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opus-tplink-mcp
by vehoelite

opus-tplink-mcp

A complete, safety-first MCP server for TP-Link Archer routers (Wi-Fi 7 / BE series). 31 tools covering virtually everything the router's web UI can do. Every change goes through the same pipeline: dry run → review → apply → verify → journal → undo.

Designed and re-engineered by Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), with Fable 5.2 advising, for vehoelite. Grown from consigcody94/mcp-tplink-router (MIT).

Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or supported by TP-Link or Anthropic. "TP-Link" and "Archer" are trademarks of TP-Link. Use at your own risk: this software changes live network equipment.

Why this one

  • Everything, not just the basics. All 238 forms the web UI uses are catalogued and reachable. Every major feature also has a dedicated tool: WAN and IPv6, DoH/DoT, LAN, IPTV/VLAN, link aggregation, DHCP, IP-MAC binding, VPN server and client, routing, access control, parental controls, Wi-Fi (incl. WPS, MLO, OFDMA, guest), port forwarding, UPnP, DMZ, ALG, firewall, EasyMesh, USB sharing, DDNS, backup/restore, firmware, diagnostics and administration.

  • Safe by construction. Every write is a dry run first. Critical changes need a one-time confirm token. Everything is journaled with before/after state and can be undone. Writes are verified by re-reading the router, and a change the router silently ignores is reported as no_effect, not "success".

  • Field-tested. 84 write operations were exercised live across an Archer BE9300 (firmware 1.2.4) and an Archer BE4800 (older, encrypted firmware): change, verify, undo, verify restored. More than a dozen firmware quirks found that way are handled for you (see Firmware quirks). router_catalog marks every operation live, ui (from the web UI's code) or none.

  • Multi-router. Manage several routers from one server, including older firmware that uses the encrypted LuCI protocol (e.g. Archer BE4800 1.0.x).

Related MCP server: ax11000-mcp

Tools (31)

Area

Tool

Highlights

Overview

router_status

WAN/LAN, internet state, Wi-Fi, clients, CPU/memory, firmware

router_get / router_catalog / router_raw_read

Read any section or any of the 238 forms; per-operation risk tier and verification status

router_logs

System log with level/type/text/time filters (never touches the router's own log filter)

device_log

Everything about one MAC: lease, reservation, every log line mentioning it, parental-control sites and blocked attempts, access/VPN/IoT status, traffic. Plus a local per-device history beyond what the router keeps

Safety

router_journal / router_undo

Every change with before/after; undo with conflict detection

router_raw_write

Escape hatch, gated by the catalog's risk tiers

Internet

internet

Connection type (DHCP, static, PPPoE, L2TP, PPTP, DS-Lite, v6plus, OCN), IPv6 (all modes), lease renew/release, DNS-over-HTTPS / DNS-over-TLS, MAC clone, WAN flow control, live speed / dual-NAT

LAN

lan

LAN IPv4/IPv6, port speed, link aggregation (LACP), flow control, IPTV / VLAN, UDP proxy, NAT / hardware NAT boost, ALG

DHCP

dhcp_server_set / dhcp_reservation

Pool, lease, DNS; reservations with random-MAC detection

ip_mac_binding

ARP binding, bind current devices, conflict checks

Wi-Fi

wifi_set

Per-band and guest SSIDs, passwords, channels, power, guest access/isolation, smart connect

wifi_extra

WPS push button and PIN (returns the outcome and the paired MAC), Wi-Fi 7 MLO network, OFDMA/MU-MIMO, TWT, advanced radio settings, guest bandwidth/time limits, AFC

wifi_schedule

Wi-Fi off periods

Mesh

mesh

EasyMesh status, devices, topology, naming/placing units, client steering, satellite reboot/unlink

VPN

vpn_server / vpn_client

OpenVPN / PPTP / L2TP / WireGuard servers and accounts; VPN-client profiles and per-device routing

Routing

routing

Static routes and the live routing table

Security

access_control / parental_control

Allow/block lists; HomeShield profiles, sites, pause internet

Ports

port_forwarding / upnp

Virtual servers, port triggering, DMZ; UPnP and its mappings

Clients

clients

Rename devices, per-device speed limits, IoT network isolation, game accelerator

USB

usb

Drives and partitions (scan, browse, share/hide a partition, eject), Samba/FTP/SFTP sharing, media server, Time Machine, USB 4G modem

DDNS

ddns

TP-Link DDNS, No-IP, DynDNS

Maintenance

maintenance

Config backup and restore, firmware (online, image upload, mesh satellites), ping / traceroute, operation mode, reboot schedule

Admin

admin

Admin password (RSA-encrypted like the web UI), remote management, HTTPS, local-management list, recovery e-mail, user permissions

System

system

SPI firewall / ping replies, LEDs, eco mode, time/NTP/DST, auto-update, QoS, device priority, reboot

Read tools are annotated readOnlyHint; write tools are annotated destructiveHint.

