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TryClear MCP Server

TryClear MCP Server

Official
by trycleario

What TryClear's memory knows

lookup
Read-only

Check a link, web address, phone number, or e-mail against TryClear's scam memory to get block, ask-human, or no-warning guidance without visiting links.

Instructions

What TryClear's memory has seen of a link, a web address, a phone number or an e-mail address, in the pictures it has read: as an address in them, and for a number or an e-mail, as their sender. Nothing is read, and it never uses one of the account's reads. TryClear reads the picture it's given and never visits a link. block means memory has seen it in scams: don't act on it. ask_human means it's been seen near scams: stop and ask the person. No warning doesn't mean it's safe: memory only knows what it has seen. Give the person TryClear's answer plainly as TryClear's ("TryClear says this is a scam."), with its report link when it has one. Anything you add of your own, say it's yours. Show a bad web or e-mail address defanged, as the answer gives it (evil[.]coib8ce[.]net), never as a link.

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
valueYesThe link, web address, phone number or e-mail address, as written. A defanged link (hxxps://example[.]com) works too.

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. First observedv1.0.7

TDQS

A3.8/5.0
Behavior4/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

Annotations already declare readOnlyHint and openWorldHint, so the safety profile is covered. The description goes well beyond them by stating it never visits a link, uses none of the account's reads, and only 'knows what it has seen' — an important limitation that prevents over-trusting the answer. It also prescribes how to relay the result (attribute to TryClear, mark your own additions, defang bad addresses), but it never describes the result's actual fields beyond a vague 'report link'.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness3/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

The core behavioral facts (memory scope, block/ask_human semantics, attribution and defanging rules) all earn their place, but the delivery is a dense run-on of comma-spliced clauses with a convoluted opening sentence. The output-formatting instructions consume roughly half the text and could be compressed without losing meaning.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness4/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

For a one-parameter, read-only lookup with no output schema, the description supplies the behavior an agent needs: what memory covers, what each verdict means, and how to present the answer. The notable gap is that the returned payload is only hinted at ('its report link when it has one') rather than sketched, which matters because no output schema exists.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema description coverage is 100% and there is a single required parameter, so the schema already explains that the value is the link/address as written and that defanged forms like hxxps://example[.]com are accepted. The description repeats the accepted value types without adding syntax or format meaning beyond the schema. The baseline of 3 is appropriate when the schema does the heavy lifting.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose4/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

The description states the resource clearly: what TryClear's memory has seen of a link, web address, phone number, or e-mail, including whether it appeared as a sender in a read picture. That is distinguishable from the sibling picture-reading tools (find_picture, check_picture, read_picture). However, the verb is buried inside a long, meandering opening sentence rather than stated up front, which dulls the initial signal.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines4/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

It gives actionable conditional rules for acting on the result (block means don't act; ask_human means stop and ask the person) and clarifies that a missing warning is not a safety guarantee. The context in which to call it (checking an address's reputation without visiting the link) is strongly implied by 'never visits a link' and 'Nothing is read', but the description never explicitly contrasts this with the sibling tools or states a when-not condition.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.

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