env-secret-exposure-analyzer-mcp
Server Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
No arguments | |||
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {
"listChanged": true
} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| scan_for_secretsA | Scan a project directory for hardcoded secrets, API keys, tokens, and passwords. Detects patterns like AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, private keys, and generic high-entropy strings. Returns file path, line number, severity, and a masked preview. |
| check_gitignore_coverageA | Check whether sensitive files (.env, .env.local, secrets.json, etc.) are properly covered by .gitignore rules. Flags files that contain secrets but could be accidentally committed. |
| scan_for_log_leaksA | Scan source files for console.log / logger calls that may print environment variables or secrets at runtime. Catches patterns like console.log(process.env.SECRET) or logger.info({ apiKey }) before they reach production logs. |
| scan_ci_workflowsA | Scans GitHub Actions (.github/workflows/.yml), CircleCI (.circleci/config.yml), and GitLab CI (.gitlab-ci.yml) workflow files for dangerous secret interpolation patterns. Detects ${{ secrets. }} and ${{ github.token }} used directly in run: steps (log_leak risk — GitHub Actions logs the expanded plaintext) and ${{ github.event.pull_request.* }} / issue / commit content interpolated in shell commands (injection risk — attacker-controlled input). Returns file, job, step, pattern_found, risk, and recommendation. |
| scan_git_historyA | Scan the git commit history of a repository for secrets that were ever committed, even if later deleted. Detects hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, and other credentials added in diff hunks across recent commits. Returns each finding with its commit hash, file, line, severity, a masked preview, entropy score, whether the secret is still present in the working tree, and whether rotation is required. Respects .gitleaksignore. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 5 tools
Each tool targets a distinctly different aspect of secret exposure: hardcoded secrets in files, .gitignore coverage, log statement leaks, CI workflow risky patterns, and git history. There is no overlap or ambiguity between them.
The verbs are mostly consistent (scan_for_* vs scan_* vs check_*), with scan_ as a common prefix. The inconsistent use of 'for' and the odd one out 'check_' create minor deviation, but the pattern is still recognizable.
Five tools is well-scoped for a secret exposure analyzer. Each tool covers a relevant and non-redundant aspect, and the number is appropriate for the domain.
The set covers the primary surface areas for secret exposure: current source code, gitignore protection, runtime log leakage, CI workflow secret handling, and historical git leaks. This provides comprehensive coverage for the stated purpose.