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vkmtx

veil-mcp

by vkmtx

veil-mcp

CI npm License: MIT Node MCP

A shell built for AI agents, not humans. veil is an MCP server that gives a coding agent (Claude Code, Cursor, …) a shell whose results come back as structured data — typed effects, one-call verification, addressable output, and a real undo — instead of a wall of scrollback text.

A normal terminal dumps everything and the agent re-greps fragile text, round-trips for state, and can't undo a mistake. veil turns each command into a quiet, structured result — and adds three things a plain shell simply can't.

quiet-by-default · effects-as-data · lazy detail · real safety net

Why it's good — in three numbers

You can approximate most of veil with Bash + truncation + careful prompting. The reason to actually adopt it is the three things a shell genuinely cannot do — each quantified, each reproducible with npm run metrics:

What you get

The number

✅ Verify in one call

expect: { exit: 0, file_exists: "dist/index.js" } folds run → check → grep into a single call; effects come back typed, so "what changed?" needs no git status.

55% fewer round-trips (11 → 5) — a scenario model over 5 hand-picked common tasks, not a live measurement

♻️ Checkpoint & roll back

sh_checkpoint / sh_restore wrap a risky refactor in an undo — a copy-on-write clone on APFS.

clone ~1.5× faster, ~0 MB vs a 60 MB rsync copy

🔒 Kernel sandbox

sandbox: true confines writes to cwd + temp (optionally no network) — and refuses to run rather than go unconfined.

5 / 5 escape attempts blocked (in-cwd write still lands)

And one honesty number — because quiet must never mean dishonest: a failure buried in the hidden middle of a long log is still surfaced, at 100% recall on a labeled corpus (SIGSEGV, CONFLICT, ! [rejected], timed out, …, none of which contain the word "error").

Everything else — quieter output, addressable detail, retry, blast-radius classification — is genuine convenience on top, not the moat.

Related MCP server: daimonos

Quickstart

No clone, no build — runs via npx:

claude mcp add veil -- npx -y veil-mcp
npx -y veil-mcp init     # adds the "prefer sh_run" nudge to this project's CLAUDE.md
// MCP server config for any MCP-speaking agent
{ "mcpServers": { "veil": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "veil-mcp"] } } }
# from source
git clone https://github.com/vkmtx/veil-mcp && cd veil-mcp
npm install                          # builds dist/ via the prepare script
claude mcp add veil -- node "$(pwd)/dist/index.js"
# dev, no build step:  npm run dev    (tsx src/index.ts)

npx -y github:vkmtx/veil-mcp runs straight from GitHub. veil init is idempotent and touches only CLAUDE.md — see Adoption.

The tools

Tool

What it does

sh_run

Run a command → quiet structured result: exit, duration, files changed, token-aware stdout/stderr. background: true starts a long-running process (dev server, --watch) and returns { id, pid, status: "running" } immediately instead of blocking. The workhorse.

sh_logs

Poll a background run's output — incremental, per-stream byte cursor (stdout_cursor/stderr_cursor), plus status/exit/signal. Never re-dumps what was already tailed. Omit id for the newest live run.

sh_kill

Stop a background run. Signals the whole process group; SIGTERM escalates to SIGKILL after 2s. Killing an already-exited id is idempotent. Omit id for the newest live run.

sh_detail

Pull the full stored output of a past run — no re-run. Disk-backed, so it survives a server restart. match=<regex> greps the stored stream for a value condensing hid. Omit id for the most recent run.

sh_checkpoint / sh_restore

Snapshot a directory and roll back. Owner-only (0700) storage, published atomically. Restore refuses a target dir different from where the checkpoint was taken. Omit label to auto-number the checkpoint / restore the newest.

sh_checkpoints

List checkpoint labels.

Every id/label is optional and defaults to the run or checkpoint you almost certainly mean; a wrong one answers with the values that are addressable. sh_run also accepts cmd as an alias for command. These are not conveniences — a 30-day audit of real agent sessions found argument shape, not execution, behind most failed calls.

