |
Shell execution |
| high |
Filesystem write/delete |
| med–high |
Network egress |
| medium |
Code injection |
| high |
Over-broad params |
| medium |
Ambiguous/missing docstring |
| low–med |
Secret read from env |
| info |
Path traversal |
| high |
Prompt injection in docstring |
| medium |
SSRF via URL param |
| high |
Resource URI → SQL injection |
| high |
Tool shadowing (cross-tool) |
| medium |
Tracks from X import Y [as Z] aliases so renamed dangerous imports
don't slip through. Reports include a coverage.detectors_run list and
limitations — absence of finding is NOT proof of safety.
Complements Snyk / Invariant Labs mcp-scan, which audits MCP configs
and tool descriptions — this audits the source code of the server.
agent_tool_risk_audit
Takes a single agent tool's JSON schema and reports schema-level risks: over-broad params, ambiguous descriptions, missing constraints, exfil potential, dangerous defaults.
prompt_injection_audit
Static review of a system prompt / template for injection surface. Flags untrusted placeholders, missing delimiters, trust-boundary violations, dangerous-instruction patterns.
owasp_llm_classify
Map a finding or observation to OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) with reasoning and severity. Useful in reports and ticket creation.
http_diff
Appsec-focused diff of two HTTP responses. For manual auth-bypass / IDOR triage. Highlights set/added/removed headers, status changes, body diffs, and security-relevant cookies.
jwt_inspect
Decode + audit a JWT. Flags alg:none, weak HS-secrets (small dictionary
check), expiry, missing standard claims, suspicious kid (path traversal),
external key URLs (jku, x5u).
Pentest pack (atomic primitives)
Bundled so an agent has the basics without needing five MCP installs. Each tool is one input → one output, no chaining.
default_creds_lookup— known default credentials by vendor / product (50+ products, aliases likefortigate,idrac,wp)sensitive_files_list— curated sensitive paths per tech stack (common,php,wordpress,dotnet,java,node,python,k8s,docker,ci); returns paths only, does not probewordlist_gen— OSINT-driven wordlist generator (passwords/usernames/subdomainsmodes)graphql_introspect— single introspection POST → schema summary + security observationsphpggc_generate— wrapsphpggcCLI for PHP-deserialization gadget chains (graceful if binary missing)interactsh_register/interactsh_poll/interactsh_stop— wrapsinteractsh-clientCLI for OOB callback URL capture (blind SSRF / XXE / RCE confirmation)._stopterminates and cleans up the session; TTL gc runs on every register
Example output
Real output from three of the headline tools. Click to expand.
{
"file": "sample_mcp_server.py",
"tools_found": 4,
"summary": {"high": 1, "medium": 5, "low": 1, "info": 1},
"tools": [
{ "name": "safe_echo", "findings": [] },
{
"name": "run_cmd",
"findings": [
{"category": "ambiguous-description", "severity": "low",
"message": "docstring is very short (4 chars) — risk of LLM misuse"},
{"category": "over-broad-param", "severity": "medium",
"message": "parameter `cmd`: command-like parameter typed as bare `str`"},
{"category": "shell-exec", "severity": "high",
"message": "calls `subprocess.run`"}
]
},
{
"name": "read_anything",
"findings": [
{"category": "ambiguous-description", "severity": "medium",
"message": "tool has no docstring — the LLM cannot reason about when to use it"},
{"category": "over-broad-param", "severity": "medium",
"message": "parameter `path`: path-like parameter typed as bare `str` (no allow-list)"}
]
},
{
"name": "write_log",
"findings": [
{"category": "over-broad-param", "severity": "medium",
"message": "parameter `path`: path-like parameter typed as bare `str` (no allow-list)"},
{"category": "fs-write", "severity": "medium",
"message": "opens file for writing (mode='a')"}
]
}
],
"file_level_findings": [
{"category": "secret-in-env", "severity": "info",
"message": "reads secret from env `SECRET_API_KEY` — ensure it is documented in README and never logged"}
]
}{
"tool_name": "shell_exec",
"detected_format": "mcp",
"findings": [
{"category": "ambiguous-description", "severity": "medium", "path": "<tool>",
"message": "description is very short (5 chars) — high risk of LLM misuse"},
{"category": "risky-name-vague-desc", "severity": "medium", "path": "<tool>",
"message": "tool name suggests it executes ('exec') but description is brief — agent may misuse"},
{"category": "over-broad-param", "severity": "high", "path": "cmd",
"message": "command-like param `cmd` is bare string — agent can execute arbitrary commands"},
{"category": "over-broad-param", "severity": "high", "path": "url",