How it talks to the router

  • Login: tplinkrouterc6u.TplinkRouterV1_11(...).authorize() (RSA login), or the encrypted TplinkRouter for older firmware.

  • Requests: our own application/x-www-form-urlencoded POST to /cgi-bin/luci/;stok=<stok>/admin/<module>?form=<form>, the same requests the web UI sends. The URL carries only ?form=; operation and every field go in the body. Multipart is used for backup, restore and firmware images.

  • One session per tool call: the router allows one admin login, so each call logs in and always logs out. If the web UI or the Tether app is logged in, log it out. (WPS pairing is the one exception: it stays logged in until pairing ends, because logging out cancels WPS.)

  • Retries: a failed login, or an ambiguous error while reading or planning, is retried once. A write is never resent. If a write times out or the connection drops, the server logs in again, re-reads, and reports whether the change was applied.

Safety model

Tier

Examples

To apply

read

every read, ping/traceroute, config backup

nothing

normal

add a reservation, block a phone, change an SSID, WPS push

apply=true

critical

LAN IP, any WAN form, DHCP off, radio off, region, white-list access control, blocking this machine, VPN-client changes, admin / remote management, firmware, restore, reboot, operation mode, firewall off

apply=true and the confirm_token from the dry run

forbidden

factory reset, quick setup, cloud bind/unbind, debug shell

router_raw_write only, with TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN=1 in the server environment, plus a confirm token

  • Dry run by default. Without apply=true a write tool returns the plan, a field-level diff, warnings, the risk tier and (for critical changes) a confirm_token. It sends nothing.

  • Confirm tokens are an HMAC over the exact requests, which embed the values being replaced. A token is valid for 5 minutes and is refused if the router changed since the dry run. Uploads are bound to the file's SHA-256.

  • Forms are read-merge-written, sending the field allowlist from the web UI's own code for that form, or only the changed fields where the UI does that.

  • Table rows are changed one at a time: re-load the table, find the row by its key, check it is unchanged, then send the request with the fresh index.

  • Collateral check: after every remove or update, the whole table is compared before and after. If any other row vanished or changed, the result is status: "collateral", the remaining steps are not sent, and router_undo can re-add the lost rows.

  • Verification: after a write the router is re-read, and the result is applied, a mismatch, or no_effect (accepted but ignored).

  • Validation: DHCP pools, reservations, bindings and routes are checked against the subnet, the router's own IP, leases and conflicts. A randomised/private MAC gets a warning.

  • Journal: ~/.local/state/mcp-tplink-router/journal.jsonl (directory 0700, file 0600). The full before state is fsynced before the first request; the exact fields sent (wire) and the result follow. The journal keeps secrets so undo can restore them.

  • Undo: router_undo id=... restores old values, removes inserts, re-adds removed rows and swaps updates back. It refuses if the router changed since, unless you pass force. Reboots, firmware and other one-way actions are not undoable.

  • Secrets (PSKs, passwords, private/preshared keys, PINs, tokens) are masked in every result, diff and error unless you pass reveal=true. Account passwords are read from files, never from tool arguments.

Configuration

python -m venv venv && venv/bin/pip install -e ".[dev]"
cp .env.example .env   # or pass the variables from your MCP client config

Variable

Default

Meaning

TPLINK_HOST

192.168.0.1

Router address (https://... if it redirects)

TPLINK_PASSWORD

The plain admin password

TPLINK_TIMEOUT

20

Per-request timeout (s)

TPLINK_JOURNAL_DIR

~/.local/state/mcp-tplink-router

Journal (also the default parent of backups and device logs)

TPLINK_BACKUP_DIR

<journal>/backups

Where maintenance action=backup saves config files (mode 600)

TPLINK_DEVICE_LOG_DIR

<journal>/device-logs

Per-MAC histories written by device_log action=record

TPLINK_PROTECTED_MACS

Comma-separated MACs whose VPN-client routing must not break silently (e.g. a filtered child's laptop). Changes affecting them are called out by name.