See it

// build AND verify the artifact exists — one call, no follow-up ls
sh_run { "command": "npm run build", "expect": { "exit": 0, "file_exists": "dist/index.js" } }

// confine a risky script to cwd, deny network, block reads of secret dirs
sh_run { "command": "./untrusted.sh", "sandbox": { "network": false, "protect_secrets": true } }

// dry-run in a CoW clone — see the cwd-relative diff, real cwd untouched
sh_run { "command": "rm -rf build && npm run generate", "preview": true }

// start a dev server detached, tail its output incrementally, stop it when done
sh_run  { "command": "npm run dev", "background": true }         // → { id: "cmd12", pid, status: "running" }
sh_logs { "id": "cmd12", "stdout_cursor": 0 }                     // poll again with the returned cursor for only NEW output
sh_kill { }                                                       // no id = the newest live run → { status: "terminating" }

// undo a refactor — label optional both ways (auto-N, then newest-first)
sh_checkpoint { "label": "pre-refactor" }
sh_restore   { "label": "pre-refactor" }

// find a value a condensed 50k-line log hid — no re-run, no full dump
sh_detail { "id": "cmd9", "selector": "stdout", "match": "ERROR|version=" }

Option

Effect

command

The shell command (required).

cwd

Working directory (defaults to the server's cwd).

full

Return uncondensed stdout/stderr inline (escape hatch from condensing).

timeout_ms

Per-command timeout (default 120s). On expiry the whole process group is killed (SIGTERM→SIGKILL), so a compound command's grandchildren (sleep 5; …) are reaped too.

expect

Post-conditions verified in the same call: exit, stdout_contains, stdout_matches, stderr_empty, file_exists, file_absent, changed, max_ms. Failures surface in assert_ok + assertions_failed — no second ls/grep/git status.

retries / retry_on_exit / backoff_ms

Declarative retry; attempts is reported when > 1.

sandbox

Real OS sandbox. true confines file writes to cwd + temp; { network: false } also denies network; { writable: [...] } adds roots. { protect_secrets: true } or { deny_read: [...] } also blocks reads of configured secret dirs (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, …) — macOS deny file-read*, Linux --tmpfs mask; sets secrets_protected: <n>. Scoped: it blocks the listed paths, not a proof against all exfiltration. Refuses to run if unavailable — never executes unconfined. Sets sandboxed: true.

preview

Dry-run in a disposable CoW clone of cwd — the command runs inside the clone, you get the cwd-relative files_changed, and the real cwd is never touched (nothing is promoted). Honest scope: absolute-path / parent-dir / network effects are not captured and may happen for real — this is not a sandbox (combine with sandbox:true for containment). Refuses if the cwd can't be cloned. Sets preview: true + preview_warning; a diff too large to buffer reports preview_effects_incomplete rather than silently claiming nothing changed.

trace

Structured FS/syscall trace (Linux strace). Surfaces trace_summary (paths read/written + syscall count); full trace via sh_detail selector=trace. Best-effort: no tracer → command still runs, trace_unavailable: true. Bounded by VEIL_MAX_STREAM_BYTES; an overflowing trace sets trace_truncated: true.

scrub_env

Strip credential-shaped env vars (*_TOKEN/*_KEY/AWS_*/…) from the child's environment before spawn. Auto-on whenever sandbox.protect_secrets/deny_read is set. Reports secrets_env_scrubbed — a count, values are never echoed.

no_store

Keep this run memory-only: addressable via sh_detail for the session, but never written to disk. Sets stored: "memory-only".

background

Start a long-running process (dev server, --watch) — returns immediately with { id, pid, status: "running" } instead of blocking until exit. Poll with sh_logs id=<id>, stop with sh_kill id=<id>. No stdin/TTY. Refused together with options that need completion (expect, preview, trace, retries, full, timeout_ms); still honors cwd/sandbox/scrub_env/no_store. Capped by VEIL_MAX_BG_PROCS (default 16); live children are reaped on server shutdown.

id, exit, ok, ms; then attempts, stdout_lines/stderr_lines (TRUE emitted counts), files_changed, timed_out, stdout_truncated/stderr_truncated, stdout_binary/stderr_binary, sandboxed, secrets_protected/secrets_unprotected, secrets_env_scrubbed, stored ("memory-only" under no_store), preview/ preview_method/preview_warning/preview_effects_incomplete, trace_summary/ trace_unavailable/trace_truncated, assert_ok/assertions_failed, advice, hint, and the condensed stdout/stderr. A background: true run instead returns id, pid, status: "running", and a hint pointing at sh_logs/sh_kill.

