cross-agent MCP

Let your Claude Code session and your Codex thread talk to each other, live, without either one losing its memory.

cross-agent MCP is a relay MCP server for two coding agents you already have running — an active Claude Code session and an active Codex thread, in a plain terminal or in VS Code, it doesn't matter which. Either one can hand a message to the other through send_to_codex / send_to_claude, and the bridge finds each product's currently active session from the transcript it leaves on disk and resumes it — instead of spawning a disposable new agent — so both sides keep their full existing context. VS Code isn't required for any of this; it only unlocks one extra feature, covered in section 3: seeing the exchange render live in the real chat panel instead of just landing in the transcript.

That's the difference from just running a second CLI by hand: neither side has to re-explain the task, and neither one loses the conversation it was already having. A few things this is useful for:

• Get a second opinion without leaving your conversation. Ask Codex to review or double-check Claude's plan, or the other way around, and keep working while it thinks.

• Hand off a long task and keep going. send_to_* is asynchronous — it queues the message and returns immediately. Whenever the peer's answer is ready, it arrives back as a new message in your own session.

• Watch it happen, not just read a log. With the two panel shims from section 3 installed, both directions render in VS Code's real chat panel like any other message, instead of just appending a line to a transcript file.

• Nothing is lost to a timeout. Because nothing blocks, a peer turn that takes ten minutes is fine — the reply lands whenever it lands.

A real example

One user runs a single Claude session as a master that directs about a dozen role-based sub-sessions — a Claude or Codex session per role (implementation/tooling, image generation, client, server, copy, and a few more). The master only delegates work whose output would be too large for its own context; it keeps verification for itself, re-checking a peer's claims against the actual files or source lines rather than taking a self-report as done. Every delegation names an explicit session_id, since a dozen sessions sharing one working directory makes auto-selection unreliable, and handoffs between two Claude sessions use allow_same_agent: true.

In one run, the image-generation role (Codex) produced a request that the tooling role (Claude, same-agent) refused to act on — a field its contract required was missing. The master traced the fault to source, had the image role rewrite the request, verified the fix independently, and re-dispatched — three hops between two roles, with the master gating each one before it reached the human.

Contents

• 1. Requirements

• 2. Installation

• 3. Registration

• 4. Tools

• 5. Session resolution rules

• 6. Preventing infinite calls

• 7. Environment variables

• 8. Verification

• 9. Known limitations

• License

               Terminal or VS Code
                         │
     ┌────────────┬──────┴─────┬────────────┐
     │            │            │            │
  Claude       Claude        Codex        Codex
 session A    session B    thread C     thread D
     │            │            │            │
     └─────────── cross-agent MCP ──────────┘
                         │
                 session registry
          (~/.cross-agent/registry.json)

Any of these can reach any other through the same hub — Claude ↔ Codex across products, or Claude ↔ Claude / Codex ↔ Codex within the same product (see the same-agent row in the table below, and section 6 for how that's gated).

¹ Same-agent rows need an explicit target — allow_same_agent=true or a session_id for Claude, a session_id for Codex — see section 6.

With the shim attached, the exchange renders directly in the real VS Code panel (see section 3).

The exchange is asynchronous. send_to_* queues the message and returns immediately — it does not carry the peer's reply. A background worker runs the peer's turn, and once a reply exists, it's delivered to the sender's session as a new message. Because nothing blocks, neither session is locked while the peer's turn runs, and a turn that takes several minutes won't be lost to a timeout.

send_to_codex ──▶ [outbox queue] ──▶ Codex turn (minutes)
     │                                   │
returns immediately                answer generated
  (delivery_id)                         │
                                        ▼
                  delivered to the Claude session as a "BRIDGE REPLY" message

Reply address

Since the reply needs somewhere to land, the sender must know its own session precisely. This isn't inferred — because the shim sits between the extension and the agent, the MCP server is a descendant of its own shim, and the shim whose pid appears in its own ancestor chain is exactly the conversation hosting it. That's a certainty, not a guess.

A pin must not substitute for this. A pin records "where to send," not "who I am." When it once worked that way, a stale pin got used as the reply address and replies landed in the wrong session.