TPLINK_ALLOW_FORBIDDEN

unset

1 lets router_raw_write send forbidden-tier operations

MCP client entry (stdio):

{"command": "/path/to/venv/bin/mcp-tplink-router", "env": {"TPLINK_HOST": "192.168.0.1", "TPLINK_PASSWORD": "..."}}

Several routers

TPLINK_HOST/TPLINK_PASSWORD is router main. To add more:

TPLINK_ROUTERS=upstairs
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_HOST=https://192.168.1.1
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PASSWORD_FILE=/path/to/router2.pw
TPLINK_UPSTAIRS_PROTOCOL=encrypted   # older firmware (e.g. BE4800 1.0.x): encrypted LuCI
  • Every tool takes router (default main). router_status lists the configured routers.

  • Journal entries record the router, and router_undo always targets the router the change was made on.

  • Risk tiers are per router. VPN-client protection applies to main; on other routers, access-control mode/enable and parental internet pause are critical. Removing the last allowlisted device is critical on every router.

  • Forms another firmware lacks return no such callback, with a hint.

  • Multipart uploads/downloads (backup, restore, firmware) are implemented for the plain protocol.

A per-device log

device_log action=record mac=... appends only what is new since the last record: online/offline, router log lines, parental-control sites and blocked attempts. Run it on a timer for a continuous history that outlives the router's own (daily) data, then read it with action=history.

Firmware quirks handled

Found against a live BE9300 (fw 1.2.4); each one is encoded in the catalog or the tools:

  • WPS: option=connect starts push-button pairing; pbc/pin only poll the status. The router cancels WPS when the admin session logs out, so wps_push stays logged in and polls until a device pairs or the window closes. Status replies take ~18 s.

  • Guest Wi-Fi: only changed fields may be sent. A full write with blank passwd_cycle is refused.

  • DoH/DoT: server_list must be sent as a repeated server_list= field and included with every write ("no server found" otherwise). JSON wipes the list, and server_list[] is refused.

  • IPTV / link aggregation: port_settings must always be sent as JSON, or the router returns HTTP 500. Saving IPTV restarts the network for about 40 s.

  • OFDMA: on routers with the combined setting, the standalone switch is ignored. Use ofdma_mimo (all / ofdma_only / disabled).

  • IP-MAC binding: refused while the IP is DHCP-reserved for another MAC. The router drops custom names on bindings and reservations.

  • Speed limits are stored verbatim (on/off). WPS wait time is read-only.

  • LAN IPv6 address is recomputed by the router on every save.

  • MAC clone and WAN changes reconnect the WAN, and the ISP may assign a new public IP. Anything allowlisting your old IP (cloud firewalls, DNS-filter locations) will need updating.

  • Admin password fields are RSA-encrypted with per-field keys from the read. The server encrypts at send time, so the dry run's confirm token stays valid.

  • MLO network: selected_bands must be sent with every write. A write without it switched the MLO network off.

  • User-permission switches are accepted but ignored for a normal admin login (no_effect).

  • Eco mode takes strong / medium / weak; DST and the 24-hour clock use dst_enable / hour24_enable.

  • USB sharing is saved as ONE request (server name + enable="on,off,off" for Samba/FTP/FTP-internet); per-service saves are refused. The server name can't be written on its own.

  • Fields the router keeps when blanked (the DMZ address, the custom WAN MAC) don't count as a failed restore.

  • TP-Link DDNS has no refresh operation (it updates itself).

Known limitations

  • mesh action=pair is disabled. In testing, starting the satellite search and a WPS session in the same login locked a BE9300 up badly enough that a factory reset was needed. Pair satellites with the router's WPS button, wifi_extra action=wps_push, or the web UI.

  • maintenance action=operation_mode (router ↔ AP/repeater) is implemented but was not switched live. With the router connected straight to an ISP box, AP mode can leave it unreachable.

  • usb action=eject is accepted by the router, but in testing the partitions kept reading as mounted until the drive was unplugged, so treat it as "safe to unplug" only after checking.

  • Not yet exercised live (implemented from the web UI's code, covered by offline tests): firmware image upload and online update (no newer firmware was available), Time Machine, DDNS login, WPS client-PIN pairing, mesh satellite operations, adding WireGuard server accounts (the router refuses the format tried so far), parental-control profile edits and operation mode. Operations marked ui or none in router_catalog fall in this group.

Development

venv/bin/pytest -q      # offline: a fake router; any socket/requests use fails the test
venv/bin/ruff check .
  • docs/router/endpoints.txt lists every form the web UI references.

  • tests/fixtures/shapes.json holds live field shapes (no values) for the readable forms. The catalog's writable fields are checked against it.

License

MIT. See LICENSE.

Tool Schema Changelog

Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

Loading tool schema changelog…

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