"message": "url-like param `url` is bare string with no `pattern` — agent can reach arbitrary hosts (SSRF / exfil)"},
{"category": "dangerous-default", "severity": "medium", "path": "verify_ssl",
"message": "safety-related param `verify_ssl` defaults to `False` — disables a safeguard by default"},
{"category": "exfil-shape", "severity": "medium", "path": "<tool>",
"message": "tool accepts both a URL-like destination and a data-like payload — classic exfil shape"}
]
}{
"valid_structure": true,
"header": {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"},
"payload": {"sub": "1234567890", "name": "John Doe", "iat": 1516239022},
"weak_secret": "your-256-bit-secret",
"findings": [
{"category": "missing-claim", "severity": "medium",
"message": "no `exp` claim — token never expires"},
{"category": "missing-claim", "severity": "low", "message": "no `iss` claim"},
{"category": "missing-claim", "severity": "low", "message": "no `aud` claim"},
{"category": "weak-secret", "severity": "high",
"message": "signature verifies with common weak secret: 'your-256-bit-secret'"}
]
}Recommended companion MCP servers
For deeper coverage in adjacent areas we explicitly recommend (and do not duplicate):
PortSwigger/mcp-server — Burp Suite
ChromeDevTools/chrome-devtools-mcp — Chrome DevTools
invariantlabs-ai/mcp-scan — MCP config / tool-description audit (complementary to our source-level audit)
mukul975/cve-mcp-server — full 27-tool CVE intelligence server
Install
pip install mcp-security-toolkit{
"mcpServers": {
"sec": { "command": "mcp-security-toolkit" }
}
}Developing locally
python -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest
ruff check .End-to-end MCP smoke test (boots the server over stdio, lists tools, calls two of them):
python scripts/smoke_mcp.pyDefensive helpers — fix what we detect
The tools above find unsafe patterns in MCP servers. The
mcp_security_toolkit.helpers
package is the inverse: drop-in primitives an MCP author imports to make
their tools safe by construction.
from mcp_security_toolkit.helpers import (
safe_path, safe_filename, safe_url, safe_sql_identifier, evaluate_expression,
)
@mcp.tool()
def read_log(name: str) -> str:
p = safe_path(name, root="/var/log/myapp", must_exist=True)
return p.read_text()
@mcp.tool()
def save_upload(filename: str, data: bytes) -> str:
name = safe_filename(filename) # basename-only
(Path("/var/uploads") / name).write_bytes(data)
return name
@mcp.tool()
def fetch_url(url: str) -> str:
url = safe_url(url) # blocks SSRF
return httpx.get(url, timeout=5).text
ALLOWED_TABLES = {"users", "orders", "events"}
@mcp.tool()
def count_rows(table: str) -> int:
table = safe_sql_identifier(table, allow=ALLOWED_TABLES)
return db.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").scalar()
@mcp.tool()
def evaluate_formula(expr: str, price: float, qty: int) -> float:
return evaluate_expression(expr, variables={"price": price, "qty": qty})Pure functions, no I/O, no globals. Each fixes the corresponding
mcp_server_audit finding category in one line.
GitHub Action
Drop into any repo to run mcp_server_audit in CI, upload SARIF to the
Security tab, and fail the build on configured severity:
# .github/workflows/mcp-audit.yml
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v5
- uses: x0base/mcp-security-toolkit@v0.3
with:
path: src/my_mcp_server.py
fail-on-severity: highCLI
# Default (no args): start the MCP stdio server — what your client config invokes
mcp-security-toolkit
# Audit every MCP server your local Claude / Cursor / Claude Desktop is configured to launch
mcp-security-toolkit scan-installed
mcp-security-toolkit scan-installed --sarif > findings.sarif
# Zero-install run, via uv
uvx mcp-security-toolkit scan-installedTreat tool outputs as untrusted data
Some tools return content from attacker-controlled sources: http_diff
quotes target response bodies, interactsh_poll returns raw OOB requests,
graphql_introspect returns target-controlled schema names. If such a
string contains "ignore previous instructions...", an LLM agent reading
it may follow the embedded instruction — classic indirect prompt
injection. MCP clients should render tool outputs inside delimiters
(<tool_output>...) and not flow them silently into the next prompt.
See THREAT_MODEL.md.
Non-goals
No orchestration, chaining, or decision logic across tools — primitives only.
No reimplementation of full-featured offensive CLIs (
sqlmap,ghauri,dalfox); where wrapping a small, focused CLI is a natural fit (phpggc,interactsh-client), we wrap it directly with a graceful "binary not found" path.No novel offensive research — all referenced techniques cite public sources.
License
MIT.