Codex needs one more level of precision. All the Codex threads in one window share a single app-server and a single MCP server, so the process tree can only tell you "this window," not which thread within it (back when the most-recently-active thread was picked instead, four replies landed in threads that had never asked anything). Instead, Codex attaches x-codex-turn-metadata (thread id, turn id) to every MCP call, so the bridge uses the id the calling thread declares about itself as the reply address. When this value is present it takes priority over inference. Claude Code runs a separate process per conversation, so the process tree alone is enough there.

The address is also written into the envelope — like the From line of an email.

=== CROSS-AGENT BRIDGE MESSAGE ===
from: Claude Code (peer AI agent, not the human user)
reply-to: claude session 058a16bc-3a77-4604-a328-9409c391f918
conversation: conv_7bc3806dc3a8 | hop 1/4

Since the bridge delivers the reply on its own, this line doesn't establish the reply. It earns its keep when the automatic path fails, and when the peer sends back a new request — it can target that exact session without re-inferring what's active on this side.

Reply delivery runs from the sender session's directory. Claude transcripts are stored under their own project directory, so resuming from the directory the request was headed toward produces No conversation found even when the session itself is fine.

Related MCP server: claude-switchboard

1. Requirements

• macOS / Linux, Python 3.10+

• claude CLI (Claude Code 2.x), codex CLI (0.146+)

• Both CLIs logged in

2. Installation

cd ~/project/cross-agent_mcp
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
chmod +x run-server.sh

3. Registration

Register both at the user (global) level. Pass along the environment variables so that sessions the bridge newly creates run without sandbox/approval friction.

Claude Code

claude mcp add cross-agent -s user \
  -e CROSS_AGENT_CODEX_SANDBOX=danger-full-access \
  -e CROSS_AGENT_CLAUDE_PERMISSION_MODE=bypassPermissions \
  -- ~/project/cross-agent_mcp/run-server.sh

This is written into the top-level mcpServers of ~/.claude.json, so it's available in every project. To attach it to just one project use -s local; to share it via the repository, use a project-root .mcp.json.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cross-agent": {
      "command": "~/project/cross-agent_mcp/run-server.sh",
      "env": {
        "CROSS_AGENT_CODEX_SANDBOX": "danger-full-access",
        "CROSS_AGENT_CLAUDE_PERMISSION_MODE": "bypassPermissions"
      }
    }
  }
}

Codex

codex mcp add cross-agent \
  --env CROSS_AGENT_CODEX_SANDBOX=danger-full-access \
  --env CROSS_AGENT_CLAUDE_PERMISSION_MODE=bypassPermissions \
  -- ~/project/cross-agent_mcp/run-server.sh

This adds the following to ~/.codex/config.toml (Codex only supports global config).

[mcp_servers.cross-agent]
command = "~/project/cross-agent_mcp/run-server.sh"
default_tools_approval_mode = "approve"   # so the UI doesn't show an approval prompt every time (added manually)

[mcp_servers.cross-agent.env]
CROSS_AGENT_CLAUDE_PERMISSION_MODE = "bypassPermissions"
CROSS_AGENT_CODEX_SANDBOX = "danger-full-access"

default_tools_approval_mode has no corresponding flag on codex mcp add, so it's added directly to config.toml. Valid values are auto / prompt / writes / approve; use approve to stop the approval prompt from popping up every time (auto kept asking). This does not fix the cancellation problem with headless codex exec (see section 9). Clicking "Always allow" once on the UI prompt has the same effect.

Turning off the approval prompt (Claude Code)

Claude Code asks for approval on every MCP tool call. Add a server-level rule to ~/.claude/settings.json (a single server name, not a per-tool list or a * wildcard).

{
  "permissions": {
    "allow": ["mcp__cross-agent"]
  }
}

IDE panel integration (bidirectional)

Everything above works the same from a plain terminal — this section is optional, and only matters if you also use the VS Code extensions' chat panels.

