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@true402.dev/mcp-server
by true402

address_risk

Same check and price as the address-safety tool, under the name buyers search for. Structural safety profile for ANY Base address — an EOA or an arbitrary contract — before an agent sends funds to it, approves it, or calls it.

Instructions

Same check and price as the address-safety tool, under the name buyers search for. Structural safety profile for ANY Base address — an EOA or an arbitrary contract — before an agent sends funds to it, approves it, or calls it. Returns contract-vs-EOA, ETH + USDC balance, tx-count (activity), and for contracts: whether it is a recognised ERC-20, ownership state, a mint() selector, and whether it is an EIP-1967 upgradeable proxy (its logic can be swapped after you trust it). Coarse risk band + flags. On-chain reads only — no API key. POST { address }. Unpaid: free while the caller's IP has free-trial calls left that day (a small daily allowance shared across the trial stalls, no wallet); otherwise returns 402. (PAID x402 service — USDC on Base; the MCP server needs a funded wallet to settle.) Price: $0.005 USD (fixed).

Tool call template

Replace each placeholder with a value matching the input schema. Only required parameters are included; add optional parameters as needed.

{
  "id": 1,
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "arguments": {
      "address": "<address>"
    },
    "name": "address_risk"
  }
}

Input Schema

NameRequiredDescriptionDefault
chainNoChain to check; only 'base' is supported (default)
addressYesAny address (0x…) on Base — an EOA or a contract

Schema Changelog

Changes observed during successful MCP inspections.

  1. Addedv1.3.0

TDQS

A4.6/5.0
Behavior5/5

Does the description disclose side effects, auth requirements, rate limits, or destructive behavior?

With no annotations, the description carries the full burden and does so: on-chain reads only, no API key, POST body shape, a fixed $0.005 price, and the 402 fallback once the shared daily IP allowance is exhausted. It even flags a real risk caveat (an EIP-1967 proxy's logic can be swapped after you trust it), which is behavioral context no schema field could convey.

Agents need to know what a tool does to the world before calling it. Descriptions should go beyond structured annotations to explain consequences.

Conciseness4/5

Is the description appropriately sized, front-loaded, and free of redundancy?

Front-loaded with the sibling relationship and the purpose, then the return fields, then payment terms — a sensible priority order. Some density in the payment parenthetical could be trimmed, but nearly every clause carries information an agent needs.

Shorter descriptions cost fewer tokens and are easier for agents to parse. Every sentence should earn its place.

Completeness5/5

Given the tool's complexity, does the description cover enough for an agent to succeed on first attempt?

No output schema exists, so the description enumerates the returned data itself (balances, activity, proxy status, risk band + flags), which is exactly what's needed. Payment semantics and the negative-result caveat round out a definition an agent can act on without further probing.

Complex tools with many parameters or behaviors need more documentation. Simple tools need less. This dimension scales expectations accordingly.

Parameters3/5

Does the description clarify parameter syntax, constraints, interactions, or defaults beyond what the schema provides?

Schema coverage is 100%, so `address` and the base-only `chain` are already documented in the schema. The description restates POST `{ address }` but adds no syntax or format detail beyond that, so the baseline 3 applies.

Input schemas describe structure but not intent. Descriptions should explain non-obvious parameter relationships and valid value ranges.

Purpose5/5

Does the description clearly state what the tool does and how it differs from similar tools?

States a specific verb+resource (structural safety profile for any Base address) with explicit scope: EOA or arbitrary contract, and enumerates the exact return fields (contract-vs-EOA, balances, tx-count, ERC-20 recognition, ownership, mint() selector, EIP-1967 proxy). It also explicitly positions itself against the `address-safety` sibling as a naming alias, so an agent can tell the two apart without opening either schema.

Agents choose between tools based on descriptions. A clear purpose with a specific verb and resource helps agents select the right tool.

Usage Guidelines5/5

Does the description explain when to use this tool, when not to, or what alternatives exist?

Names the precise trigger situations — before sending funds, approving, or calling the address — which is exactly the decision point an agent needs. It also discloses the cost/free-trial condition, which affects when the tool is worth invoking at all.

Agents often have multiple tools that could apply. Explicit usage guidance like "use X instead of Y when Z" prevents misuse.