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unstrike
by unstrike

analytics

Retrieve AttackForge security analytics: list failed test cases, top vulnerable assets by vulnerability count, or the most common vulnerabilities across projects.

Instructions

Query AttackForge analytics endpoints.

Actions: failed_testcases — GET /analytics/failed/testcases vulnerable_assets — GET /analytics/vulnerable/assets (top 100 by vuln count) common_vulns — GET /analytics/common/vulnerabilities (top 50 by count)

Input Schema

TableJSON Schema
NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
actionYes

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv0.1.0

TDQS

A3.6/5.0
Behavior3/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. It usefully discloses the HTTP verb (GET, implying read-only) and result caps for two actions ('top 100 by vuln count', 'top 50 by count'), which is real behavioral context beyond the schema. It omits auth requirements, pagination, and error behavior.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness5/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded purpose sentence followed by a tight action-to-endpoint mapping with inline parenthetical details. No filler text; every line carries information the agent needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness3/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, read-only analytics query tool with no output schema, the description covers action selection and rough result scope adequately. It still leaves response shape, authentication, and pagination unaddressed, which the absence of annotations and output schema means the description should ideally cover.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters4/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 0% and the single 'action' parameter has no enum, so the schema alone would leave the agent guessing valid values. The description compensates by enumerating exactly the three permitted action strings and what each returns.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb and resource ('Query AttackForge analytics endpoints') and enumerates the three sub-actions with their underlying routes, so the agent knows exactly what capabilities exist. It does not differentiate itself from siblings like reports or vulnerabilities, which also surface aggregate security data.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines3/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

The action list implies which query to pick based on the desired aggregate (failed testcases, vulnerable assets, common vulns), giving implicit usage guidance. However, there is no explicit when-to-use-the-tool guidance or exclusions versus siblings such as reports or vulnerabilities.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.