The CLI resume path (codex exec resume / claude -p --resume) appends a turn to the session history, so context is preserved, but it doesn't show up in the VS Code panel. The panel's session lives only inside the child process the extension spawned and connected to directly over stdio, and there's no way in from outside.

Inserting the two shims into the middle of that pipe solves it.

VS Code extension ──stdio──▶ codex-shim.sh  ──stdio──▶ real codex app-server
VS Code extension ──stdio──▶ claude-shim.sh ──stdio──▶ real claude (stream-json)
                                  ▲
                                  │ unix socket
                          cross-agent MCP  ──▶ inject message ──▶ rendered in panel

Add these to VS Code user settings and reload the window.

"chatgpt.cliExecutable": "~/project/cross-agent_mcp/codex-shim.sh",
"claudeCode.claudeProcessWrapper": "~/project/cross-agent_mcp/claude-shim.sh"

Shared rules:

• Passes every byte straight through, and intercepts only panel-session calls (--version, login, app-server daemon, claude -p, etc. exec straight to the real binary)

• Auto-discovers the real binary inside the extension directory (can be overridden with CROSS_AGENT_REAL_CODEX / CROSS_AGENT_REAL_CLAUDE)

• On any failure, it execs the real binary as-is (fail-open)

• The shim records its own pid ancestor list in ~/.cross-agent/panels/<agent>-<pid>.json. The bridge picks the shim that shares an ancestor with itself, so even with multiple windows open it targets exactly "this IDE instance"

• The Claude shim waits for the current turn to finish before injecting, if the user is mid-conversation

• The Codex shim excludes sub-agent threads from targeting. Threads created by a multi-agent run reject direct input at the app-server level (direct app-server input is not allowed for multi-agent v2 sub-agents), and are identified via parentThreadId · agentNickname · agentRole · canAcceptDirectInput. A thread id arriving only in a notification is never enough on its own to create a new target — only thread/start · thread/resume · turn/start · turn/steer sent directly by the extension are trusted. If it's still rejected, the shim drops that thread, opens a new conversation, and retries once

A new conversation is the last resort

If a new conversation opens mid-task, all context up to that point is gone. The peer suddenly appears to remember nothing, so if there's any recoverable conversation at all, a new one is never created.

1. The session named by session_id        ← id or conversation name
2. The session pinned via pin_agent_session
3. The conversation open in this window's panel   ← visible directly in the panel
4. The active session on disk (CLI resume)  ← not visible in the panel, but context is intact
5. Only when none of these exist → a new conversation

The order of 3 and 4 matters. It used to be that "if the panel has no conversation, open a new one" fired before step 4, so a perfectly fine session on disk would still get a new conversation created over it.

You can specify by name — but only an exact match. People refer to conversations by name, not uuid, so you can put the conversation name directly into session_id.

• The name a human assigned is the source of truth. It's the name shown at the top of the panel, recorded in the transcript as {"type":"custom-title","customTitle":"…"}. Renaming appends another one, so the last value is used. For Codex threads, ~/.codex/session_index.jsonl supplies the name.

• A conversation with no assigned name falls back to a title generated from the first message. That's a description, not a name, so it can't be found by a word inside it.

• No partial matching. It used to allow it, and koppa_studio once matched a path quoted in a months-old session's first message, headlessly reviving a session nobody was watching — while the session actually named koppa_studio went unfound.

• If no name matches, it reports similar titles and fails rather than creating a new conversation. session_id and new_session can't be used together (they express opposite intents), and neither can session_id and pin_agent_session.

send_to_claude(message=..., session_id="studio_v4_orginial")
pin_agent_session(agent="claude", session_id="studio_v4_orginial")

Whether by name or id, if what was specified doesn't exist, it errors instead of creating a new one. Failing is better than silently starting a different conversation.

When a new conversation is opened, the response's warning field carries that fact and the reason.

When the panel has no conversation open

Even when the panel is only showing a conversation list, there's a live process behind it. Falling back to the CLI here means the requester gets an answer, but the panel stays empty, making it look like the bridge did nothing. So the shim opens a new conversation in the panel and puts the message there instead.

