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agent-network-access-probe

agent-network-access-probe

Probe

Public product: Trustabl Probe

Runs your agent tool in an isolated OpenShell sandbox, observes the network destinations it actually reaches, and generates a least-privilege OpenShell network_policies draft from that evidence — no hand-written allow list required. Static analysis also flags hardcoded credentials, missing timeouts, and other reliability issues, with AI-generated fixes for each, reviewed one by one. Your source code never leaves your environment.

Language support: Static analysis is supported for Python, Go, JavaScript/TypeScript, Ruby, and Shell. Sandbox execution is available for all languages.



How It Works

  1. Your tool is uploaded to a sandboxed OpenShell environment and executed

  2. Runtime evidence is collected — network destinations reached, denials, crashes, warnings, policy violations

  3. Static analysis scans your source for hardcoded credentials, unauthorized network calls, missing timeouts, and more

  4. You get back a least-privilege OpenShell policy YAML (unsigned draft) built from what the tool actually reached, findings from both passes, and a fixed version of the code for each issue found

Each session can also be attested: an optional signed manifest of the run, using Sigstore keyless signing — no private key to manage. In CI (e.g. GitHub Actions with permissions: id-token: write), it signs with your workflow's identity automatically. Run locally without that, and it falls back to an interactive browser login bound to your personal identity, recorded in Sigstore's public transparency log — pass --no-sign to skip signing entirely instead.

Cloud metadata endpoints and link-local addresses (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) are always excluded from the generated policy, regardless of what the tool actually reaches — pass --deny-list FILE to add your own hosts/IPs/CIDRs on top of that built-in set.

By default, everything a tool observably reaches (and isn't denied) goes into the draft. Pass --allow-list FILE to make that stricter: once supplied, an observed destination not on the list is flagged instead of auto-added — the allow list becomes the required source of truth, not just an addition to what was seen. --platform-allow-list FILE works the same way for platform must-reach endpoints (e.g. NIM, IdP) and tags matching entries source=platform in probe.profile.json.

If a tool's code contains a call shape with a real-world side effect — a network write, a subprocess call, a filesystem delete, destructive SQL — its sandbox execution is skipped by default (static analysis still runs and still reports on it) so a default run can never actually charge, delete, or modify anything. Pass --allow-write-tools to run it for real once you're ready, ideally alongside --env-fixtures FILE so the tool picks up staging/test-mode credentials instead of production ones.

Sandbox results are cached per tool under os.UserCacheDir()/trustabl-probe/results — keyed by the tool's source content and effective run config (base image, --sandbox-args, --env-fixtures content), not its filesystem path, so the same tool referenced by two different agent classes reuses one cache entry. probe.profile.json's cache_hit field reflects whether each tool's result came from the cache. Pass --no-cache to skip the cache entirely (neither read nor write) — always do this for release gates.

Related MCP server: Trustabl for Cursor

Requirements

  • A sandbox runner for --sandbox execution — pick one with --runner:

    • docker (default-friendly, no separate install beyond Docker itself) — Docker Desktop or Docker Engine, daemon running. No OpenShell required.

    • openshell (default --runner) — OpenShell installed, with openshell gateway start running. Also requires Python 3.8+ on the host machine, for dependency wheel downloads.

  • Access to an OpenAI-compatible LLM endpoint (OpenAI, Anthropic, Ollama, LiteLLM, LM Studio, etc.), only for generated fixes. Without --model, Probe still writes the policy, profile, findings and attestation.

Setup

1. Install a sandbox runner

Docker only (no OpenShell needed): install Docker Desktop or Docker Engine and make sure the daemon is running (docker info). Pass --runner docker to fix/watch — that's the whole setup.

OpenShell:

Download from build.nvidia.com/openshell, then:

openshell gateway start   # keep running in a separate terminal
openshell sandbox list    # verify CLI is on PATH

2. Configure an LLM (optional, only for generated fixes)

Local (Ollama):

brew install ollama       # macOS
ollama serve
ollama pull qwen2.5-coder:32b

Cloud: set OPENAI_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY — the endpoint is auto-detected from the model name.

3. Install autofix

macOS (Homebrew):

brew tap trustabl/autofix
brew install autofix

Windows (Scoop):

scoop bucket add trustabl https://github.com/trustabl/scoop-autofix
scoop install autofix

Linux / manual:

# Replace v0.1.0 with the latest version from https://github.com/trustabl/agent-network-access-probe/releases
curl -L https://github.com/trustabl/agent-network-access-probe/releases/download/v0.1.0/autofix_0.1.0_linux_amd64.tar.gz | tar xz
sudo mv autofix /usr/local/bin/
autofix version

Or use it from your coding agent (MCP)

Probe also runs as an MCP server, so a coding agent (Cursor, Claude Code, Claude Desktop) can check what Probe needs, install it, and scan a tool, then apply the fix hints itself. No model key is needed. See mcp/README.md.