Available Tools
14 toolsagent_tool_risk_auditA
Statically audit a single agent tool definition for schema-level risks.
Accepts OpenAI function-calling, Anthropic tool-use, MCP tool, or a bare JSON Schema. Reports:
over-broad params (bare-string paths/commands/URLs)
missing constraints (enum/pattern/min/max/maxLength/maxItems)
dangerous defaults (suspicious paths, disabled safeguards)
exfil-shape (URL-destination + data-payload in the same tool)
ambiguous descriptions vs risky tool names
Args: schema: A tool definition as a dict.
Returns: Structured AuditReport. Pure function, no I/O, no chaining.
Inputs: schema (required).
default_creds_lookupA
Return known default credentials for a vendor / product / service.
Accepts a short product name (cisco, tomcat, idrac, mongo),
a full key (router:cisco, db:mongodb), or a substring match.
Returns every credential pair across all matching keys.
Pure data lookup — no network, no scanning.
Args: query: vendor / product / service identifier (case-insensitive).
Returns:
LookupReport with matched_keys and credentials.
Inputs: query (required).
graphql_introspectA
Run a GraphQL introspection query against url and summarize the schema.
Single HTTP POST. Read-only. Will not mutate state on the server.
By default, requests resolving to private / loopback / link-local /
cloud-metadata addresses are blocked (SSRF protection). Set
allow_private=True to override — useful when explicitly auditing
internal infrastructure.
Redirects are disabled (an HTTP 3xx from the target raises
HTTP-error: redirects disabled). This prevents a public endpoint from
redirecting the request to a private address after the pre-flight check.
Residual risk: DNS rebinding. The pre-flight resolution and the actual HTTP request happen in separate syscalls and the OS may resolve the hostname twice. A hostile DNS that returns a public IP for the check and a private IP for the request can defeat the guard. For high-stakes environments, run this tool inside a network namespace / egress proxy that enforces address restrictions independently.
Args:
url: Full GraphQL endpoint URL (e.g. https://api.example.com/graphql).
timeout: Network timeout in seconds (clamped to [1, 60]).
insecure: Skip TLS verification (for self-signed certs in test envs).
allow_private: Permit requests to private / internal addresses.
Default False.
Returns:
IntrospectReport summarizing the schema and security observations.
If the URL resolves to a private address and allow_private is
False, returns {"error": "blocked-private-address", ...}.
Inputs: url (required), timeout, insecure, allow_private.
http_diffA
Diff two HTTP responses with security-relevant findings.
Inputs may be raw HTTP response strings (status line + headers + body)
or dicts shaped {"status": int, "headers": list|dict, "body": str}.
Reports:
status transitions classed as auth-bypass-likely / idor-possible / etc.
header diffs with security-header and auth-header tagging
cookie attribute diffs (HttpOnly / Secure / SameSite removal flagged high)
body diff: size, content-type shift, error-leak hints, unified diff excerpt
Stateless. Two inputs in, one report out.
Inputs: response_a (required), response_b (required).
interactsh_pollA
Read captured OOB interactions for a previously-registered token.
Args:
token: token returned by interactsh_register.
Returns: PollReport with all interactions captured so far.
Inputs: token (required).
interactsh_registerA
Register a new interactsh callback URL via the interactsh-client CLI.
Spawns interactsh-client detached, captures the assigned callback URL,
and persists a session descriptor for later polling. Returns a token
that pairs with interactsh_poll.
Args:
server: interactsh server hostname (default interact.sh public).
timeout: seconds to wait for the client to emit its URL.
Returns:
RegisterReport with callback_url and token.
Inputs: server, timeout.
interactsh_stopA
Stop a previously-registered interactsh-client session and clean up.
Terminates the spawned interactsh-client process (best-effort) and
removes the session descriptor. The log file is removed by default
(set delete_log=False to keep it for post-mortem).
Args:
token: token returned by interactsh_register.
delete_log: also remove the session log file (default True).
Returns: {"stopped": bool, "log_removed": bool, "note": str | None}
Inputs: token (required), delete_log.
jwt_inspectA
Decode and audit a JWT.
Reports algorithm issues (none, weak HS*), expiry, missing standard
claims (exp, iat, iss, aud), suspicious kid values that look
like path traversal or SQL, and (optionally) checks the signature
against a small dictionary of common weak HS256/384/512 secrets.
Args: token: The JWT string (three dot-separated base64url segments). check_weak_secrets: If True, attempt a small dictionary of common secrets against the signature for HS* algorithms. Default True.
Returns: Structured inspection report (see JwtInspection schema).
Inputs: token (required), check_weak_secrets.
mcp_server_auditA
Statically audit an MCP server Python source file.
