zn-gate
OfficialServer Configuration
Describes the environment variables required to run the server.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| ZN_CLOUD | No | Set to 1 to let prompt analysis (analyze_prompt) also query the cloud classifier. Requires ZN_API_KEY. Default is off; by default nothing is sent. | off |
| ZN_STAGE | No | Cloud endpoint selection. | v30 |
| ZN_API_KEY | No | API key from usezn.com/dashboard, used for the optional cloud classifier. Has no effect without ZN_CLOUD=1. | |
| ZN_API_URL | No | Cloud endpoint selection. | v30 |
| ZN_LOCAL_ONLY | No | Set to true to force local-only operation, even when ZN_CLOUD=1 is set. |
Instructions
Guidance the server publishes about itself, which clients place ahead of the tool catalog so the model reads it before choosing anything.
This server publishes no instructions, or was last inspected before Glama recorded them.
Capabilities
Features and capabilities supported by this server
Protocol revision2025-11-25
| Capability | Details |
|---|---|
| tools | {} |
Tools
Functions exposed to the LLM to take actions
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| analyze_promptA | Analyze text, prompt, or agent messages for security threats (prompt injection, jailbreak, credential exfiltration, role hijacking). Runs locally; only if the user set ZN_CLOUD=1 and ZN_API_KEY is the text, with secrets redacted, also sent to the zn cloud gate. Returns threat assessment, confidence score, and matched rule. |
| check_tool_callA | Pre-flight safety inspection for tool invocations and arguments before execution. Always local: arguments never leave the machine. Defends against tool poisoning, argument injection, and unauthorized exfiltration attempts. |
| check_tool_resultA | Post-execution safety inspection for tool outputs and third-party content (web pages, git commits, database queries) before LLM context assimilation. Always local: content never leaves the machine. Returns the content with secrets redacted, or neutralized if an injection is detected. |
| zn_statusA | Get current zn-gate status: engine, rules version, and exactly what (if anything) leaves the machine. |
Prompts
Interactive templates invoked by user choice
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No prompts | |
Resources
Contextual data attached and managed by the client
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
No resources | |
TDQS
Scored across 4 tools
Each tool targets a distinct phase of the LLM pipeline: analyze_prompt handles user/agent input, check_tool_call inspects outbound tool invocations, check_tool_result inspects inbound tool outputs, and zn_status reports configuration. There is no meaningful overlap in purpose or timing, so an agent can select unambiguously.
All names use snake_case and are readable, with check_tool_call/check_tool_result forming a clean parallel pair. The minor deviations are analyze_prompt using a different verb and zn_status using no verb at all, but the convention is still largely predictable.
Four tools is exactly right for a security gate covering the three inspection checkpoints plus a status probe. Nothing is redundant and nothing feels padded or missing.
The surface covers the full lifecycle of a security gate: pre-prompt analysis, pre-execution tool call checking, post-execution result checking, and introspection via zn_status. No obvious operational gap remains for the stated domain.