Blast Radius MCP
Provides tools for analyzing npm dependency trees, simulating package upgrades, and mapping security vulnerabilities to attack paths.
Click on "Install Server".
Wait a few minutes for the server to deploy. Once ready, it will show a "Started" state.
In the chat, type
@followed by the MCP server name and your instructions, e.g., "@Blast Radius MCPAnalyze the blast radius of lodash and show attack paths."
That's it! The server will respond to your query, and you can continue using it as needed.
Here is a step-by-step guide with screenshots.
Blast Radius MCP ๐๐
Blast Radius is an AI-powered Dependency Decision Engine & Visual Security OS built for the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It allows AI agents like Claude to natively reason about software supply chains, simulate upgrade impacts, trace vulnerability attack paths, and generate a 3D visualization of your project's dependency topology.
Why this exists
Most security scanners just tell you: โYou have a HIGH vulnerability in lodash.โ
Blast Radius tells your AI:
โThe vulnerability in lodash is 3 levels deep. It is reachable via your express entry point. If you try to upgrade zod to fix another issue, it will break your production build because of a peer-dependency mismatch in package-b.โ
Instead of a flat list of CVEs, Blast Radius treats your dependencies as a living graph that AI agents can query and manipulate.
Related MCP server: NOMIK
โก Core Capabilities
The MCP server exposes four powerful tools to Claude:
1. dependency_blast_radius
Calculates the exact "blast radius" if a package is removed or compromised, mapped out by depth.
Maps direct vs. transitive impact.
Helps the AI understand how deeply embedded a library is before suggesting a refactor.
2. dependency_upgrade_analysis
Simulates the impact of upgrading an npm package by evaluating precise semver constraints across the entire graph.
Example AI Query: "Can I safely upgrade zod to 4.0.0?"
{
"upgrade": { "package": "zod", "from": ["3.25.76"], "to": "4.0.0" },
"impact": {
"depth_1": [
{
"name": "blast-radius-mcp",
"status": "BREAK",
"reason": "requires ^3.22.4 (does not satisfy 4.0.0)"
},
{
"name": "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk",
"status": "SAFE",
"reason": "supports ^3.25 || ^4.0"
}
]
},
"summary": { "safe": 1, "warning": 0, "break": 1 }
}3. security_audit_graph
Queries the live Open Source Vulnerability (OSV) database and runs a Reverse BFS traversal to map out Attack Paths.
Doesn't just find vulnerabilitiesโit traces exactly how an attacker reaches them from your root project.
Prioritizes risks using a bespoke
Severity / Reachability Depthalgorithm.
4. open_dependency_visualizer
A visual "Security Operating System." Returns a deep-link to an interactive 3D Galaxy Viewer served directly from the MCP process.
โญ Gold Stars: Root applications
๐ Blue Planets: Direct dependencies
๐ด Pulsing Supernovas: Vulnerable packages
โก Glowing Edges: Traced attack paths
๐๏ธ Architecture
Blast Radius MCP
|
โโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโโโโโโโโโ
| |
v v
MCP stdio Express Server
(Claude API) (localhost:3000)
| |
โโโโโโโโดโโโโโโโ v
| | React 3D Galaxy
Upgrade OSV (force-graph)
Engine Engine๐ Getting Started
1. Build the project
npm install
npm run build
cd ui
npm install
npm run build2. Configure Claude Desktop
Add the following to your claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"blast-radius": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["/absolute/path/to/blast-radius-mcp/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}3. Ask Claude!
Try asking Claude:
"Analyze the blast radius of
typescriptin this project.""Simulate an upgrade of
expressto version5.0.0. What breaks?""Run a security audit and show me the attack paths."
"Open the 3D visualizer and focus on the
lodashpackage."
๐ฎ Future Roadmap (Phase 3)
Because the Security Engine relies on the agnostic OSV Database, the core intelligence layer already supports Python (pip), Rust (cargo), and Go (go). Future updates will introduce lockfile parsers for these ecosystems, instantly granting them full upgrade simulation and 3D attack-path visualization capabilities.