Commands

fix — Generate a least-privilege policy from observed egress, and fix what's found

autofix fix --source ./my-tool
autofix fix --source ./my-tool --entrypoint tool.py --sandbox --model gpt-4o
autofix fix --source ./my-tool --existing-policy ./policy.yaml --model claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022

Flags:

Flag

Default

Description

--source

required

Path to the tool directory

--entrypoint

auto-detected

Entry point script(s) — can repeat for multi-file scanning

--model

—

Model name. Cloud: gpt-4o, claude-3-5-sonnet-20241022. Local: qwen2.5-coder:32b (recommended). Omit it to skip fix generation: the policy, profile, findings and attestation are still written, and --output json prints [].

--llm-url

auto-detected

OpenAI-compatible base URL. Auto-detected for gpt-* and claude-*. Required for all other models.

--api-key

env var

API key — defaults to OPENAI_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / LLM_API_KEY

--llm-timeout

5m

Per-request LLM timeout (increase for slow local models)

--sandbox

off

Run the tool in a sandbox for runtime findings

--runner

openshell

Sandbox runner: openshell or docker

--base-image

auto

Sandbox base image (default: auto-detected from entrypoint extension)

--sandbox-args

—

Arguments passed to the tool inside the sandbox. Value is a raw shell token — avoid shell metacharacters.

--existing-policy

—

Path to an existing OpenShell policy YAML to diff against the generated least-privilege policy

--deny-list

—

Path to a deny list file (one host/IP/CIDR per line, # comments) — evaluated on top of the built-in metadata/link-local deny

--allow-list

—

Path to a declared allow list file (one host/CIDR/*.suffix per line, # comments) — an observed destination not on this list is flagged, not auto-added to the draft

--platform-allow-list

—

Path to a platform allow list file (jail must-reach endpoints, e.g. NIM/IdP) — same format as --allow-list, tagged source=platform in probe.profile.json

--allow-write-tools

off

Allow sandbox execution of tools that appear to perform mutating/irreversible operations (default: skipped, static analysis only)

--env-fixtures

—

Path to a dotenv-style file (KEY=value per line, # comments) injected into the sandbox environment — lets a tool pick up staging credentials/endpoints instead of production ones

--no-cache

off

Skip the per-tool result cache entirely — neither read nor write it (use for release gates that must always execute for real)

--auto-accept

off

Accept all fixes without interactive review (useful for CI)

--no-sign

off

Skip Sigstore signing — no network call, no interactive browser flow, no public transparency log entry

--output

text

Output format: text or json

Output files (written to --source directory):

File

Description

network_policies.draft.yaml

Least-privilege OpenShell network policy (unsigned draft, built from observed egress)

probe.profile.json

Per-tool egress table, grant-set hash, and scan metadata (unsigned)

probe.findings.json

Every finding (title, severity, evidence, fix hint) with file attribution — always written, independent of whether interactive fix review ran

autofix-attestation.json

Optional signed behavioral manifest with source hash

autofix-session.json

Full session log (findings, diffs, accept/reject decisions)

autofix-session.patch

Unified diff of all accepted fixes


watch — Continuous improvement loop

Polls source files for changes. On every save, re-runs static analysis, rewrites network_policies.draft.yaml, probe.profile.json, probe.findings.json, and autofix-attestation.json, and prints a delta (score change, resolved/new findings, new source hash).

autofix watch --source ./my-tool
autofix watch --source ./my-tool --entrypoint tool.py --interval 1s

Flags:

Flag

Default

Description

--source

required

Path to the tool directory

--entrypoint

auto-detected

Entry point script(s) to watch

--interval

2s

Poll interval

--no-sign

off

Skip Sigstore signing — no network call, no interactive browser flow, no public transparency log entry

--deny-list

—

Path to a deny list file (one host/IP/CIDR per line, # comments) — evaluated on top of the built-in metadata/link-local deny

--allow-list

—

Path to a declared allow list file (one host/CIDR/*.suffix per line, # comments) — an observed destination not on this list is flagged, not auto-added to the draft

--platform-allow-list

—

Path to a platform allow list file (jail must-reach endpoints, e.g. NIM/IdP) — same format as --allow-list, tagged source=platform in probe.profile.json


verify — Verify an attestation and gate CI

Checks an attestation's content digest and Sigstore signature, then optionally fails (non-zero exit code) on a low score or critical findings. See docs/ci-gate.md for a full CI setup.

autofix verify ./autofix-attestation.json --min-score 70 --fail-on-critical
autofix verify ./autofix-attestation.json --require-signature --identity "https://github.com/acme-corp/.*"

Flags:

Flag

Default

Description

--min-score

0 (no gate)

Fail if production_readiness_score is below this value

--fail-on-critical

off

Fail if any critical findings are present

--require-signature

off

Fail if no valid Sigstore signature is present

--identity

—

Regex the signer's certificate SAN must match

--issuer

—

Regex the signer's OIDC issuer must match

--output

text

Output format: text or json


version — Print version

autofix version

license — Print license and copyright information

autofix license

License

Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE, or run autofix license to read it in the terminal.

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