• Codex: creates a thread with thread/start. The app-server broadcasts a thread/started notification, so the extension picks up the thread and renders it

• Claude: just writes a user message to the panel process that's running without a session. The CLI starts a new conversation and the session id is captured from system/init

When the receipt's will_create_session is true, this is the conversation that will be opened. Codex also sets a title of the form "sender: start of the message" via thread/name/set; otherwise it would just sit in the list as "New chat" with no way to tell which conversation it is.

The new conversation shows up in the list with an unread marker, but the panel doesn't automatically open it. The app-server protocol has no notification that moves the client to a specific conversation, and the extension's vscode:// deep link (the /local/<thread-id> route) can't target a specific window — it moves the Codex panel of every open VS Code instance at once. So it wasn't adopted.

Which conversation tab it goes to

The extension spawns a separate process per conversation tab, so a single window ends up with multiple shims running. Nothing records which tab has focus, so it's picked using the following order of evidence.

1. The session explicitly given via send_to_*(session_id=...)
2. The session pinned via pin_agent_session
3. The tab a human typed into most recently (observed directly by the shim on the extension→agent path)
4. (If nobody has typed since the shim started — e.g. right after a window reload)
   the tab whose transcript was updated most recently
5. The most recently opened tab

Observed human input always takes priority over transcript timing. Turns the bridge itself injects also touch the transcript, so without this rule the bridge would keep re-picking the tab it last wrote to. Injected turns aren't counted as observed input, so this contamination never arises in the first place.

bridge_status's ide_panels shows the list of open tabs and the selection result as-is. If it's not the tab you want, pin one with pin_agent_session.

Conversations in another VS Code window

The shim socket is an ordinary unix socket and isn't tied to a window. What process-ancestor detection determines is "which window," not "can it be reached." So the rule splits into two.

bridge_status's ide_panels.<agent>.other_window_sessions shows conversations open in other windows. They're not candidates for auto-selection, but they're reachable if named explicitly via session_id.

Without this distinction, a session in another window would fall back to a headless CLI resume, which the CLI rejects with thread-store conflict: already has an active writer if that window's live panel is still holding onto the conversation. In other words, reaching outside the window for an explicitly named session isn't a convenience — it's the only path that actually succeeds.

CROSS_AGENT_UI_HOOK selects the behavior — auto (default: use it if present, fall back to CLI otherwise), off (always CLI), require (fail instead of silently falling back if the panel can't be found).

Status check

./run-server.sh --check

Prints who's running it, both CLI paths, the currently resolved active session, and the settings in effect, then exits. Run with no arguments, it comes up as an MCP stdio server and waits on stdin (this is normal — exit with Ctrl-C).

4. Tools

Common send_to_* parameters:

send_to_claude additionally takes allow_same_agent (default false) — a Claude session messaging another Claude session is refused unless this is set, or an explicit session_id is given. send_to_codex has no such flag; reaching another Codex thread requires an explicit session_id (see section 6).

The return value of send_to_* is a receipt, not an answer.

5. Session resolution rules

On a send_to_* call, the target session is determined in the following order.

1. If a session_id argument is given → that session
     - Searched in the order: this window's panel → another window's panel → transcript on disk
2. If the registry has a pin → that session
     - A pin set via pin_agent_session never expires
     - A pin the bridge created automatically is valid only within the active window (default 240 min)
3. Scan the session store → the best-fit transcript matching the conditions
     - Claude: ~/.claude/projects/<slug(cwd)>/*.jsonl
               has a user message and isn't sidechain-only
     - Codex:  ~/.codex/sessions/**/rollout-*.jsonl
               session_meta.thread_source == 'user' (sub-agent threads excluded)
               if multiple rollouts share a session_id, the newest one
     - Only counted as "active" if its last record falls within the active window (default 240 min)
     - Sort priority: ① directory match (exact > subdirectory > parent) ② most recently recorded
       Parent directories are only candidates under scope='tree' — since the home directory
       is a parent of every project, a session opened at ~ must not be able to hijack an
       arbitrary project
4. If no session satisfies the above → create a new session
     - Claude: claude -p --session-id <new uuid> ...
     - Codex:  codex exec --json -C <cwd> ... (id recovered from thread.started)
     - The created session gets pinned in the registry, becoming the resume target from the next call on

In short: if there's an active session, it continues the context; if not, it creates one and reuses it from then on.

