Decoy
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In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Decoylist the available decoy deployment and cluster inspection tools"
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Supradim AI Honeypot
Decoy — Evidence-first deception for autonomous AI agents
Observe · Attribute · Investigate
Website · Quick start · Architecture · Safety · 中文简介
Supradim AI Honeypot, codename Decoy, is an open-source Web/API/MCP deception and investigation platform for enterprise security teams. It exposes controlled synthetic assets, observes how automated clients interact with them, correlates behavior across surfaces, and produces an explainable Agent Investigation Package.
Decoy does not treat every bot as an AI agent. Its deterministic evidence engine separates ordinary browsers, crawlers, scanners, tool clients, and agent-like behavior—and preserves the raw events and counter-evidence behind every verdict.
This repository is an early-stage, single-node security research MVP. It is suitable for controlled labs, authorized testing, and evaluation—not as a drop-in replacement for production WAF, SIEM, or EDR controls.
Why Decoy?
Traditional honeypots and bot controls can tell you that something touched an asset. They often cannot explain whether the client:
discovered machine-readable instructions;
enumerated and called tools;
adapted after a structured error;
carried state from Web to API or MCP;
reused a unique credential or canary;
behaved like a scanner, a tool client, or a multi-step agent.
Decoy is built to answer those questions with an auditable timeline instead of a black-box label.
Related MCP server: datalox-gated-runtime
Core capabilities
Capability | What the current implementation does |
Multi-surface deception | Exposes synthetic Web, OpenAPI/REST, MCP, credential, Git, container, cloud-metadata, and internal-cluster surfaces. |
Signed canary correlation | Issues HMAC-signed, per-session markers and correlates valid propagation across entry points. |
MCP behavior observation | Records initialization, tool discovery, tool calls, argument shape, multi-tool sequences, and breadcrumb following. |
Adaptive behavior detection | Detects structured error recovery, cross-surface state, tool planning, scanner paths, and semantic tarpit navigation. |
Evidence-based classification | Produces E0–E4 verdicts using deterministic rules, evidence references, and explicit counter-evidence. |
Layered attribution | Keeps orchestration framework, agent harness, model/provider, and operator infrastructure as separate hypotheses. |
Investigation packages | Returns session metadata, verdicts, capabilities, objective, attribution candidates, evidence, counter-evidence, surfaces, and the raw behavior log. |
SOC workspace | Provides actor clusters, session telemetry, prompt/context captures, deception statistics, AI-assisted analysis, and a built-in capability guide. |
Local evidence store | Persists append-only events and derived session/actor views in SQLite with WAL enabled. |
How it works
flowchart LR
A[Browser / Scanner / AI Agent] --> B[Web & developer portal]
A --> C[REST / OpenAPI]
A --> D[MCP tools]
A --> E[Credential & infrastructure decoys]
B --> F[Signed canaries]
C --> F
D --> F
E --> F
B --> G[Append-only event store]
C --> G
D --> G
E --> G
F --> G
G --> H[Deterministic evidence engine]
H --> I[Agent Investigation Package]
I --> J[SOC console]Expose synthetic services and machine-readable breadcrumbs.
Observe requests, protocol events, timing, source context, and canary movement.
Correlate behavior across Web, API, MCP, and credential surfaces.
Assess automation and agentic behavior using deterministic rules.
Investigate original events, evidence, counter-evidence, and attribution candidates.
Evidence model
Decoy deliberately avoids claiming a specific agent, framework, or model from a single User-Agent string.
Level | Meaning | Typical evidence |
E0 — Unknown | Insufficient evidence of automation | Ordinary page access |
E1 — Claimed | Client declares a crawler-like identity | Self-reported client metadata |
E2 — Automated | Automation is established | Scanner paths, protocol/tool discovery |
E3 — Agent-like | Multi-step or adaptive behavior is observed | Multiple tools, semantic breadcrumb following |
E4 — Corroborated | Independent signals jointly support an agent conclusion | Valid cross-surface canary, OOB callback, instrumented context disclosure |
E5 — Controlled verified | Reserved for identity established in a controlled test | Not automatically emitted by the current wild-traffic engine |
Brand or family candidates remain low-confidence when based only on claimed client identity. The Investigation Package says so explicitly.