Available Tools
4 toolsdependency_blast_radiusC
Analyzes dependency blast radius using reverse BFS.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| packageName | Yes | ||
| lockfilePath | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations provided, the description carries the full burden of behavioral disclosure. It hints at methodology ('reverse BFS') but does not mention whether the operation is read-only, required permissions, performance characteristics, or what the return format is. This is a significant gap for a tool with no annotation safety hints.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single concise sentence with no wasted words, which is good for front-loading. However, it is too terse for the tool's complexityโthere are two parameters and sibling tools that require differentiation. The brevity sacrifices necessary information, making it under-specified rather than appropriately concise.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The description is insufficiently complete. There are no annotations, no output schema, and both parameters are undocumented in the schema. The description only provides a high-level purpose and algorithm hint, leaving critical details like lockfilePath semantics, return values, and usage context unresolved for a non-trivial tool.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The schema has 2 parameters (packageName, lockfilePath) with 0% description coverage, and the tool description does not mention either parameter. It fails to explain what packageName or lockfilePath mean or how they should be used, forcing the agent to infer from the parameter names alone. This is a complete lack of parameter semantics.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description clearly states the tool's function: 'Analyzes dependency blast radius using reverse BFS.' The verb 'analyzes' and resource 'dependency blast radius' are specific, and the method 'reverse BFS' adds technical clarity. While it doesn't explicitly name sibling tools, the focus on blast radius distinguishes it from dependency_upgrade_analysis, security_audit_graph, and open_dependency_visualizer.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
The description offers no guidance on when to use this tool versus its siblings. It simply states what it does, leaving usage context implicit. There are no exclusions, prerequisites, or explicit alternatives mentioned.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
dependency_upgrade_analysisC
Simulates dependency upgrade impact.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| packageName | Yes | ||
| lockfilePath | No | ||
| targetVersion | Yes |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries the full burden. The verb 'simulates' hints at non-destructive analysis, but the description does not clarify whether any files are modified, what the output format is, or any side effects. Very little behavioral context is disclosed.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, concise sentence with no fluff or redundancy. It is front-loaded and efficient, though very brief. It earns a high score for conciseness because every word is meaningful, but it is under-specified overall.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
The tool has 3 parameters, no annotations, no output schema, and 0% schema description coverage. The description 'Simulates dependency upgrade impact' is far too minimal to be complete. It does not explain what 'impact' means, what inputs are required, what the tool returns, or how it behaves. An agent would struggle to invoke this correctly without additional context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, and the description provides no information about the parameters (packageName, lockfilePath, targetVersion). The description does not compensate for the lack of parameter documentation, leaving the agent to infer semantics from names alone.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description states a clear action ('simulates') and resource ('dependency upgrade impact'), which is specific enough to understand the core function. However, it does not explicitly distinguish this tool from sibling tools like dependency_blast_radius or security_audit_graph, so it lacks sibling differentiation.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No usage guidance is provided. The description does not mention when to use this tool, when not to use it, or alternatives. There is no context to help an agent decide between this and the sibling tools.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
open_dependency_visualizerD
Launches 3D dependency security galaxy.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| focus | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
No annotations are provided, so the description must disclose behavior. It only says 'launches' without indicating side effects, permissions, or the nature of the 'galaxy' (e.g., read-only visualization). There is no mention of what happens upon execution or what the user will see.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is extremely short (six words), but this is under-specification rather than effective conciseness. It does not front-load actionable information and instead uses a vague metaphor that obscures the tool's function.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
Given the tool's sibling tools are all security dependency analyses, this description is far too minimal. It does not explain what the 'galaxy' visualization represents, what the output is, or how the 'focus' parameter affects the result. With no annotations and no output schema, the description fails to provide a complete picture.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
The input schema has one optional 'focus' string parameter with no description and 0% schema description coverage. The description does not mention this parameter at all, so the agent cannot infer its purpose or acceptable values.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description 'Launches 3D dependency security galaxy' includes a verb and a metaphorical resource, but the resource is vague and unclear. It could imply a visualization, a game, or an analysis, and it does not distinguish the tool from siblings like dependency_blast_radius or security_audit_graph.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
There is no guidance on when to use this tool versus alternatives. The description contains no context, prerequisites, or exclusions, leaving the agent entirely without direction for selection.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
security_audit_graphC
Runs OSV vulnerability analysis and attack path mapping.
| Name | Required | Description | Default |
|---|---|---|---|
| lockfilePath | No |
TDQS
Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?
With no annotations, the description carries full responsibility for disclosing behavior. It only says 'Runs', which implies an action, but does not specify whether it is read-only, whether it modifies files, requires permissions, or produces side effects. This lack of detail is inadequate for a security tool.
Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.
Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?
The description is a single, concise sentence that front-loads the core action and resource. It is efficiently worded, though slightly vague terms like 'attack path mapping' could be elaborated without compromising conciseness.
Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.
Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?
For a tool with one parameter, no annotations, and no output schema, the description is too sparse. It does not explain what OSV analysis entails, expected outputs, prerequisites, or how it relates to sibling tools. An agent would struggle to invoke it correctly without additional context.
Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.
Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?
Schema description coverage is 0%, so the description must compensate, but it does not mention the 'lockfilePath' parameter at all. The parameter name is self-explanatory, but the description fails to explicitly connect it to the analysis, leaving the agent without added semantic meaning.
Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.
Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?
The description uses a specific verb ('Runs') and resource ('OSV vulnerability analysis and attack path mapping'), clearly distinguishing it from siblings like dependency_blast_radius or open_dependency_visualizer. The mention of OSV and attack path mapping makes the tool's focus unambiguous.
Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.
Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?
No guidance is provided on when to use this tool versus alternatives such as dependency_blast_radius or dependency_upgrade_analysis. The description merely states what it does, leaving the agent to infer appropriate usage context.
Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.
Tool Schema Changelog
Recent tool additions, removals, and schema changes observed during successful MCP inspections. Dates show when Glama detected each change.
4 tool updates
v1.0.0- First observed
dependency_blast_radius - First observed
dependency_upgrade_analysis - First observed
open_dependency_visualizer - First observed
security_audit_graph
TDQS
Each tool has a distinct focus: blast radius analysis, upgrade impact simulation, security auditing, and visualization. However, dependency_blast_radius and dependency_upgrade_analysis both deal with impact analysis, which could cause mild confusion without careful description reading.
All names use snake_case, but the pattern is inconsistent: three are noun phrases (dependency_blast_radius, dependency_upgrade_analysis, security_audit_graph) while one is a verb phrase (open_dependency_visualizer). The 'dependency' prefix is repeated, but the lack of a uniform verb_noun structure reduces predictability.
With only 4 tools, the server is tightly scoped to its stated purpose of dependency and security analysis. Each tool covers a distinct aspect, and the count feels appropriate rather than thin or bloated.
The server covers core analysis, upgrade simulation, security auditing, and visualization, which covers the main workflows for dependency blast radius. Minor gaps exist, such as missing a simple dependency graph listing or direct comparison tools, but these are not critical for the domain.
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