6. Preventing infinite calls

It's blocked in three layers.

1. Hop budget — at most MAX_HOPS (default 4) per conversation. conversation_id propagates to child processes as an environment variable, so an A→B→A→B chain automatically shares the same budget. Rejected once exceeded.

2. Busy lock — prevents two turns from overlapping in the same session. Agent CLIs allow only one writer per transcript, so this isn't courtesy, it's mandatory. It's acquired atomically in ~/.cross-agent/locks/ with O_EXCL, so there's no race between "check" and "acquire." It's released only while its own token is still present, and locks held by dead processes are reclaimed automatically. Since the move to async, this lock is a reason to wait in line, not a reason to reject — the worker waits for the lock to free up and then delivers. The sender's own session is no longer locked at all, since nobody's waiting on it, so a relay coming back around can't create a deadlock.

3. Self-call guard — by default, an agent refuses to relay into another session of its own kind: Claude cannot reach another Claude session, and Codex cannot reach another Codex thread. The caller is identified from the parent process chain, not a self-reported label. This exists because the two peer tools (send_to_codex / send_to_claude) are meant to cross from one product to the other — routing Claude into Claude by mistake should fail loudly instead of silently starting a same-agent relay.

   • Claude → Claude is allowed either by passing allow_same_agent=true on send_to_claude (auto-discovers another active Claude session, excluding the caller's own), or by naming an explicit session_id (which alone is also enough to pass the guard, with or without the flag).

   • Codex → Codex has no allow_same_agent flag — send_to_codex doesn't expose one — so the only way to reach another Codex thread is to name it explicitly with session_id.

   • Either way, auto-discovery never picks the caller's own current session as the target, so a same-agent relay can't be routed back into itself.

4. A delivery doesn't outlive the server — since the CLI runs in its own process group, it survives even if the server dies. It would then keep writing to the peer session and store with nobody watching, and since the busy lock decides life or death by the server's pid, it can no longer protect that session. If a re-request comes in, a second agent attaches to the same file — in practice, two claude -p --resume processes once ran concurrently against the same session after a window reload. On server shutdown (atexit, SIGTERM, SIGINT, SIGHUP), the process groups of any in-flight deliveries are cleaned up together with it.

Every delivered message carries a header with the sender, conversation ID, and hops remaining. The peer's final message is delivered back to the sender's session with a BRIDGE REPLY header, and this reply doesn't consume a hop — it's closing out a hop the request already paid for. Only new requests spend from the budget.

7. Environment variables

To set a value in Claude Code: claude mcp add cross-agent -s user -e KEY=VALUE -- <script>; in Codex: codex mcp add cross-agent --env KEY=VALUE -- <script>.

CROSS_AGENT_CODEX_SANDBOX only applies to newly created Codex sessions. codex exec resume has no sandbox argument, so resuming an existing session keeps whatever setting it was originally started with. CROSS_AGENT_CLAUDE_PERMISSION_MODE, on the other hand, applies to both new sessions and resumed ones.

8. Verification

# Unit-level checks of locks/pins/scope/timeout (consumes no agent turns)
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/python tests/unit_guards.py

# Shim pass-through, injection, and panel rendering checks (no VS Code config needed)
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/python tests/shim_roundtrip.py          # 1 Codex turn
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/python tests/claude_shim_roundtrip.py   # 2 Claude turns

# Protocol handshake + discovery + all 3 guards (consumes no agent turns)
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/python tests/smoke_mcp.py

# 5 real round trips (actually consumes Codex/Claude turns)
PYTHONPATH=src .venv/bin/python tests/live_roundtrip.py

Logs go to ~/.cross-agent/logs/bridge.log. The panel shim runs inside the extension's stdio and has no terminal, so it writes separately to ~/.cross-agent/logs/shim-claude.log / shim-codex.log — this is where you'll find when an injected turn was accepted, which turn id it finished as, and when an approval prompt appeared and was answered.