Enumerates tools registered with FastMCP-style @*.tool() decorators (and
imperative mcp.tool()(fn) calls) and reports risk findings per tool:
shell execution, filesystem writes, network egress, code injection,
over-broad parameter types, and ambiguous/short descriptions.
Args: path: Absolute path to a Python file defining an MCP server. max_bytes: Reject files larger than this (default 5 MB). Prevents DoS via huge input. Pass a larger value if you need to audit a big monolith, but consider splitting it first.
Returns:
Structured audit report (see AuditReport schema). Does NOT execute
the target file. Includes a coverage block and limitations list
— absence of finding is NOT proof of safety.
Inputs: path (required), max_bytes.
owasp_llm_classifyA
Map a finding or observation to OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) categories.
Pure rule-based: keyword and regex patterns with weights per category.
Returns the top top_n matching categories with the matched evidence
snippets and a confidence score.
Args: observation: Free-form text describing a finding, scan result, bug report, threat model entry, or security observation. top_n: Number of matches to return (default 3).
Returns:
ClassifyReport with ranked matches. If nothing matches, unmatched
is True and matches is empty.
Inputs: observation (required), top_n.
phpggc_generateA
Generate a single PHP unserialize gadget chain via phpggc.
Args:
chain: Gadget chain identifier (e.g. Laravel/RCE9, Symfony/RCE4,
Monolog/RCE1). Run phpggc -l locally to enumerate.
command: Shell command to embed in the chain (e.g. id, curl ...).
encoding: One of raw, base64, url, json, soft.
fast_destruct: Adds --fast-destruct (triggers without await).
extra_args: Extra raw arguments to pass through.
Returns:
PhpggcReport with the generated payload (string). If phpggc is not
installed, available is False.
Inputs: chain (required), command (required), encoding, fast_destruct, +1 more.
prompt_injection_auditA
Statically analyze a system prompt / template for prompt-injection surface.
Reports:
placeholders (jinja
{{x}}, fstring{x}, dollar${x}, percent%(x)s) with a trust classification (untrusted / trusted / unknown)missing-delimiter findings: untrusted placeholders not wrapped in XML tags / triple-backticks / triple-quotes /
[START]..[END]etc.dangerous-instruction patterns (
ignore previous instructions, role overrides, trust-boundary violations, system-prompt leakage hints, special-token sequences)precedence-inversion: untrusted content placed near the end with no instruction reinforcement after it
Pure function. No LLM call, no I/O, no chaining.
Args: prompt: The system prompt or template text.
Returns: Structured AuditReport.
Inputs: prompt (required).
sensitive_files_listA
Return curated sensitive-path lists for a given tech stack.
Args:
stack: Comma-separated stack hints. Supported keys:
common, php, wordpress, dotnet, java, node, python, k8s, docker, ci.
include_common: If True (default), always include the common set.
Returns:
FilesReport with paths (each {path, why}). No network is performed.
Inputs: stack, include_common.
wordlist_genA
Generate a wordlist tailored to the target surface.
Modes:
passwords: combine brand / keyword seeds with leet substitution, capitalization variants, common suffixes and year suffixes.usernames: combine person names into common patterns (first,last,first.last,flast,firstl, …).subdomains: combine brand + keywords with a curated list of common environment / service subdomain labels.
Pure function. No network.
Args:
mode: One of passwords, usernames, subdomains.
brand: Target organization brand (used in all modes).
names: List of person names ("Jane Doe") for usernames mode.
keywords: Additional seed words for passwords / subdomains.
years: Year strings to append (passwords mode).
max_size: Hard cap on returned entries.
Returns:
GenReport with sample (the wordlist itself, up to max_size).
Inputs: mode (required), brand, names, keywords, +2 more.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.
Loading tool schema changelog…
TDQS
Scored across 14 tools
Each tool has a clearly distinct purpose, covering different security tasks like auditing, credential lookup, introspection, diffing, OOB interaction, JWT inspection, and wordlist generation. There is no overlap that would cause confusion.
Naming conventions are mixed: some use verb_noun (graphql_introspect), noun_verb (agent_tool_risk_audit), or prefix-based (interactsh_register). While readable, the inconsistency can lead to agent confusion about the expected pattern.
With 14 tools, the server provides a comprehensive toolkit without being overwhelming. Each tool appears necessary for the domain, and the count is well within the typical range.
The toolset covers major security assessment areas (static analysis, dynamic testing, credential checks, OOB, JWT, wordlist generation). Minor gaps exist (e.g., lack of network scanning or CVE lookup), but it fulfills its stated purpose well.
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