Deception surfaces
Web and developer portal
Realistic Northstar developer/deployment environment
Machine-readable discovery paths and signed session markers
Production-style status, headers, 403, and 404 behavior
REST and OpenAPI
Synthetic deployment metadata and runtime configuration
Structured validation errors that make adaptive recovery observable
Decoy service tokens and cluster breadcrumbs with no real privileges
MCP
Streamable HTTP-compatible JSON-RPC endpoint
initialize,tools/list, andtools/callflowsSynthetic deployment, runtime, cluster inspection, and audit-log tools
Argument validation, session correlation, and multi-tool evidence
Infrastructure and credential decoys
Synthetic
.env,.git, Docker Compose, and cloud metadata surfacesPer-session fake credentials and canary-bearing endpoints
Deterministic internal-cluster breadcrumbs with bounded asynchronous delay
An instrumented verification endpoint that records context voluntarily submitted by a client
All credentials, identities, hosts, repositories, and business data served by these surfaces are synthetic.
Quick start
Requirements
Python 3.11+
uv(recommended)
Run from source
git clone https://github.com/YOUR_ORG/agent-honeypot.git
cd agent-honeypot
uv sync --extra dev
export AGENT_HONEYPOT_SECRET="$(python -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))')"
export AGENT_HONEYPOT_SOC_KEY="replace-with-a-strong-admin-key"
uv run uvicorn agent_honeypot.app:app --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000Replace YOUR_ORG with the final GitHub organization or account before publishing.
Use .env.example as the configuration reference. The application reads environment variables directly; export them in your shell or inject them through your process manager.
Open:
Decoy developer surface: http://127.0.0.1:8000/developer
SOC console: http://127.0.0.1:8000/soc
SOC capability guide: http://127.0.0.1:8000/soc/readme
Health check: http://127.0.0.1:8000/health
The SOC endpoints require one of:
X-SOC-Key: <your key>
Authorization: Bearer <your key>
Authorization: ApiKey <your key>
HTTP Basic password: <your key>For local browser evaluation only, /soc?key=<your key> is supported. Avoid secrets in URLs in deployed environments because URLs may be retained in logs and browser history.
Install the command
uv tool install .
supradim-ai-honeypotThe packaged command starts the service on 127.0.0.1:8000.
The legacy agent-honeypot command remains available as a compatibility alias.
Configuration
Environment variable | Required | Default | Description |
| No |
| SQLite database path |
| Production: yes | Random per process | HMAC secret for session and canary signatures |
| Production: yes |
| SOC console and admin API credential |
| No |
| Signed session cookie name |
| HTTPS: yes |
| Adds the Secure flag to the session cookie |
| No |
| Maximum accepted request body size |
| No | unset | Enables AI actor analysis and SOC Copilot |
| No |
| OpenAI-compatible analysis endpoint |
| No |
| Model used for optional SOC assistance |
If AGENT_HONEYPOT_SECRET is not set, a new secret is generated at process start. That is convenient for local evaluation but invalidates signed sessions after every restart and is unsuitable for multi-instance deployment.
AI assistance is optional. Detection, correlation, evidence levels, and Investigation Packages do not require an LLM API key.