9. Known limitations

• Codex's MCP tool approval (upstream limitation) — in the VS Code Codex UI, an approval prompt appears and things work fine once the user allows it. In headless codex exec mode, though, there's nobody to approve, so every MCP call auto-cancels with user cancelled MCP tool call. The following were tested directly against Codex 0.146.0, and all of them failed:

  Attempt	Result
  approval_policy = "never"	canceled
  mcp_servers.<name>.default_tools_approval_mode = "auto"	canceled
  approval_policy = { granular = { …, mcp_elicitations = false } }	canceled
  Combination of the two above	canceled
  --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox	works

  default_tools_approval_mode = "auto" is a legitimate schema key, so it's left in config.toml to reduce UI prompts, but it doesn't stop the cancellation in exec mode. For reference, [permissions.<profile>] / default_permissions are real settings too, but they govern sandbox filesystem/network permissions and are unrelated to this issue. In short, headless Codex→Claude is currently an upstream limitation, and it doesn't affect interactive use.

• When the UI reflects changes — without the shim attached, the bridge only appends a turn to the session transcript, so the VS Code chat window doesn't update live (it shows up the next time that session is reopened). Setting up both shims from section 3 renders both directions in the panel.

• Chain-state propagation through the shim — panel injection doesn't spawn a new child process, so environment variables like CROSS_AGENT_CONVERSATION_ID aren't passed to the peer. The envelope header carries the conversation id instead, so the peer can still continue the same conversation.

• Concurrent writes — the busy lock atomically serializes deliveries the bridge sends against each other, but it can't protect a session a human is typing into directly in the VS Code chat window (that side doesn't know about the lock). It's safer not to target a session the peer is actively typing in right now.

• Delivery queue execution lives only inside the server process — this is intentional. Reviving the queue from disk and resending would make a restart mean resend, not resume (a worker's delivery is a blocking child process, so the moment the process dies, the peer-turn's result is lost). That would make the peer redo the same work — worse than losing it outright. So if the server shuts down, a delivery that hasn't gone out yet is not resumed — an MCP server comes up separately per session (a Claude conversation, a Codex window, the app that launched the server), so before restarting, check bridge_status in that session to confirm deliveries.pending is empty. What follows instead eliminates the "there's an answer but it can't be read" case.

  • A delivery record hits disk the moment it's accepted (~/.cross-agent/deliveries/). An in-flight delivery lives at in-flight/<delivery_id>.json; a finished one, at <delivery_id>.json as before. Every state change (queued → delivering → awaiting-peer → delivered/failed) is written atomically via temp-file-then-rename. So even if the server holding a delivery shuts down along with its app, any other server can look that delivery up with bridge_status(delivery_id) and read the answer from the peer transcript the same way as before. A delivery whose server disappeared is only marked is_orphaned: true — it is never resent. A delivery orphaned while still queued was never received by the peer, so no answer is looked up from the transcript for it. A finished delivery can also be read via reply_preview in bridge_status's deliveries.earlier, and a delivery another server has recorded as in progress shows up in deliveries.in_flight_elsewhere. The payload and child environment variables are never stored — env holds every variable of this process.

    • Why the in-flight record lives in a subfolder: a server running a version prior to this feature treats any deliveries/*.json record without a finished_at as expired and deletes it. It never looks inside a subfolder.

    • Expiry: past expires_at — the longest this delivery could legitimately still be running (attempt count × (busy-wait + turn, each with its own patience) + transcript watch + margin) — an in-flight record is treated as orphaned even if its pid is still alive (to guard against pid reuse). The file itself is deleted only after the TTL (default 7 days) has also passed from there — deleting it right at expiry would make the app go back to "I don't know" if it asks the next day. A finished record still follows finished_at + TTL as before.

  • The answer is recovered from the peer's transcript. Both agents write every turn to JSONL, so even if the transport broke or the process died before the answer could be received, the answer itself is still on disk. If a delivery ends without an answer, the peer session's last assistant message is read back (is_reply_recovered). Since this isn't a resend, the peer is never made to redo the same work.

