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Check MCP tool call

check_mcp_tool_call

Records a downstream MCP tool call decision and returns ALLOW, REVIEW, or BLOCK for an AI agent before it acts, without executing the tool.

Instructions

Records a decision for a downstream MCP tool call (POST /v1/gateway/mcp). Vulnify maps the tool name to an action by substring and returns the same recorded decision as decide_action, including an id. This writes a security event and an audit entry. The tool arguments are not executed. The finalDecision field is the authoritative result. A REVIEW or BLOCK finalDecision means the downstream tool was not allowed. This server cannot approve the review. An idempotencyKey makes a retry return the same event.

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
toolYesDownstream MCP tool name. Vulnify maps it to an action by substring. The tool is not executed.
agentNoAgent name. Use this or agentId. A registered MCP route can supply a default agent.
agentIdNoAgent id (UUID). Use this or agent.
contentNoOptional text scanned for sensitive data. Scanned in memory and not stored. This server does not log it.
routeIdNoRegistered MCP route. Supplies a default agent.
resourceNoResource name registered in Vulnify. Use this or resourceId.
argumentsNoTool arguments. Not executed by Vulnify.
resourceIdNoResource id (UUID). Use this or resource.
destinationNoWhere the data goes. Allowed values: INTERNAL, EXTERNAL_EMAIL, EXTERNAL_API.
idempotencyKeyNoRetries with the same key return the stored decision for 24 hours instead of recording another event.
recordsAffectedNoHow many records the tool call would touch. Optional. 0 to 100000000.

Output Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
idYesDecision id.
finalDecisionYesAuthoritative result. Allowed values: ALLOW, REVIEW, BLOCK.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.5

TDQS

A3.9/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations only carry the readOnly/destructive/idempotent/openWorld hints, and the description adds substantial context beyond them: it writes a security event and an audit entry, the tool arguments are never executed, finalDecision is the authoritative output, REVIEW/BLOCK means the downstream tool was denied, the review cannot be approved here, and idempotencyKey governs retry behavior. This is exactly the side-effect and outcome disclosure a security-gate tool needs.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the core action and delivered in short, information-dense sentences with no filler. It reads as a flat list of facts rather than organized prose, but each sentence carries distinct, useful information.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

An output schema exists, so return values need not be enumerated, and the description still flags the critical output field (finalDecision is authoritative) plus the meaning of REVIEW/BLOCK. For a write-bearing security gate with 11 parameters it covers the important behaviors, though it could be clearer about how a caller should act on an ALLOW versus a REVIEW outcome.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100%, so the schema already documents all 11 parameters (substring mapping, agent/agentId alternatives, content not stored, idempotencyKey 24h window, etc.). The description largely restates that material ('The tool arguments are not executed', the idempotencyKey behavior) rather than adding new parameter meaning, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Records a decision for a downstream MCP tool call') and pins it to an endpoint, so the agent knows exactly what operation it is. It names the sibling decide_action and explains the relationship ('returns the same recorded decision as decide_action'), which helps differentiate, though it never states plainly why one would pick this over decide_action.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Usage is implied rather than stated: the tool is scoped to downstream MCP tool calls that Vulnify maps by substring, which hints at the MCP-specific case versus the generic check_action/decide_action. There is one useful when-not signal ('This server cannot approve the review'), but no explicit 'use this instead of X when Y' routing guidance.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.