Env var

Default

Meaning

VEIL_INLINE_MAX_LINES

45

stdout shorter than this (lines) is returned whole

VEIL_HEAD_LINES

20

lines kept from the top when condensing

VEIL_TAIL_LINES

20

lines kept from the bottom when condensing

VEIL_MAX_LINE_CHARS

1000

max chars of any single inline line (longer → capped with a pointer)

VEIL_STDERR_INLINE_ON_FAIL

60

on failure, show up to this many stderr lines inline

VEIL_TIMEOUT_MS

120000

default per-command timeout (0 = none)

VEIL_MAX_STREAM_BYTES

5000000

max bytes stored per stream (older dropped)

VEIL_MAX_RECORDS

500

max addressable run records (oldest evicted)

VEIL_MAX_STORE_BYTES

268435456

total disk-store byte budget (256MB), on top of VEIL_MAX_RECORDS — oldest evicted by mtime

VEIL_STATE_DIR

auto

record store base ($XDG_STATE_HOME/veil~/.local/state/veil$TMPDIR/veil). none/off/memory/0 = memory-only

VEIL_RECORD_TTL_MS

86400000

persisted records older than this are pruned on boot (0 = keep)

VEIL_EFFECTS

true

compute the git effect-diff (set 0 to skip in huge repos)

VEIL_MAX_BG_PROCS

16

max concurrent live background: true processes

Output honesty

Condensing saves tokens, but it must never hide signal. So:

  • A failure buried mid-stream is surfaced — including crash idioms with no error/fail keyword (Segmentation fault, SIGSEGV, CONFLICT, ! [rejected], undefined reference, timed out). More distinct signals than fit inline? The marker reports the true total with a +N more note, never a silent cap. Best-effort, but measured: 100% recall on a labeled corpus (see below).

  • A byte-capped stream is labeled and never shows its tail as the head.

  • stdout_lines/stderr_lines are the true emitted count; binary output is base64-flagged, not mangled to mojibake.

  • advice never blocks — it nudges on the highest-signal issue (widen a sandbox denial, checkpoint before an unconfined destructive command, use raw Bash for an interactive tool).

Safety

sh_run runs arbitrary shell commands with your privileges, and exposes the server's full environment (secrets included) to them. It's a shell — run it in trusted contexts. Two opt-in layers harden the risky cases:

  • Kernel sandbox (sandbox: true) — the real boundary. Confines writes to cwd + temp via macOS sandbox-exec (Linux bubblewrap / Landlock, experimental), optionally denies network (Linux bwrap also masks /run//var/run, so a Docker/Podman socket isn't a bypass), blocks reads of secret dirs, and refuses to run rather than go unconfined. Honest scope: solid on macOS; Linux bwrap needs unprivileged user namespaces, which containers / Codespaces / Ubuntu 24.04+ often restrict — there veil falls back to a namespace-free Landlock backend (via landrun, kernel 5.13+) that write-confines where bwrap can't, and still reports unavailable (refusing) if neither works. The Landlock path is write-confine only: it refuses network-deny / secret-read-confine rather than fake them. The default non-sandboxed path works everywhere.

  • Guard hook (hooks/veil-guard.sh) — a routing nudge, not a security boundary. It steers verbose/dangerous Bash toward sh_run, but it is fail-open and VEIL_BYPASS-able and never stops a command from running. Real containment is the sandbox above.

A PreToolUse guard that hard-blocks only verbose (installs / builds / test runners — npm/pnpm/yarn/bun/deno/uv/pip/cargo/go/…, plus docker build/buildx/compose build) or dangerous (rm -rf, dd, mkfs, shred, find -delete, raw-device writes) Bash, steering it to sh_run. Commands sh_run can't help with are explicitly allowed through to raw Bash: long-running dev/watch/start servers (incl. bun run dev, docker compose up), backgrounded jobs (trailing &), process management (kill/pkill), and interactive/TTY tools (vim/less/top/tail -f). It is fail-open (any parse error → allow, so a bug can never block all Bash), with an escape hatch: prefix a command with VEIL_BYPASS=1 to force raw Bash.

It classifies what the shell will execute, not what the command string contains: heredoc bodies and quoted strings are stripped before matching (so a commit message mentioning "build", or grep -E '"(tsc|build)"' package.json, is not a build), and every tool name must sit at executable position — start of command, after an operator, or behind a runner like sudo/timeout/npx — so grep -rn "HttpApiGroup.make" src passes while npx vitest run still blocks. Deleting a regenerable build artifact (rm -rf .next|dist|build|out|coverage|.turbo|node_modules/.cache, relative or under an absolute project path) is not treated as dangerous, which keeps the dev-server restart idiom (pkill …; rm -rf .next; nohup next dev …) on the allow path; anything unresolvable — a glob, .., ~, $VAR, a root-level path, or one non-build target in the list — still blocks. Enable globally in ~/.claude/settings.json:

{ "hooks": { "PreToolUse": [
  { "matcher": "Bash",
    "hooks": [{ "type": "command",
      "command": "/bin/sh '/ABSOLUTE/PATH/veil-mcp/hooks/veil-guard.sh'" }] }
] } }

Takes effect on the next Claude Code restart. Remove the entry to disable.