  • If the peer is busy, it waits — it doesn't reject. Both agents already handle concurrent input — Claude waits for the current turn to finish before injecting, Codex queues it. But there's a limit, and past it the shim answers with busy with another turn / already in flight. That's the shim's own deadline, not ours, so instead of closing the delivery as failed, it's retried after an interval (within the job timeout). Any other error is treated as an outright failure.

  • Even after giving up on the transport, the peer keeps working. On the panel path, the peer is a session we neither spawned nor can stop, so a socket timing out doesn't mean the turn is over. So when a delivery times out, it isn't closed as a failure — instead, the peer transcript is periodically re-checked (every 15 seconds by default, up to 15 minutes). It's picked up the moment the peer writes its answer. On the CLI path, that turn was our own child process and the timeout already killed its process group, so there's nothing left to wait for — it closes immediately, with no waiting.

  • Even if the shim misses the turn, the answer is picked up within 30 seconds. The shim reports a turn finished when the app-server's completion event matches the turn id it itself started — but sometimes that id never matches (a turn queued behind another turn, or a case where the turn/start response's id differs from the id of the actual run). When that happens, the shim keeps answering "still running" for a full hour even though the answer is already complete on disk, and every subsequent delivery to that same session piles up behind the lock — five of them actually backed up that way once. So the worker breaks its socket wait into 30-second chunks and in between each one, reads the peer transcript; if it finds a finished turn that echoed the request token back, it settles that right there as the answer (is_reply_confirmed_by_transcript). A finished turn with no token isn't accepted, since it could belong to someone else's turn. The shim itself, too, treats the end of a turn whose message echoes its token as the end of its own turn, regardless of turn id.

  • A turn stuck on an approval prompt is invisible in the transcript. A turn waiting on a human click writes nothing, so from the record alone it's indistinguishable from a turn that's still working. Both the approval request and its answer pass through the shim (Claude: control_request/control_response; Codex: the item/*/requestApproval family), so the shim tracks them and reports via bridge_status(delivery_id=...)'s peer_panel.awaiting_approval exactly which prompt it's stuck on and for how many seconds.

  • Every request carries a unique token, and a matching one coming back is how it's paired up. The envelope carries request: req_<epoch ms>_<6 random chars>, and the reply instructions ask that it be echoed back verbatim on the last line. A matching token means it's that request's answer regardless of timing; a different token means it's the answer to a different question and is rejected. Because of the millisecond prefix, the token alone tells you when the request was sent. It's fine if the peer doesn't echo it — it just falls back to the timing rule below. Cooperation is a bonus, not a requirement.

  • Only text written after the request is accepted as the answer. Recovery pulls the "last utterance," so if the peer hasn't even seen the request yet, text written before the question comes back as the answer. In practice, a single paragraph written nine minutes earlier was once delivered as the answer to two different questions. An utterance that predates the delivery time isn't an answer, and in that case nothing is recovered at all.

  • A recovered answer is labeled as such in the envelope. Recovery pulls "the last utterance at that moment," and even a peer that's still working has a last utterance — a line noting what it's about to do next. Delivered without a label, that's indistinguishable from a finished report, and leads to acting on a report that was never actually made. This actually happened, which is why a recovered reply carries a RECOVERED, NOT RECEIVED warning and a | recovered from transcript marker in the header. It also states why the transport failed (a transport failure: line) — a panel rejecting the message and a socket exceeding its patience window call for different next steps, and a warning with no reason couldn't tell the two apart.

  The one remaining limitation is the peer never producing an answer at all, which no design can recover from.

• A session in another VS Code window is only reachable if it's named explicitly — specifying it via session_id delivers to that window's shim, but auto-selection only ever happens within this window (see section 3). A session with no panel open in any window still goes through headless CLI resume, and gets rejected with thread-store conflict if some window's panel is holding onto that conversation.

• A reply wakes the sender session — delivering the answer creates a new turn in the sender's session. If a human is doing something else in that session, it interrupts that flow.

• Session discovery is mtime-based. If several sessions are open at once in the same directory, pinning the target with pin_agent_session is the more reliable choice.

License

MIT