API examples
Initialize an MCP session
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/integrations/mcp \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "initialize",
"params": {
"protocolVersion": "2025-06-18",
"clientInfo": {"name": "authorized-lab-client", "version": "1.0"}
}
}'List observed sessions
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/sessions \
-H "X-SOC-Key: $AGENT_HONEYPOT_SOC_KEY"Retrieve an Investigation Package
curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/sessions/<session-id>/investigation-package" \
-H "X-SOC-Key: $AGENT_HONEYPOT_SOC_KEY"Example structure:
{
"schema_version": "0.1",
"verdict": {
"classification": "behavior-confirmed-agent",
"evidence_level": "E4",
"automation_confidence": 0.99,
"agentic_behavior_confidence": 0.99
},
"capability_profile": {},
"family_attribution": {
"orchestration_framework": [],
"agent_harness": [],
"model_provider": [],
"operator_infrastructure": []
},
"evidence": [],
"counter_evidence": [],
"behavior_log": []
}Architecture
src/agent_honeypot/
├── app.py FastAPI surfaces, MCP endpoint, SOC console, admin APIs
├── config.py Environment-backed runtime configuration
├── deception.py Synthetic infrastructure and credential generators
├── detection.py Deterministic evidence and classification engine
├── store.py SQLite event, session, actor, and prompt-context storage
└── tokens.py HMAC-signed canary and session tokens
tests/
├── test_honeypot.py Core correlation, auth, safety, and API tests
└── test_advanced_deception.py Deception surface and breadcrumb testsThe public lure intentionally disables FastAPI's generated /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json endpoints. A synthetic OpenAPI document is exposed at /developer/openapi.json as part of the decoy environment.
Testing
uv sync --extra dev
uv run pytestThe current suite covers:
browser versus scanner versus adaptive agent behavior;
signed canary correlation and forged-canary rejection;
MCP validation and type-confusion handling;
session hijacking resistance and request-size limits;
SOC authentication and capability documentation;
synthetic environment, Git, container, metadata, OOB, and tarpit surfaces;
delete and reset administration flows.
Safety boundary
Use Decoy only on systems you own or are explicitly authorized to test.
Decoy is designed to observe behavior inside defender-controlled infrastructure. It does not:
execute visitor-supplied commands;
fetch visitor-supplied URLs;
connect back to or exploit visitor systems;
grant access to real infrastructure;
expose real customer data or production credentials;
claim a specific model or vendor from a single spoofable signal.
Some deception responses intentionally resemble sensitive configuration. They contain synthetic values only. Review applicable privacy, monitoring, retention, and employee-notice requirements before deployment.
Production considerations
The current MVP is intentionally small. Before internet-facing or multi-tenant deployment, add or validate:
TLS termination and trusted-proxy IP handling;
secret management and key rotation;
rate limiting and resource quotas;
database retention, encryption, backup, and migration strategy;
SSO/RBAC instead of a shared SOC key;
CSRF protection for browser-based administrative actions;
centralized logs, metrics, alert delivery, and health monitoring;
an external durable event store for horizontal scaling;
legal and privacy review for captured request content.
Roadmap
Versioned Investigation Package schema
Pluggable fingerprint and evidence rules
SIEM/webhook export
PostgreSQL and multi-sensor correlation
SSO, RBAC, and tenant isolation
Deployment manifests and hardened reverse-proxy profile
Controlled family-fingerprint laboratory and collision tracking
Roadmap items are intentions, not shipped capabilities.
Contributing
Issues and focused pull requests are welcome. Good contributions include reproducible behavioral signals, false-positive cases, safe synthetic surfaces, schema interoperability, documentation, and deployment hardening.
Please keep the evidence model conservative: observations are facts; attribution is a hypothesis unless independently verified.
中文简介
Supradim AI Honeypot(产品代号 Decoy) 是面向企业 SOC 的开源 AI Agent 欺骗感知与调查平台。它通过部署完全合成的 Web、API、凭证和 MCP 诱饵,记录自动化客户端的多步行为,并将跨入口活动关联为可解释、可回放的证据链。
项目不会因为一个 User-Agent 就断言访问者属于某个 Agent 或模型。当前检测引擎使用确定性规则输出 E0–E4 证据等级,并同时保留原始事件、支持证据和反证。
适用场景包括授权安全研究、企业内部 Agent 暴露面评估、SOC 欺骗防御实验和 AI Agent 行为指纹研究。请勿将其用于未授权监控、攻击或反制。
License
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
Built by Supradim — AI-native cybersecurity across every digital dimension.
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