Adoption

veil is opt-in and complements Bash — its value lands only when the agent actually reaches for sh_run, and an agent left to itself often defaults to raw Bash. Two levers close that gap: the nudge (veil init writes a short CLAUDE.md block — soft, zero-friction) and the guard hook (stronger, per-machine). There's no native integration yet, so one must be configured; or skip both and call sh_run directly.

Reproduce every number

Don't take the numbers on trust — no account, all local:

git clone https://github.com/vkmtx/veil-mcp && cd veil-mcp && npm install
npm test          # 429+ smoke assertions over a live stdio server (prints its tally; some platform-gated)
npm run metrics   # the value numbers below
npm run backtest  # byte-savings regression (bulk-condense ratio + per-command overhead floor)
npm run bench     # detailed 5-dimension benchmark (economy, latency, per-feature, condense, session)

Metric

Result

What it measures

Agent turns saved

55% fewer round-trips (11 → 5) — a scenario model, not a live measurement

MCP calls collapsed by expect + effects + retry across 5 hand-picked common tasks (bench/metrics-data.ts) — counts calls, not bytes, so it holds as context windows grow

Sandbox escapes blocked

5 / 5

adversarial outside-cwd / spawned-child / symlink / network writes denied by the kernel; a legitimate in-cwd write still lands (selective, not deny-all)

Signal recall

100% on 10 fixtures

buried failures surfaced from the elided middle, incl. non-keyword crash idioms

Checkpoint cost

clone ~1.5× faster, ~0 MB vs rsync 60 MB

CoW clone latency + disk vs the rsync mirror (macOS / same-volume APFS)

The deterministic rows (turns, recall) are asserted in the smoke suite from the same fixtures, so the published figures can't silently drift. Timing rows are machine-dependent. CI runs the whole suite on macOS and Linux (with bubblewrap + strace), so the Linux-only sandbox and trace paths are exercised too.

Feature

Status

I / J / H

token-aware output · addressable detail (sh_detail, match) · effect diff

✅ done

G / M

inline assertions (expect) · declarative retry/timeout

✅ done

B / K-lite

blast-radius classification (read-only → destructive) gating every sh_run

✅ done

C / C+

checkpoint / rollback · atomic CoW clone (same-volume APFS; cross-volume falls back to rsync, reported honestly)

✅ done

K

real sandbox (macOS sandbox-exec)

✅ done

J+

disk-backed record store (survives restart, TTL-pruned)

✅ done

K-read / P

secret read-confine (sandbox.protect_secrets) · dry-run preview (CoW clone, real cwd untouched)

✅ done

tool surface pruned to what agents actually call (sh_plan, sh_history removed in 0.8.0 — 0 calls across a 30-day audit of 3.5k real sessions)

✅ done

K+ / A

Linux sandbox (bubblewrap) · structured trace (strace)

🧪 experimental — validated on Linux CI

K++

namespace-free Linux sandbox (Landlock via landrun) — write-confine in containers/Codespaces where bwrap can't

🧪 experimental — arg-builder unit-tested

background / long-running processes (background: true, sh_logs, sh_kill) for dev servers / watchers

✅ done

streaming / PTY (interactive processes)

🔭 planned

See CHANGELOG.md for version history and ARCHITECTURE.md for the module/feature map. (Why an MCP server and not a shell fork? Most of the value is a presentation/orchestration layer that ships natively to how an LLM already consumes tools — in weeks, not a 200k-line C fork — and the kernel/FS bits, veil drives rather than reimplements.)

Community

Early project, good time to shape it:

License

MIT — see LICENSE.


v0.7.1 — experimental, single-author. Adds background/long-running processes (sh_logs / sh_kill), env-secret scrubbing (scrub_env), memory-only runs (no_store), and two correctness/security audit passes (CHANGELOG): 429+ smoke assertions + backtest + value metrics, green on macOS and Linux CI. Judge it by the reproducible suite above, not its age.

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